Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. District Court In and For El Paso County

• Decision Date: 10 November 1958
• Docket Number: No. 18732,18732
• Citation: 331 P.2d 502,138 Colo. 227
• Parties: COLORADO STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Plaintiff, v. The DISTRICT COURT in And For the COUNTY OF EL PASO and State of Colorado, The Honorable John G. Reid, Judge of said Court; Reginald B. Weiler, Defendants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 502

331 P.2d 502

138 Colo. 227

COLORADO STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Plaintiff, v. The DISTRICT COURT in And For the COUNTY OF EL PASO and State of Colorado, The Honorable John G. Reid Judge of said Court; Reginald B. Weiler Defendants.

No. 18732.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Nov. 10, 1958.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.

James J. Moyers, Donald E. LaMora, Colorado Springs, for defendants in error.

DAY, Justice.

This is an original proceeding instituted in behalf of the Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners. We will refer to the petitioner as the Board and to the respondent District Court of El Paso County as the respondent.

The Board seeks an order in the nature of prohibition to prevent the respondent District Court from proceeding in a matter entitled 'Reginald B. Weiler v. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners; etc.' now pending in the District Court.

The action in the lower court was commenced by filing a verified complaint labeled, 'Complaint under Rule 106 [a](4) for a writ in the nature of prohibition and other relief.' Attached to the complaint and made a part thereof was a notice of hearing directing Dr. Weiler to appear before the State Board of Medical Examiners, on a date therein stated, to answer certain specified charges attached thereto. As grounds for invoking the aid of the judiciary, the petitioner before the District Court alleges that the statute (Medical Practice Act of 1951, C.R.S '53, 91-1-1 et seq.) does not provide a means whereby plaintiff may object to the jurisdiction of the Board; that it would be useless to apply to the Board for relief; that undue delay would be prejudicial to plaintiff and would seriously interfere with plaintiff's treatment of patients; that the charges show prejudice on the part of the Board, and that the Board has conducted investigations and not given plaintiff the right to confront witnesses; that the charges are vague and uncertain; that the statute does not give subpoena rights to the plaintiff; that the plaintiff does not know the names of the witnesses who appeared against him; that the members of the Board are precluded from impartiality and that the members of the Board are not experts in the field in which plaintiff practices; that the Act does not provide standards and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative function; that the Act is unconstitutional and deprives plaintiff of due process and equal protection of the laws; that the offenses charged constitute acts of malpractice and are barred by the statute of limitations; that the offenses charged constitute misdemeanors under the law and plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial; that he has no adequate remedy at law. On the complaint only, in an ex parte proceeding, the district court issued the following order:

'That the verified complaint of Plaintiff herein sets forth sufficient allegations to warrant the relief herein sought; that the Plaintiff has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law; that the Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless said relief is granted; that a Writ in the nature of Prohibition should be issued commanding the Defendants to desist and restrain from further proceeding to hear and determine charges preferred by them against Plaintiff until the further order of the Court.

'Wherefore, It Is Ordered By The Court, that the Clerk of this Court forthwith issue under her hand and the Seal of this Court a Writ in the nature of Prohibition pursuant to Rule 106, Colorado R.C.P., 1941, as amended, commanding the Defendants the Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners, Samuel H. Brown, Cecil C. Thorpe, John B. Farley, Piero Albi, B. Franklin Blotz, C. Walter Metz, C. Robert Starks, Arthur B. Taylor and Lester L. Ward and each and all of them, to immediately desist and refrain from further proceedings of any kind or nature whatsoever in the matter of certain charges previously preferred against Plaintiff by said Defendants until the further order of the Court and further commanding and directing said Defendants to appear before the Court on the 11th day of July, A. D. 1958 at the hour of 10 o'clock A.M. to then and there show what cause they have, if any, why said Defendants and each and all of them should not be permanently and absolutely further restrained from any further proceedings in said matter.'

Pursuant to this order a writ in the nature of prohibition was issued the same day, which immediately prohibited the Board from taking any further action in the premises and ordered the Board to appear before the Court on July 11, 1958, to show cause why the writ should not be made permanent. The Board is here seeking to prohibit the district court from conducting any further proceedings and from issuing any further orders in the premises, permanent or otherwise, and to prohibit the court from interfering with the Board in the exercise of its statutory functions.

As long recognized by this court and recently reiterated in Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938, the purpose of prohibition is to prevent usurpation or unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior tribunal (in this instance the trial court).

The question to be determined is: Does the district court have jurisdiction to prohibit a branch of the executive department such as the State Board of Medical Examiners from carrying out its statutory functions?

This question is answered in the negative.

The instant case falls squarely within the category of cases referred to in Prinster v. District Court, supra, as well as earlier cases for the reason that the action of the lower court constitutes direct and unjustified judicial interference with a function properly delegated to the Executive Department.

It is well established that the General Assembly has power to enact laws regulating the practice of medicine, and in so doing may create within the Executive Department a board empowered to administer and enforce such laws. Chenoweth v. State Board, 57 Colo. 74, 141 P. 132, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 958; Harding v. People, 10 Colo. 387, 15 P. 727; Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 P. 612, 36 L.R.A.,N.S., 158. By law, therefore, the sole original jurisdiction to grant or revoke licenses to practice medicine in compliance with the regulatory provisions of such statute is vested in the State Board of Medical Examiners. Thompson v. State Board, 59 Colo. 549, 151 P. 436. Significantly, the respondent district court did not find the only fact which would support its action, namely, that the board lacked jurisdiction. Of course there could be no such finding for the reason that the board did and does have jurisdiction--sole and exclusive original jurisdiction.

As early as 1901, in People ex rel. Alexander v. District Court, 29 Colo. 182, 68 P. 242, 250, this court issued and made permanent a writ of prohibition in an action wherein the district court was attempting to restrain the State Board of Assessors from proceeding with a function imposed by statute. In issuing the writ in that instance, the court elaborated upon the doctrine of separation of powers, pointing out quite clearly that the trial court had no jurisdiction to interfere with officers of the state whose duties are imposed by statute. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Steele plainly established the precedent for our holding there, but a special concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Gabbert was most lucid and clearly demonstrates why this court must intervene when formally requested where, as in the case at bar, the lower court is attempting to restrain a duly authorized administrative board from performing its duty pursuant to laws passed by the General Assembly. We quote with approval from Justice Gabbert's concurring opinion:

'Can the judicial directly prohibit the executive department from executing laws governmental in their nature? When the question arises whether one department is encroaching upon the authority of another, the courts must become the final arbiters. When this question is between the judicial and either of the other departments, the judiciary must be just as careful in marking the line between their authority and either of the others as if the contest was one of...