Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove
Decision Date | 18 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 95181.,95181. |
Citation | 209 Ill.2d 248,282 Ill.Dec. 815,807 N.E.2d 439 |
Parties | RAINTREE HOMES, INC., et al., Appellees, v. The VILLAGE OF LONG GROVE, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John M. Mullen, Libertyville, for appellant.
Morrison & Morrison, P.C., Waukegan (Margaret Morrison Borcia, of counsel), for appellees.
Patrick A. Lucansky, Gerard E. Dempsey and Rinda Y. Allison, of Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae Village of Kildeer.
Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Erika Dunning, of counsel), for amicus curiae City of Chicago.
Roger Huebner, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.
Plaintiffs, Raintree Homes, Inc., and Raintree Builders, Inc., filed a one-count amended complaint against defendant, the Village of Long Grove (the Village), seeking a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a Village ordinance requiring the payment of impact fees to the Village to obtain building permits and a refund of those fees paid by plaintiffs. The circuit court of Lake County dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 8-101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2000)) did not apply to the present cause of action. 335 Ill.App.3d 317, 269 Ill.Dec. 301, 780 N.E.2d 773. The Village argues for reversal of the appellate court because: (1) the statute of limitation of the Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2002)) bars all but one of plaintiffs' claims, (2) plaintiffs lack standing to assert the sole claim that is not time-barred, and (3) the appellate court erred in remanding the matter to a different trial judge. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on March 26, 1998, and their amended complaint on July 14, 2000. The amended complaint alleged that plaintiffs entered into several contracts to build homes in the Village from February 1993 to August 1997. As a condition of these contracts, plaintiffs were required to apply for and obtain building permits from the Village and were required to pay all impact fees for the issuance of the building permits. From June 26, 1996, through February 1998, section 4-1-4(B) of the village code required the payment of impact fees, setting forth that "as a condition of the issuance of a building permit for the construction of a dwelling unit, the building permit applicant shall be required to donate monies to the Village." Long Grove Municipal Code § 4-1-4(B) (amended June 25, 1996). The impact fees, which totaled $7,300 for each building permit, were for the benefit of the school district and for the acquisition, maintenance, preservation, and operation of open space in the Village. Long Grove Municipal Code § 4-1-4(B) (amended June 25, 1996). Between June 26, 1996, and February 21, 1997, plaintiffs paid the required impact fees to obtain building permits for 11 lots. On February 20, 1998, plaintiffs applied for and obtained a twelfth permit for an additional lot, designated Lot 8.
The amended complaint sought a declaration that the required impact fees exceeded the Village's statutory and constitutional authority and a "refund" of all monies plaintiffs paid to the Village as impact fees. The Village filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2000)), asserting that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2000)).1 With respect to Lot 8, the Village alleged that plaintiffs had no standing to assert a claim for that lot because the lot owner, not plaintiffs, paid the impact fees.
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Act applied only to actions sounding in tort, and remanded the matter to a different judge. 335 Ill.App.3d at 321, 269 Ill.Dec. 301, 780 N.E.2d 773. The appellate court did not address the Village's argument regarding standing. See 335 Ill.App.3d at 321, 269 Ill.Dec. 301, 780 N.E.2d 773. We allowed the Village's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and also allowed the Village of Kildeer, the City of Chicago and the Illinois Municipal League to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the Village (155 Ill.2d R. 345).
The Village first requests this court to reverse the appellate court and uphold the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code. Under section 2-619(a)(5), a defendant is entitled to a dismissal if the "action was not commenced within the time limited by law." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2002). An appeal from a section 2-619 dismissal is similar to an appeal following a grant of summary judgment, and both are subject to de novo review. Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill.2d 16, 22, 262 Ill.Dec. 1, 764 N.E.2d 1118 (2002); Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 116, 189 Ill.Dec. 31, 619 N.E.2d 732 (1993). In both cases, the reviewing court must determine whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether the dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Carroll, 199 Ill.2d at 22,262 Ill.Dec. 1,764 N.E.2d 1118; Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc.,156 Ill.2d at 116-17,189 Ill.Dec. 31,619 N.E.2d 732.
