Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C.J.R. Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 980062-CA,980062-CA
• Citation: 977 P.2d 541
• Parties: 38 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 424, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 1999 UT App 91 COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORP., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION dba Jack's Southwest Collision Repair; and John W. Cumberledge, Jr., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 541

977 P.2d 541

38 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 424, 365 Utah Adv. Rep.

27, 1999 UT App 91

COLONIAL PACIFIC LEASING CORP., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. J.W.C.J.R. CORPORATION dba Jack's Southwest Collision

Repair; and John W. Cumberledge, Jr., Defendants

and Appellants.

No. 980062-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 25, 1999.

Grant W.P. Morrison and William Patrick Morrison, Morrison & Morrison LC, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.

J. Bruce Reading and Wesley D. Hutchins, Scalley & Reading, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, P.J., and GREENWOOD and BILLINGS, JJ.

OPINION

BILLINGS, Judge:

¶1 Appellants J.W.C.J.R. Corp. (JWCJR) and John W. Cumberledge, Jr. (Cumberledge) appeal a judgment in favor of appellee Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. (Colonial Pacific), awarding Colonial Pacific the amount due under its finance lease agreement with JWCJR. Because we conclude the trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its judgment enforcing the finance lease agreement, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

¶2 JWCJR, an autobody shop, sought a computer and software package that would facilitate the generation of estimates for insurance companies and improve internal shop management. JWCJR was approached by Bottomline Systems, Inc. (Bottomline), who demonstrated a computer and software system. To obtain the demonstrated system, JWCJR entered into a finance lease agreement with Colonial Pacific, the lessor. JWCJR's owner, Cumberledge, signed the lease both as an agent of JWCJR and as a personal guarantor. Colonial Pacific purchased the equipment from Bottomline. Under the finance lease agreement, JWCJR was to make monthly payments to Colonial Pacific.

¶3 A few days before JWCJR received the computer and software package from Bottomline, Colonial Pacific required Cumberledge to sign an "acceptance and acknowledgment" form that stated the equipment had been received from Bottomline and was satisfactory. Cumberledge signed the acceptance and acknowledgment form and made an initial lease payment. On the day JWCJR received the equipment, Colonial Pacific contacted Cumberledge seeking a verbal verification that the equipment was acceptable. Cumberledge told Colonial Pacific's representative that JWCJR had received the equipment, but it was not yet operational.

¶4 Cumberledge had difficulty getting the computer system to function properly and repeatedly contacted Bottomline with his concerns. On the second day JWCJR had the computer equipment, Colonial Pacific again contacted Cumberledge to inquire whether the system was operational; Cumberledge responded that the system was working. Colonial Pacific then paid Bottomline for the equipment. Later that day the system crashed, and despite repeated calls to Bottomline and many attempts to get it functioning, Cumberledge could not get the system to work.

¶5 Soon after, Cumberledge phoned Colonial Pacific and informed it the computer equipment was not functioning and never had functioned properly. Cumberledge boxed up the equipment and contacted Bottomline to pick it up. Within the next few weeks, Cumberledge again phoned Colonial Pacific to tell it of his problems with the computer system and to cancel the lease. From his conversation with a Colonial Pacific representative, Cumberledge believed the lease was canceled and that he was no longer obligated to make lease payments. Colonial Pacific had no record of the telephone calls.

¶6 More than two years later, Colonial Pacific sought to recover the unpaid lease payments. JWCJR, and Cumberledge as guarantor of the lease, refused to pay. Colonial Pacific brought this action to recover the full lease amount. The trial judge concluded JWCJR had breached the lease agreement by failing to make the required lease payments and awarded Colonial Pacific a judgment for $21,275.30. JWCJR and Cumberledge now appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Acceptance

¶7 On appeal JWCJR argues the trial court erred in enforcing the lease agreement because JWCJR never accepted the goods covered by the lease. JWCJR contends any alleged acceptance took place before it had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the computer equipment.

¶8 Under Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs enforcement of financing leases, we must determine if a lessee has accepted the goods, and therefore, has agreed to the lease. Once a lessee has accepted the goods, the lessee's promises are deemed irrevocable. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a407(1) and (2) (1997). Subsections 407(1) and (2), commonly referred to jointly as "the hell or high water provision," state:

(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods.

