Collins v. Seaboard Coastline R. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-8007,82-8007
• Citation: 681 F.2d 1333
• Parties: Martha COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEABOARD COASTLINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1333

681 F.2d 1333

Martha COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEABOARD COASTLINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 82-8007

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 2, 1982.

Roy D. Tritt, Charles C. Stebbins, III, Augusta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Thomas R. Burnside, Jr., James B. Wall, Augusta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before RONEY, KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

In this truck-train collision case, interlocutory appeal was granted to determine whether the district court, 516 F.Supp. 31, properly struck defendant's defense as to liability under the so-called offensive collateral estoppel doctrine. Plaintiff sued for loss of consortium by reason of injuries to her husband. The husband had previously obtained a personal injury judgment against the railroad. That judgment has been affirmed by this court, Collins v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 675 F.2d 1185 (11th Cir., 1982). On proper motion, the district court held that the railroad could not again litigate liability, even though the plaintiff had not been a party to the prior suit, so that the only issues the court would entertain concerned plaintiff's claim for damages. For reasons herein set forth, we vacate the district court order and remand for reconsideration under the proper standards.

The federal law is not fully developed in this regard. Offensive collateral estoppel is used by a plaintiff to prevent relitigation of issues previously lost against another plaintiff by a defendant, see Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 3007, 69 L.Ed.2d 389 (1981), in contrast to defensive collateral estoppel which prevents relitigation by a plaintiff of issues previously lost against another defendant. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). The leading case of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), holds that "the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied." 439 U.S. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 651. Thus the trial court's order here comes on for consideration under the abuse of discretion standard of review.

In reviewing an exercise of discretion under the abuse of discretion standard, it is important to examine the premises upon which that discretion was exercised. This differs from a decision of pure law. If a decision of law is correct, that the lower court incorrectly reasoned its way to that decision is irrelevant on appeal. If for any reason the decision was correct, it is due to be affirmed.

By very definition, however, an exercise of discretion could resolve the matter either way and still be affirmed, assuming the result is not beyond the permissible scope of discretion. A discretionary decision that falls within permitted bounds, but is based on false premises, raises the question on review as to whether the trial court would have come to the same conclusion using proper premises. That it could have does not satisfy the inquiry as to whether it would have reached the same result. The affirmance of a discretionary decision that is based on an improper view of the facts or the law merely reflects the appellate court's exercise of discretion that rightfully belongs to the trial court. The proper role of appellate review permits a remand for further proceedings when a discretionary decision has been made on false premises.

Such is the case here. The court reasoned that the "wait and see" attitude of the potential plaintiff and the "everything to gain and nothing to lose" posture of the plaintiff that concerned the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. United States, 439 U.S. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651, was not a problem here because the plaintiff would have been bound by an adverse judgment in the first action had the defendant prevailed. We agree with the appellant-defendant here that this reasoning would not support a decision not to inquire into whether the plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action and into the fairness to the defendant if the plaintiff was in fact following a "wait and see" course of action.

First, it is an open question in this Circuit, as it is in the Southern District of Georgia, as to whether the "minority rule" adopted in Jones v. Beasley, 476 F.Supp. 116 (M.D.Ga.1979), would be applicable in this case.

Second, there was nothing before the trial court to demonstrate that Jones and the principle that plaintiff would be barred by an adverse decision in her husband's suit played a part in her decision not to join her husband's suit.

Third, the husband sued in state court where the wife would clearly not have been barred from subsequent suit, even if her husband had lost his action in state court. Russ Transport, Inc. v. Jones, 104 Ga.App. 612, 122 S.E.2d 282 (1961); Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ga.App. 149, 6 S.E.2d 126 (1939). Everything indicates that the wife's decision not to join her husband's suit was made prior to removal of the suit to federal court. In fact, the initial trial brief of plaintiff on the collateral estoppel point argued the applicability of Georgia law. The trial brief particularly pointed out that the converse to the argued position was not true in Georgia. The brief argued:

That is to say, if the husband loses his case the wife is not thereby barred from prosecuting her loss of consortium action arising from the same facts on which the husband's claim was based. Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Company of Savannah, et al., 61 Ga.App. 149 (6 S.E.2d 126); Russ Transport, Inc. v. Jones, 104 Ga.App. 612 (122...