Collins v. Snow
| Citation | 218 Mass. 542,106 N.E. 148 |
| Parties | COLLINS v. SNOW et al. |
| Decision Date | 11 September 1914 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Michael J. Sughrue, of Boston, and Jas J. McCarthy, of Worcester, for appellants.
Chas F. Smith, of Boston, for appellee.
The plaintiff, who was a real estate broker, testified that he had a conversation with one of the defendant firm (who for convenience will be spoken of as the defendants), also brokers in real estate, in which (to quote his own words) he said:
The plaintiff further testified that he then disclosed to Snow that the owners of an estate then subject to an unexpired lease wanted to let it for 75 years on a ground rent of $70,000 a year. The defendants thereupon applied to the owners to be and were employed by them as their brokers, and succeeded in letting the estate, whereby they became entitled to a commission of $25,000. The defendants denied the contract testified to by the plaintiff, and this bill in equity was brought to reach and apply certain property of theirs in payment of the debt. The judge who tried the case believed the plaintiff and entered a decree in his favor. From this decree the defendants took an appeal; and the case is here on the evidence which was taken by a commissioner.
The first contention made by the defendants is that the arrangement testified to by the plaintiff is too indefinite to amount to a contract. In support of that contention they ask what the damages would have been if the defendants had refused to make any attempt to negotiate a lease. The fact that there could be no recovery (if there could be none) in that event is not of consequence. The promise sued on was to pay the plaintiff one-half of the commission earned. It is like a promise by a manufacturer to sell to the plaintiff all goods manufactured by him during a specified time.
The second contention is that when the arrangement testified to by the plaintiff and set forth above was made, it was expected that more definite terms would be agreed upon later on; that when the subsequent terms were agreed upon and the arrangement became a contract it was a contract which could not be performed within a year and so not enforceable by reason of the statute of frauds. Passing by the fact that the statute of frauds has not been pleaded the facts relied upon by the defendants in making this contention are these: When the owners employed the defendants they gave them a written option in which it was stipulated that the commission to be paid in case a lease was made would be $24,000. The commission was to be $25,000, and the owners had forborne to require a deposit of $1000 on giving the option. The $1000 thus paid to the defendants and repaid by them to the owners made the commission $25,000. In the written option it was stipulated that the $24,000 was to be paid as follows: $3000 on September 1, 1908; $3000 on October 1, 1908; $3000 on November 1, 1908; and the remaining $15,000 to be paid $5000 a year during each of the three years beginning August 1, 1909, August 1, 1910, and August 1, 1911. The written option was given on December 12, 1902. The lease negotiated by the defendants was dated November 15, 1904. If the arrangement between the defendants and the plaintiff became a contract either when the option was given or when the lease was negotiated, the contract was within statute of frauds.
In contending that the conversation testified to by the plaintiff and set forth above was a preliminary arrangement only and not a definite contract, the defendants rely on what...
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