Colony Cadillac & Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Yerdon

• Decision Date: 24 February 1986
• Parties: COLONY CADILLAC & OLDSMOBILE, INC. v. Frederick YERDON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 98

505 A.2d 98

COLONY CADILLAC & OLDSMOBILE, INC. v. Frederick YERDON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 22, 1986.

Decided Feb. 24, 1986.

Frederick Williams, (orally), North Windham, for plaintiff.

Ralph W. Brown, Portland, Francis M. Jackson, (orally), Westbrook, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

SCOLNIK, Justice.

The defendant, Frederick Yerdon, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County) affirming the judgment of the District Court (Portland) that Yerdon defaulted on a promissory note payable to the plaintiff, Colony Cadillac & Oldsmobile, Inc. (Colony). Yerdon had counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, violations of the Used Car Information Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1471-1477 (1980 & Supp.1985-1986) and the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 (1979 & Supp.1985-1986), and fraud. Among his many claims of error on appeal, Yerdon contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by limiting his cross-examination of John Alberti, Colony's president, so as to preclude impeachment of Alberti's credibility on an issue central to Yerdon's defense and to his counterclaim. Because we agree that the scope of the cross-examination was impermissibly limited, we vacate the judgment.

The dispute arose from Colony's sale in March, 1982, of a 1974 Chevrolet Caprice to Yerdon, for which he executed a promissory note payable to Colony in monthly installments. It is undisputed that the car bore a current state inspection sticker at the time of the sales transaction. In October, 1982, Yerdon discovered that the car had a badly rusted trunk and would not pass inspection. He stopped payments on the promissory note at that time.

One of the key issues at trial was whether the car in fact met State inspection standards at the time of Yerdon's purchase. ¹ Alberti testified that all of the used cars for sale at Colony, including the one sold to Yerdon, were inspected, bore valid State inspection stickers, and met State inspection standards. However, when counsel for Yerdon attempted to cross-examine Alberti as to whether Colony had ever received complaints regarding its sale of used cars, the presiding judge sustained an objection to that line of questioning. When the judge continued to exclude any testimony about such complaints, the defendant made an offer of proof focusing upon the Assurance of Discontinuance made by Colony to the Attorney General of Maine. Colony had stated therein that it would discontinue selling used motor vehicles without an up-to-date inspection sticker, and those that could not pass state inspection standards. Despite the offer of proof showing the relevancy of the proffered evidence, the judge reaffirmed his prior ruling and continued to limit Yerdon's examination of Alberti.

Rule 611 of the Maine Rules of Evidence provides a "wide-open rule permitting cross-examination on any issue in the case, subject to a discretionary right to limit it in the interests of justice." Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 611.2, at 154 (1976) (footnote omitted) (hereinafter Field & Murray at ----). ² The trial court is vested with significant discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination. Depositors Trust Co. v. Blanchard, 377 A.2d 101, 104 (Me.1977). The trial judge's exercise of discretion will be upheld on appeal unless he has "clearly interfered with a party's right to a fair trial." Field & Murray at § 611.1, at 153; cf. Inhabitants of Falmouth v. Inhabitants of Windham, 63 Me. 44 (1873) (limitation of cross-examination not reversible error absent prejudice).

We conclude that it was not in the interests of justice to limit the cross-examination here of ...