(2) A promise that has become irrevocable and independent under Subsection (1):

(a) is effective and enforceable between the parties, and by or against third parties including assignees of the parties; and

(b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, modification, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the party to whom the promise runs.

Id. (Emphasis added.).

¶9 Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515 (1) (1997) explains when a lessee has accepted leased goods:

(1) Acceptance of goods occurs after:

(a) the lessee has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods and the lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the goods are conforming or that the lessee will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or

(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods as provided in Subsection 70A-2a-509(2).

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2a-515 (1) (1997) (emphasis added).

¶10 One commentator further explains acceptance in financing leases:

Section 2A-515(1) provides that acceptance occurs when the lessee does any of three things after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods: (a) signifies acceptance; (b) fails to make an effective rejection; or (c) does any act that signifies acceptance. Normally, acceptance occurs under the first test where the lessee, after inspection, indicates that the lessee is satisfied with the goods and will take them, or signifies that the lessee will take or retain them notwithstanding their defects.

2A William D. Hawkland & Frederick H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2A-515, at 839 (1993) (emphasis added).

¶11 Because it is generally accepted that UCC sections 2-606 and 2A-515 are analogous, ¹ we look to case law interpreting both provisions to help us determine whether JWCJR had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the computer equipment, and thus by its acts accepted the equipment.

¶12 Whether a party has had a "reasonable opportunity to inspect," and thus whether an acceptance has occurred, is a question of fact. See Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149, 845 P.2d 567, 576 (Ct.App.1992) ( "What is a reasonable time is primarily a question of fact."); Sjogren v. Maybrooks, Inc., 214 Ill.App.3d 888, 158 Ill.Dec. 182, 573 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (1991) ("The UCC definition of a reasonable time suggests that the question of reasonableness is particularly fact sensitive. It follows that '[w]hether conduct has amounted to an acceptance or a rejection of goods is a question of fact "to be determined within the framework of each particular case." ' " (Citations omitted.)); Capitol Dodge Sales v. Northern Concrete Pipe, 131 Mich.App. 149, 346 N.W.2d 535, 538-39 (1983) (holding trial court's findings of fact were inadequate to establish whether acceptance had occurred); Ho v. Wolfe, 688 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex.App.1985) ("[T]he determination of what actions amount to an acceptance or rejection in a particular case is generally made by the trier of fact."); cf. Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223, 226-27 (Utah 1976) (stating that determination of what constitutes "reasonable time" for confirmation of sale is usually question of fact).

¶13 Taking possession of the goods is not determinative of acceptance, nor is the signing of a form acceptance before receipt of the goods, nor the making of a lease payment. "A 'reasonable time to inspect' under the UCC must allow an opportunity to put the product to its intended use, or for testing to verify its capability to perform as intended." Capitol Dodge Sales, 346 N.W.2d at 539; see also James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Hornbook of the Law Under the UCC § 8-2, at 296 (4th ed. 1995) ("[T]he prevailing view is that one who buys complex goods ... and signs a contract for purchase after only a short [period] should not be held to have had a 'reasonable opportunity to inspect' and therefore not be held to have accepted the goods."). In Capitol Dodge Sales, the Michigan Court of Appeals found a trial court's determination that a buyer accepted a new vehicle to be clearly erroneous when the vehicle overheated repeatedly and the buyer later returned the vehicle. See Capitol Dodge Sales, 346 N.W.2d at 537-38. The court noted that acceptance under the UCC assumes an act beyond merely taking possession of goods: "Possession during the time necessary for the 'reasonable opportunity' to inspect is contemplated prior to acceptance." Id. at 539.

¶14 Similarly, in Moses v. Newman, 658 S.W.2d 119, 121-22 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983), the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the buyer of a mobile home had not had a "reasonable opportunity to inspect," and thus, although the buyer had possession of the goods, no acceptance had occurred. "What is a reasonable opportunity varies, depending upon the type of goods involved.... [T]he statute, by affording the purchaser a reasonable opportunity to inspect, implies possession or some possible use by the purchaser without acceptance of the goods." Id. at 121 (citations omitted); see also Jacob Hartz Seed Co., Inc. v. Coleman, 271 Ark. 756, 612 S.W.2d 91, 92 (1981) ("It is clear that under the [Uniform Commercial] Code, delivery does not...