The Village argues that section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act unambiguously provides that any "civil action" filed against a municipality, other than those actions specifically excluded by section 2-101 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 2002)), must be filed within one year from the date the cause of action accrues. As a civil action for damages, the Village asserts, plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the Act. Section 8-101 provides as follows:
745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 2000).
The enumerated exceptions to which the Village refers are listed in section 2-101, which provides:
If the Act were interpreted to apply only to torts, the Village argues, it would render section 2-101 meaningless, as there would be no need for that section to carve out exceptions to the Act for liability based on nontort actions such as contract actions.
Plaintiffs respond that the Village's argument mischaracterizes the relief they seek. Plaintiffs maintain that they request a declaration that the Village does not have the statutory authority to require plaintiffs to pay the impact fees, and they also seek a refund of those fees. The amended complaint does not seek "damages," and, as such, plaintiffs argue, their cause of action is excluded by the plain meaning of the Act. We agree with plaintiffs that section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act does not bar plaintiffs' cause of action.
In construing section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 503-04, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language without resort to other tools of statutory construction. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528. We must construe the statute so that each word, clause or sentence is givenreasonable meaning and not deemed superfluous or void. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill.2d 499, 505, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002).
Plaintiffs' claim is an action which seeks "relief other than damages," as set forth in the first sentence of section 2-101, and is, therefore, excluded from the Act. 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 2002); see also In re Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies of School District No. 205, 193 Ill.2d 490, 500-01, 250 Ill.Dec. 745, 739 N.E.2d 508 (2000) ( ). Plaintiffs request nothing more than a declaration that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Weitz Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.
...Court cases that recognize unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action, such as Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill.2d 248, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439, 445 (2004); Peddinghaus v. Peddinghaus, 295 Ill.App.3d 943, 230 Ill.Dec. 55, 692 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (1998); H......
-
Mayle v. Urban Realty Works, LLC
...court may affirm the dismissal if the record supports a proper ground for dismissal. See Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove , 209 Ill. 2d 248, 261, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439 (2004) (when reviewing a section 2-619 dismissal, we can affirm "on any basis present in the record......
-
Reid v. Unilever United States, Inc.
...tied to an underlying claim in tort, contract, or statute is unsettled in Illinois. Compare Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill.2d 248, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439, 445 (2004) ( “Here, plaintiffs have no substantive claim grounded in tort, contract, or statute; therefo......
-
Astellas U.S. Holding, Inc. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co.
...a distinction between the legal remedy of "damages" and the "restitution" of unjust gains. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove , 209 Ill.2d 248, 282 Ill.Dec. 815, 807 N.E.2d 439, 445 (2004) ("Damages differs from restitution in that damages is measured by the plaintiff's loss; resti......
-
Illinois Civil Practice Guide - 2022 Edition
...proof, the facts in the supporting affidavit are deemed admitted. 735 ILCS § 5/2-619(c); Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 262 (2004). A party responding to a Section 2-619 motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment can seek additional discovery by filing......
-
Table of Cases
...1995), §§24:160, 24:161 Rainey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 139 FRD 94 (WD La 1991), §24:81 Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Long Grove , 209 Ill2d 248, 807 NE2d 439, 282 Ill Dec 815 (2004), §3:471 Raintree Homes v. Village of Long Grove, 335 Ill App3d 317, 780 NE2d 773, 269 Ill Dec 301 (2nd ......
-
Statutes of Limitations
...would not apply. Restitution envisions a refund of money, not an award of damages. [See Raintree Homes, Inc. v. The Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill2d 248, 807 NE2d 439, 282 Ill Dec 815 (2004).] Similarly, the Act did not apply where plaintiff filed a declaratory action seeking a declaration th......
-
Statutes of Limitations
...would not apply. Restitution envisions a refund of money, not an award of damages. [See Raintree Homes, Inc. v. The Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill2d 248, 807 NE2d 439, 282 Ill Dec 815 (2004).] Similarly, the Act did not apply where plaintiff filed a declaratory action seeking a declaration th......
-
Statutes of Limitations
...would not apply. Restitution envisions a refund of money, not an award of damages. [See Raintree Homes, Inc. v. The Vill. of Long Grove, 209 Ill2d 248, 807 NE2d 439, 282 Ill Dec 815 (2004).] Similarly, the Act did not apply where plaintiff filed a declaratory action seeking a declaration th......