Moses v. Newman
| Decision Date | 08 June 1983 |
| Citation | 658 S.W.2d 119,37 UCCRep.Serv. 461 |
| Parties | 37 UCC Rep.Serv. 461 Mike MOSES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary NEWMAN, individually and d/b/a Lakeview Mobile Homes, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
John W. Cleveland of Howe & Cleveland, Sweetwater, for defendant-appellant.
J. Michael Billingsley of Carter & Reid, Athens, for plaintiff-appellee.
Plaintiff purchased a mobile home from defendant seller, which was delivered to plaintiff's lot. The mobile home was destroyed by a windstorm and the chancellor held the risk of loss had remained with the seller and entered judgment for plaintiff. Defendant has appealed.
Plaintiff, in response to defendant's advertisement of "trailer, complete set-up", along with his uncle, made several trips to Lakeview Mobile Homes and agreed on February 7, 1981, to purchase the used mobile home.
On February 9, 1981, defendant delivered the mobile home to plaintiff's rented lot, blocked up, leveled the mobile home, removed the tires and axles and connected the sewer and water pipes. On the same date, plaintiff's fiancee cleaned the interior of the mobile home and moved some kitchen utensils and dishes into the mobile home. She made an inspection of the home and discovered a broken window and water pipe. Plaintiff called these conditions as well as having no door keys to defendant's attention. On the afternoon of February 10th, a windstorm totally destroyed the mobile home.
The evidence on the issue of whether plaintiff had accepted the mobile home is sharply disputed. The chancellor concluded plaintiff had not accepted the mobile home at the time of the loss. Defendant insists the evidence preponderates against the chancellor's determination.
Plaintiff and his uncle testified defendant's salesman represented to them that a "set-up" of the mobile home included placing the trailer on blocks, leveling, connecting water and sewer pipes and anchoring the mobile home. Defendant's salesman denied representing to plaintiff that a complete set-up included anchoring the trailer and, while defendant would anchor trailers, an additional charge of $150.00 was made for this service.
The chancellor accredited the testimony of plaintiff and his uncle on this issue. Defendant's witness conceded in some instances the cost of anchorage was included in the purchase price and responded thusly to the chancellor's question:
A. The same thing.
THE COURT: Well, what was this?
A. Our policy on set-up?
THE COURT: I mean, what did you tell them? What was your conversation? That's what I'm asking you.
A. They asked me what the policy on set-up was.
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
A. We block, level, hook the sewer up to twenty feet away from the home, and sometimes stretch that twenty feet. Anchoring--we do that.
THE COURT: Is that what you told them?
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you tell them, at that time, that anchoring was not important?
A. I don't remember.
Defendant further conceded the installation crew was to return the following day. The evidence does not preponderate against the chancellor's determination that the seller had not completed the contracted installation at the time of loss.
The issue thus becomes whether the buyer "accepted" the goods within the meaning of the Code. Acceptance is defined in T.C.A., § 47-2-606, which provides in pertinent part:
§ 47-2-606. What constitutes acceptance of goods.--(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer:
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of § 47-2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
Under subsections (a) and (b) the purchaser is afforded a "reasonable opportunity to inspect." In the instant case, plaintiff did not explicitly accept under (a) but defendant argues that plaintiff's failure to reject constituted an acceptance under (b). What is a reasonable opportunity varies, depending upon the type of goods involved. Plaintiff's opportunity to inspect the mobile home on the seller's sales lot and during the installation did not constitute a reasonable opportunity for inspection within the meaning of the Code.
Under T.C.A., § 47-2-606(c), arguably the placing of personal property in the mobile home was an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; however, any use of the goods by the purchaser is inconsistent with the seller's ownership but the statute, by affording the purchaser a reasonable opportunity to inspect, implies possession or some possible use by the purchaser without acceptance of the goods. White and Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code, (2 ed., 1980), § 5.5 at 187-8. Accord: Jakowski v. Carole Chevrolet, Inc., 180 N.J.Super. 122, 433 A.2d 841 (1981).
In the instant case, the purchaser had not occupied the mobile home and the limited use by placing certain articles of...
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...(b) give the buyer a reasonable time to inspect the goods, a time period that varies with the type of goods involved. Moses v. Newman, 658 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983). Subsection 606(c) seems to draw a bright line, but even the simple test of "doing any act inconsistent with the seller's ......
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...versions of the UCC have reached the same conclusion— although not necessarily following the exact route we have. Moses v. Newman, 658 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983), is the case most factually similar to this one. As in this case, the seller had agreed to provide a mobile home and to set it......