Colon v. Flomeh, 0100889
Decision Date | 30 March 2004 |
Docket Number | 0100889 |
Parties | Juana G. Colon v. Livingston M. Flomeh et al.[1] |
Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
Venue Worcester
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):McCann, J.
The defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b)(2), arguing that "on the close of the plaintiff's evidence and upon the facts, the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the plaintiff's negligence." On motion of a defendant, pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2), Mass.Civ.P. 41(b)(2), Further, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence "in an action tried by the court without a jury," the defendant may move for dismissal, "it upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." Mass.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(2) & Reporters Notes (emphasis added), As the plaintiff has not failed to prosecute or comply with a court order or procedural rule and as this action is scheduled for jury trial, the defendants' motion is improper. In the interest of judicial economy, however, this court will briefly discuss the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The defendants seek to bar the plaintiffs from litigating the issue of negligence on the ground that the plaintiff's greater fault was previously established by the fact that she received a surcharge on her insurance, which was upheld on appeal to the "Merit Ratings Board." However, the same issue was subsequently heard by a district court judge who found the plaintiff and defendant equally at fault awarding damages to the plaintiff.[2] "A nonparty may use collateral estoppel defensively against a party to the original action who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in question." Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61 (1987). Significantly, this doctrine "is premised upon an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 19, 23 n.18 (1980). Where, as here, two inconsistent determinations have been made on the same issue, application of the estoppel doctrine would be inappropriate. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 23 n.17; Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 939 F.Supp. 603 (ND. Ill. 1996) (...
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