Collins v. the Town of Normal

• Decision Date: 22 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 4–10–0694.,4–10–0694.
• Citation: 951 N.E.2d 1285,351 Ill.Dec. 621
• Parties: Mary COLLINS, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.The TOWN OF NORMAL, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2011 IL App (4th) 100,694

951 N.E.2d 1285

351 Ill.Dec. 621

Mary COLLINS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.The TOWN OF NORMAL, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 4–10–0694.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

July 22, 2011.

Nile J. Williamson (argued), Peoria, for Mary Collins.Ellen K. Emery, Pedro Fregoso (argued), Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Bush, DiCianni & Krafthefer, Chicago, for Town of Normal.

OPINION

Justice COOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[351 Ill.Dec. 622] ¶ 1 On September 22, 2009, plaintiff, Mary Collins, filed a complaint against defendant, the Town of Normal, her former employer, alleging she was discharged in retaliation for the exercise of her rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (Workers' Compensation Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 through 30 (West 2008)). After several amended complaints, the Town filed a motion to dismiss under section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2008)), arguing that plaintiff's complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set out in section 8–101(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8–101(a) (West 2008)). On August 25, 2010, the trial court granted the Town's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that section 2–101(c) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2–101(c) (West 2008)) bars application of section 8–101(a) in this case. Section 13–205 of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes a five-year limitation period on “all civil actions not otherwise provided for.” 735 ILCS 5/13–205 (West 2008). The Town recognizes that section 13–205 applies here if section 8–101 does not apply. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 30, 2007, she sustained injuries in an accident related to her employment as a crime-scene technician/property manager. Plaintiff originally reported her work injuries to her supervisor on May 30 but was told not to fill out an incident report. On June 12, plaintiff requested her work partner mark her as “out sick.” On June 14, plaintiff reported her work injuries to the Town's human resource department and was instructed to make a doctor's appointment. On June 27, plaintiff was verbally counseled, pursuant to department regulations, for the “[u]se of sick leave procedure, fictitious illness or injury reports.”

[951 N.E.2d 1287 , 351 Ill.Dec. 623]

¶ 4 As a result of her injuries, plaintiff received benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. Plaintiff continued to work with weight restrictions. However, on December 14, she was informed her position would not be renewed, effective April 1.

¶ 5 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 6 A. Standard of Review

¶ 7 A trial court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2–619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(5) (West 2008)) for failure to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations is reviewed de novo. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill.2d 248, 254, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439, 443 (2004).

¶ 8 B. Applicability of the Tort Immunity Act

¶ 9 Section 8–101 contains broad language, but section 2–101 contains broad language in the opposite direction.

¶ 10 Section 8–101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8–101(a) (West 2008)) provides:

“(a) No civil action other than an action described in subsection (b) may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.”

¶ 11 Section 2–101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2–101 (West 2008)) provides:

“Nothing in this Act affects the right to obtain relief other than damages against a local public entity or public employee. Nothing in this Act affects the liability, if any, of a local public entity or public employee, based on:

a). Contract;

b). Operation as a common carrier; and this Act does not apply to any entity organized under or subject to the ‘Metropolitan Transit Authority Act’, approved April 12, 1945, as amended;

c). The ‘Workers' Compensation Act’, approved July 9, 1951, as heretofore or hereafter amended;

d). The ‘Workers' Occupational Diseases Act’, approved July 9, 1951, as heretofore or hereafter amended;

e). Section 1–4–7 of the ‘Illinois Municipal Code’, approved May 29, 1961, as heretofore or hereafter amended[;]

f). The ‘Illinois Uniform Conviction Information Act’, enacted by the 85th General Assembly, as heretofore or hereafter amended.”

¶ 12 The Tort Immunity Act does not provide broad overall immunity to local public entities. Rather it contains a number of very specific sections identifying where immunity exists. The Tort Immunity Act adopted the general principle from Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 20–22, 163 N.E.2d 89, 93–94 (1959), that local governmental units are liable in tort but limited the principle with an extensive list of immunities based on specific government functions. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill.2d 501, 506, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1990). At the opposite end, section 2–101 of the Tort Immunity Act specifies some situations where the Tort Immunity Act does not apply, where there clearly is no immunity. Because of the numerous exceptions to immunity set out in section 2–201, a wide variety of cases have addressed the relationship between sections 2–101 and 8–101. The common thread running through all those cases, however, has been that if an action fits within one of the enumerated exceptions in section 2–101, section 8–101 does not apply.

