Collins v. State, 54014
| Decision Date | 09 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 54014,No. 1,54014,1 |
| Citation | 450 S.W.2d 186 |
| Parties | Melvin COLLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
PEPER, MARTIN, JENSEN, MAICHEL & HETLAGE, St. Louis, for appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Richard L. Wieler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
HIGGINS, Commissioner.
Appeal from denial, after hearing, of motion to set aside and vacate two judgments of conviction of murder, first degree, and judgment of conviction of assault with intent to rob, imposed on pleas of guilty. Criminal Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R.
On May 22, 1967, Melvin Collins, with his court-appointed trial attorney, Orville Richardson, pleaded guilty to charges of murder, first degree, and one charge of assault with malice with intent to rob, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for life in the murder cases and ten years in the assault case. In this proceeding, instituted November 24, 1967, appellant contends his pleas were involuntary because they were entered out of fear that trial would result in a death penalty on account of adverse publicity, an alleged coerced confession, and improper line-up procedures which he thought could be used against him, and were induced by 16-months' inhuman confinement. The issues thus raised were aired at a hearing February 21, 1968, at which appellant had the services of appointed counsel, Richard Hetlage and John Roach, and after which the court found against appellant. As stated by appellant, the sole issue for review is whether appellant's pleas of guilty were shown to be 'involuntary, coerced or unfairly obtained.'
The burden of proving his ground for relief under Rule 27.26, supra, was on appellant and review is limited to determining whether the findings and judgment against appellant are clearly erroneous. Mitchell v. State, Mo., 447 S.W.2d 281, 283, 285; Crosswhite v. State, Mo., 426 S.W.2d 67, 70(1).
Evidence at the hearing was adduced from appellant, his previous lawyer, Orville Richardson, and by way of a transcript of proceedings when the guilty pleas were taken.
According to appellant, he was taken into custody between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m., January 1, 1966. He was not advised of his right to counsel and to remain silent. He wanted to call attorney Paul Simon 'but they wouldn't let me call him.' He was interrogated for two or three hours and then taken to Homer G. Phillips Hospital where he was shown to an injured codefendant who said he was not Al. While in the hospital hall, the victims' family recognized him. He was taken back to Central Station where interrogation resumed until 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. Interrogation was resumed the next day and recessed for lunch. Interrogation was conducted 'in a roughly manner' but he was never struck. Interrogations continued over 'maybe ten days,' and he signed a confession 'between the fourth and fifth day.' His brother, Donald Collins, also a codefendant, was said to be planning suicide. He was also taken to the store where the robbery attempt was made and was caused to walk the aisle with a rag and handkerchief in front of his face. He was in several line-ups alone and with others.
He characterized conditions in the city jail as poor, overcrowded, and with bad food. He was in the jail thirteen months, in the workhouse two months, and in Fulton State Hospital two months for mental examinations.
Mr. Richardson was appointed in April, 1966. He explained the nature of the charges against appellant and advised of the alternative of life or death penalty on the murder charges. Appellant understood that a motion to suppress evidence was overruled by Judge Aronson and his jury trial before Judge Bloom resulted in a mistrial April 27, 1967. He was identified at trial by one of the witnesses who saw him at the hospital. The confession was not introduced.
Following the mistrial, his brother, Donald Collins, entered his plea of guilty and newspaper publicity followed. A week or two later, appellant's case again came on for trial and a continuance on the ground of prejudicial publicity was refused.
He was advised of his right to plead guilty and 'they said if I pleaded guilty I wouldn't get the death chamber.' 'They' referred to Mr. Richardson and appellant's wife. He knew his right to a jury trial but figured he had no chance. He acknowledged Mr. Richardson's willingness to try the case. He believed his confession could be used at trial. At the hearing he was satisfied 'in a way' that Mr. Richardson did a competent job but felt after entry of his pleas that Mr. Richardson had failed 'all of my constitutional rights.' However, he wrote to Mr. Richardson before he left for the penitentiary to thank him for his services and to tell him he was satisfied.
The transcript of proceedings at the entry of the pleas before Judge Bloom established that Melvin Collins was 40 years of age, married, father of three children, possessed of eight grades of education, able to read and write, understood how his participation in the holdup in which two people were killed resulted in murder charges against him even though he did not do the actual shooting, understood that conviction of murder, first degree, by a jury would result in a penalty of either death or life imprisonment. A jury was then under summons and appellant understood he could have a jury trial. He understood the consequences of pleading guilty, and Judge Bloom explained: Appellant also acknowledged that he had discussed the consequences of pleading guilty with his wife and Mr. Richardson and that he was 'well satisfied' that Mr. Richardson had done everything possible that he would want him to do in defending his case. Judge Bloom asked further: The prosecuting attorney recommended the sentences ultimately imposed and Mr. Richardson made a statement in detail of his preparation by way of investigation and depositions through which he was aware of substantial evidence available to the state to support its charges and, upon this statement, appellant was asked further by Judge Bloom: Appellant was then permitted to withdraw his pleas of not guilty and to plead guilty to the three charges after which he was granted allocution and was sentenced. Upon allocution, appellant advanced no cause why he should not be sentenced, and Judge Bloom proceeded: ...
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... ... Collins v. State, 450 S.W.2d 186, 190(2, 3) (Mo.1970); State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441, 443(4), 445 (Mo.1969); Peterson v. State, 444 S.W.2d 673, 676(5, 6) ... ...
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...under Rule 27.26 has the burden of proving his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 27.26(f). Collins v. State, 450 S.W.2d 186, 187(1) (Mo.1970). The trial court has the right and duty to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and the scope of appellate review is ......
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...Mr. Hefley reasonably believed he was eligible for LTDP when he entered his guilty plea is a question of fact. See Collins v. State , 450 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Mo. 1970) (holding the defendant's state of mind when he entered his guilty plea is to be decided by the trier of fact); State v. Cook ,......
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