Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. John

• Decision Date: 08 October 1894
• Citation: 5 Colo.App. 213,38 P. 399
• Parties: COLORADO COAL & IRON CO. v. JOHN.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

38 P. 399

5 Colo.App. 213

COLORADO COAL & IRON CO. v. JOHN.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

October 8, 1894

Error to district court, Las Animas county.

Action by James M. John against the Colorado Coal & Iron Company for services rendered and moneys expended. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

D.C Beaman, for plaintiff in error.

James M. John, pro se.

THOMSON J.

This is a suit brought by James M. John against the Colorado Coal &amp Iron Company to recover for professional services rendered by him to the company, and for moneys expended in its behalf. The last amended complaint sets forth as the first cause of action an indebtedness of $150 for defending, at the defendant's request, one Capello against a criminal charge. The second cause of action avers a contract, made about January 1, 1891, with A.E. Steck, the general counsel of the defendant, and duly authorized to make such contract in its behalf, for the performance of legal work for the defendant by the plaintiff at $25 per day for each day or part of a day which he should devote to its business; and alleges the rendering of such services to the amount of $825. The defendant answered, admitting the authority of Steck to make the contract and the employment of the plaintiff by him to perform professional services for the defendant, but denying its possession of, or ability to obtain, sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief as to the other allegations of the complaint. The only evidence in behalf of the plaintiff was his own testimony. He testified to the services mentioned in the first cause of action, and their value. He also testified to services rendered and moneys expended by him under the contract set forth in the second cause of action, between January 1, 1891, and February 11, 1892, amounting in all to $924.91, and admitted payments at different times aggregating $310.38. The defendant introduced a statement, furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant, which purports to contain his charges on account of services rendered and moneys expended during the year 1891, and which the plaintiff testified was intended to be a complete statement of his account with the defendant during the period mentioned. The amount of the charges shown by the statement was $812.21. When all the evidence on both sides had been introduced, the court directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff for $181 on the first cause of action and $688.50 on the second which was accordingly done. This action of the court is assigned for error.

The first cause of action stated in the complaint is not directly denied. The evidence in its support was clear, uncontradicted, and conclusive, and upon that cause of action the court might well have directed a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $150. The verdict returned in obedience to the court's direction was for $181, being $31 in excess of the claim. Although the record is silent upon the subject, counsel seem to agree that this excess is for interest accrued at the time of the trial. They also agree that the amount of the verdict upon the other cause of action is a combination of principal and interest, and the plaintiff has filed in this court his offer to remit the interest, and take judgment for the principal sum. As to the first cause of action, we would find no difficulty in rejecting the excess, and entering judgment in plaintiff's favor here for $150; but as to the second, even if the court's action were otherwise free from error, it would be impracticable for us to reject any specific sum, or give judgment for any specific sum, because there is nothing in the record to indicate upon what amount, or from what time, interest was computed. There is nothing in our statutes which entitles the plaintiff to interest upon either of his claims, and its allowance by the court was error.

But the most serious question in the case arises out of the direction to the jury. It is not clear from the evidence what amount should have been awarded to the plaintiff upon his second cause of action. This alleged a contract made with the defendant about January 1, 1891, under which certain services were performed. Manifestly the plaintiff's recovery must be confined to services rendered pursuant to that contract but as to...