Colon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 18 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-CV-4319 (MKB) |
| Parties | DONNA COLON dbn FRANTZ NOEL/Beneficiary-Decedent, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Donna Colon, proceeding pro se on behalf of the estate of Frantz Noel, [1]commenced the above-captioned action on July 26, 2019, seeking review of an award of widower's benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a letter seeking mandamus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) moves to dismiss the Complaint and Plaintiff's request for mandamus relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, and Plaintiff opposes the motion.[2]
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Commissioner's motion.
On July 21, 2016, Noel filed a claim with the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) for widower's insurance benefits.[3] (See Podraza Decl. ¶ 3(d); Appl. for Widower's Insurance Benefits, annexed to Podraza Decl. as Ex. 4, Docket Entry No. 13-3, at 15-21.)[4] On June 13, 2017 he received a Notice of Award from the SSA indicating that he was entitled to widower's benefits retroactive to January of 2016. (See Podraza Decl. ¶ 3(g); Notice of Award annexed to Podraza Decl. as Ex. 8, Docket Entry No. 13-3, at 36-38.) On July 6, 2017, Noel filed a Request for Reconsideration, challenging the SSA's determination that his benefits were retroactive only to January of 2016 (“July 2017 Request for Reconsideration”). (See July 2017 Request for Recons., annexed to Compl. as Ex. C-2, Docket Entry No. 1, at 29.) About five months later, on December 16, 2017, Noel died.
The SSA reviewed Noel's July 2017 Request for Reconsideration on February 22, 2018, but contends that it did not take action on the request at that time because there was no evidence of a substitute party.[5] On April 23, 2018, Noel's estate submitted documentation to the SSA indicating that the estate had appointed Plaintiff as its administrator on September 28, 2017, and that the Queen's County Surrogate Court had authorized Plaintiff to serve as the Voluntary Administrator for Noel's estate on December 20, 2017.[6] (Letter dated Apr. 23, 2018, annexed to Bowles Decl. as Ex. E, Docket Entry No. 13-4, at 16-21; see also Compl. ¶ 19.)
On April 15, 2019, about one year after the April 23, 2018 letter, Plaintiff visited an SSA office “to inquire about the status of the [April 23, 2018] letter and obtain any possible decision” regarding the July 2017 Request for Reconsideration. (See Compl. ¶ 20.) Following Plaintiff's visit, the SSA issued a non-appealable letter on May 1, 2019, advising Plaintiff why the SSA determined to award widower's insurance benefits retroactive only to January of 2016. (Podraza Decl. ¶ 3(i); Letter dated May 1, 2019, annexed to Podraza Decl. as Ex. 10, Docket Entry No. 13-3, at 42-43.)
On July 26, 2019, shortly after receiving this letter, Plaintiff commenced this action. (Compl.)
On December 7, 2019, following Plaintiff's filing of the Complaint, the SSA issued Plaintiff a Notice of Reconsideration regarding Noel's July 2017 Request for Reconsideration indicating that, after additional review, the SSA had concluded that its determination of Noel's widower's benefits was correct (“December 2019 Notice of Reconsideration”). (Bowles Decl. ¶ 9; Dec. 2019 Notice of Recons., annexed to Bowles Decl. as Ex. F, Docket Entry No. 13-4, at 22-29.) The December 2019 Notice of Reconsideration advised Plaintiff that if she disagreed with the decision, she could file an appeal within sixty days by requesting a hearing with an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Plaintiff requested a hearing on or about February 13, 2020 (“February 2020 Request for Review”). (Letter dated June 26, 2020, Docket Entry No. 23; Feb. 2020 Request for Review, annexed to Letter dated June 26, 2020, as Ex. 2, Docket Entry No. 23, at 5-6; Pl.'s Opp'n 5.) Almost one year later, the SSA processed the request and, on January 22, 2021, notified Plaintiff that it had scheduled a hearing for April 5, 2021, before ALJ Gloria Pellegrino.[7] (Decl. of Emilio Justiniano ¶ 5, annexed to Comm'r's Reply as Ex. 1, Docket Entry No. 32-1.) The status of the hearing is unknown, as there have been no filings on the docket since March of 2021.[8]
A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the court “lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Huntress v. United States, 810 Fed.Appx. 74, 75 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)); Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.A.R.L., 790 F.3d 411, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113); Shabaj v. Holder, 718 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005)). “‘[C]ourt[s] must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [the] plaintiff,' but ‘jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.'” Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (first quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006); and then quoting APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2003)), aff'd, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). Ultimately, “the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction ‘has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.'” Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113); see also Suarez v. Mosaic Sales Sols. U.S. Operating Co., 720 Fed.Appx. 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170); Clayton v. United States, No. 18-CV-5867, 2020 WL 1545542, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020) (quoting Tandon, 752 F.3d at 243); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 369 F.Supp.3d 547, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Tandon, 752 F.3d at 243).
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff has not alleged that she has standing to appear pro se on behalf of Noel's estate. In addition, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged standing, as the Commissioner argues, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one's self, a person may not appear on another person's behalf in the other's cause.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). Therefore, “an administr[ator] or execut[or] of an estate may not proceed pro se when the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the litigant.” Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997)); Weinstein v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 307 Fed.Appx. 529, 530 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). This is because “[w]here there are other beneficiaries, ‘an action cannot be described as the litigant's own, because the personal interests of the estate, other survivors, and possible creditors . . . will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings.” Guest, 603 F.3d at 20 (quoting Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 559). However, “the administrator and sole beneficiary of an estate with no creditors may appear pro se on behalf of the estate.” Id. at 21. In this event, “[b]ecause the administrator is the only party affected by the disposition of the suit, [s]he is, in fact, appearing solely on h[er] own behalf.” Id. “These standing requirements apply with equal force to applications for Social Security benefits.” Webb v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-CV-82, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133697, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102803 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2009). “[T]he court has a responsibility to ensure appropriate representation for the parties appearing before it, even if those parties do not raise the issue.” Seemann v. Seemann, No. 18-CV-502, 2018 WL 2078815, at *3 (citing Guest, 603 F.3d at 20), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2435165 ; see also Guest, 603 F.3d at 20 ().
Although Plaintiff is the administrator of Noel's estate, she has not alleged that she is the sole beneficiary of the estate or that the estate has no creditors. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing to proceed pro se on behalf of Noel's estate. See, e.g., Sterling v. Hum. Res. Admin. (Soc Servs.), No. 21-CV-10192, 2022 WL 329266, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) ( ); Seemann, 2018 WL...
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