[951 N.E.2d 1288 , 351 Ill.Dec. 624]

¶ 13 A 1986 case applied the Tort Immunity Act's statute of limitations to a wrongful demolition action, despite the action's specific exclusion from tort immunity under section 2–101(e), reasoning that the word “liability” does not refer to the statute-of-limitations provision of the Tort Immunity Act because a statute of limitations is procedural and does not affect substantive rights. Hapeniewski v. City of Chicago Heights, 147 Ill.App.3d 528, 530–31, 100 Ill.Dec. 217, 497 N.E.2d 97, 98–99 (1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 806, 108 S.Ct. 53, 98 L.Ed.2d 17 (1987). That approach has been rejected. We “see no practical reason for distinguishing the effect of a notice provision from the effect of a statute of limitations provision. Both require a plaintiff to take some sort of action within a specified period and both affect plaintiff's cause of action if not followed.” (Emphasis added.) Slaughter v. Rock Island County Metropolitan Mass Transit District, 275 Ill.App.3d 873, 875–76, 212 Ill.Dec. 284, 656 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (1995).

¶ 14 Slaughter did apply the Tort Immunity Act one-year statute of limitations to the case before it, a common-carrier case, noting that additional language in section 2–101(b) specifically excluded the Metropolitan Transit Authority (CTA). “The legislature must have intended something different than exemption when it used the term ‘liability’ in reference to common carriers (other than the CTA).” Slaughter, 275 Ill.App.3d at 875, 212 Ill.Dec. 284, 656 N.E.2d at 1120; see also Cooper v. Bi–State Development Agency, 158 Ill.App.3d 19, 25–26, 110 Ill.Dec. 257, 510 N.E.2d 1288, 1292–93 (1987) (applying the one-year notice provision, now repealed).

¶ 15 Also in 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiff's right to bring a retaliatory-discharge action against a local public entity was protected by section 2–101. “The plaintiff's claim against the district is not an action exempt from the protection of the Tort Immunity Act. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 85, par. 2–101.” Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113 Ill.2d 545, 554, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1986). Boyles, 113 Ill.2d at 555, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d at 439, rejected the argument that a specific section of the Tort Immunity Act that barred liability for punitive damages, viewed as an important part of a retaliatory-discharge action, should be read to bar the action in its entirety. “Under our holding, only the damages available are restricted; the cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge remains unchanged.” Boyles, 113 Ill.2d at 556, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d at 439.

¶ 16 The complaint in Boyles, 113 Ill.2d at 547, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d at 435, alleged that plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act. A plaintiff employed a different theory in a later case, arguing his retaliatory-discharge claim and the elements of damages sounded in contract. Halleck v. County of Cook, 264 Ill.App.3d 887, 890, 202 Ill.Dec. 374, 637 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (1994). Contract actions are specifically excluded from the immunity protections of the Act, under section 2–101(a), but Halleck held that a retaliatory-discharge action is a tort action, not a contract action, and therefore the Tort Immunity Act's one-year statute of limitations applied. Halleck, 264 Ill.App.3d at 892, 202 Ill.Dec. 374, 637 N.E.2d at 1113–14. It is now clear that an action alleging discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim is an action based on the Workers' Compensation Act for purposes of section 2–101(c). “[U]nder established Illinois law, public entities possess no immunized discretion to discharge employees for exercising their workers' compensation rights.”

[351 Ill.Dec. 625 , 951 N.E.2d 1289]

Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill.2d 111, 119, 324 Ill.Dec. 446, 896 N.E.2d 232, 237 (2008) (citing section 2–201); see also Boyles, 113 Ill.2d at 551, 101 Ill.Dec. 847, 499 N.E.2d at 437 (“public policy embodied in the Workmen's Compensation Act”).

¶ 17 The leading case in this area is Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill.2d 248, 261, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439, 447 (2004), where the Illinois Supreme Court refused to...