Colon v. Blades

• Decision Date: 22 January 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07-1380 (JAG).
• Citation: 570 F.Supp.2d 204
• Parties: William Anthony COLON, Plaintiff v. Ruben BLADES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

570 F.Supp.2d 204

William Anthony COLON, Plaintiff v. Ruben BLADES, Defendant.

Civil No. 07-1380 (JAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

January 22, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jose A. Hernandez-Mayoral, Hernandez Mayoral Law Office, Juan H. Saavedra-Castro, Juan H. Saavedra Castro Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Pamela D. Gonzalez-Robinson, Roberto Corretjer Piquer Law Office, San Juan, PR, Eugene F. Hestres-Velez, Bird, Bird & Hestres, Old San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Ruben Blade's ("Defendant") Motions to Dismiss. (Docket Nos. 12, 13). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 22, 2003, Plaintiff William Anthony Colon ("Plaintiff") and Defendant signed an Engagement Contract with DISSAR Production ("DISSAR") where both Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to perform at a musical concert, in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Said contract stated that the sum to be paid for Plaintiff and Defendant's performance would be $350,000. The $350,000 payment was to be split equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. The firm of Martinez, Morgalo & Associates, and its partners Arturo Martinez and Robert Morgalo (all three collectively referred to as "Martinez and Morgalo") were to handle the collection of the $350,000.

Plaintiff also contends that there was a separate agreement (the "Agreement") between him and Defendant in which Defendant agreed to be in charge of the business aspect of the concert, including collecting the $350,000 fee, and paying Plaintiff. According to the Agreement, Plaintiff would be in charge of the concert's production.

A few days prior to the concert, Defendant informed Plaintiff that Arturo Martinez had disappeared with the money to be paid to Plaintiff. On the concert date, Plaintiff informed Defendant that "under the circumstances he would not perform at the concert." As a result, Defendant allegedly told Plaintiff that he would be personally responsible for the full payment of Plaintiffs portion of the $350,000.¹ Plaintiff accepted Defendant's promise (the "promise") and performed at the concert. The aforementioned concert took place on May 3, 2003.

For his performance, Plaintiff only received a $60,000 advance payment. Plaintiff never received the remaining $115,000.² Consequently, on May 4, 2007, Plaintiff filed the present complaint alleging that Defendant breached the agreement between them. Plaintiff avers that Defendant failed to pay him the amount he is still owed for the concert he performed. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that even though the Engagement Contract stated that Martinez and Morgalo was to handle the collection of the $350,000,³ said firm acted only as agents of Defendant. According to Plaintiff, pursuant to the Agreement and the promise, Defendant is responsible for the payment of the $115,000 that remain outstanding. Thus, Plaintiff requests that this Court order Defendant to pay the $115,000 that are still owed. (Docket No. 1).

On October 22, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in which he alleged that Plaintiffs complaint is time barred. Specifically, Defendant avers that Plaintiff is requesting artist fees, which is governed by Article 1867 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5297. Defendant contends that pursuant to Article 1867,⁴ the case at bar is subject to a three year statute of limitations period.

According to Defendant, the three year period commenced on May 3, 2003, the date of the concert. Plaintiff filed its complaint on May 4, 2007, four years after the performance. Consequently, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs complaint is time barred.

Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Namely, Plaintiff alleges that its breach of contract claim has a fifteen year statute of limitation period. Alternatively, Plaintiff contends that if this Court were to find that his complaint was subject to a three year statute of limitations period, said period was tolled by several letters that were sent to Defendant requesting payment of the $115,000. (Docket No. 14).

On October 22, 2007, Defendant also filed another Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiffs failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Defendant contends that Martinez and Morgalo are necessary and indispensable parties to the lawsuit, and because their joinder would destroy diversity, this suit must be dismissed.⁵ (Docket No. 13). On November 2, 2007, Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff contends that Martinez and Morgalo's joinder would not defeat diversity jurisdiction because Arturo Martinez is currently incarcerated in Georgia, Roberto Morgalo is a resident of Reading Pennsylvania and the corporation Martinez, Morgalo and Associates, Inc., is a Delaware corporation that has been inactive for years.⁶ Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Martinez and Morgalo are not an indispensable party because they are co-obligors. As such, Plaintiff alleges that their joinder is not compulsory. (Docket No. 17).

On January 11, 2008, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiffs opposition. In said Motion, Defendant alleges that Martinez and Morgalo are necessary parties and, therefore, should be joined. Alternatively, Defendant contends that if this Court finds that joinder is not feasible because it would divest the Court of jurisdiction it should dismiss Plaintiffs complaint because Martinez and Morgalo are necessary and indispensable parties. (Docket No. 21).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard

In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95-96 (1st Cir.2007)(quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1967). While Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to "nudge [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. Accordingly, in order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965.

The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (quoting Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss Standard

"A Rule 12(b)(7) motion is one to dismiss for failure to join a party under Rule 19." Rojas v. Loewen Group Int'l, 178 F.R.D. 356, 361 (D.P.R.1998). Such a motion should be granted when there is an absent party without whom complete relief will not be possible in the case or whose interest in the controversy is such that to proceed without this party might prejudice it or the parties already present in the case. Id. at 360 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, "compulsory joinder or dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party should only be ordered where the movant has carried the burden of producing evidence which shows the nature of the interest possessed by the absentee and that the protection of that interest will be impaired by the absence." Cook Stratton & Co. v. Universal Ins. Group, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 411, 418 (D.P.R. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

A Court ruling on a 12(b)(7) motion may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Albahary v. City of Bristol, 963 F.Supp. 150, 156 n. 2 (D.Conn.1997). The movant has the burden of showing why the absent party should be joined. Sunrise Financial, Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1002, 1006 (D.Utah 1996). To meet this burden, the movant may submit affidavits or other relevant evidence. Sunrise Financial, 948 F.Supp. at 1006.

Discussion

Plaintiff makes several references to the existence of a separate agreement to that of the Engagement Contract. Plaintiff points to a business venture relationship with Defendant (the Agreement) in which Defendant was in charge of the business aspect of the concert, including collecting the $350,000 fee. (See Docket Nos. 1, 14). Furthermore, on the date of the concert Defendant allegedly promised Plaintiff that he would be personally responsible for paying the amount that Plaintiff was still owed. According to Plaintiff, the relationship between Defendant and Martinez and Morgalo is that of a co-obligor. They were both responsible of paying Plaintiff $175,000. (See Docket No. 17).

This Court recognizes that the Agreement and the promise if construed as a verbal contract could entail that there was a novation of the Engagement Contract. Nonetheless, at this stage of the proceedings we need not discuss this issue on the merits. This Opinion and Order will simply address Defendant's Motions to Dismiss. Since this Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true,...