Colorado-Wyoming Express v. DENVER LOCAL UNION, ETC., 200.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1940
• Docket Number: No. 200.,200.
• Parties: COLORADO-WYOMING EXPRESS et al. v. DENVER LOCAL UNION NO. 13 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, STABLE MEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

35 F. Supp. 155

COLORADO-WYOMING EXPRESS et al. v. DENVER LOCAL UNION NO. 13 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, STABLE MEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA et al.

No. 200.

District Court, D. Colorado.

October 7, 1940.

Harry S. Silverstein and Harry S. Silverstein, Jr., both of Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.

Philip Hornbein and Theodore Epstein, both of Denver, Colo., for defendants.

SYMES, District Judge.

This bill alleges that the plaintiffs, all foreign corporations, are individual motor vehicle common carriers transporting commodities by truck in interstate commerce under separate certificates of authority and permits duly issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the respective states, through which they transport interstate commerce, "interlining" with each other. That the defendant, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Denver Local No. 13, is a labor union affiliated with, and chartered by, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stable Men and Helpers of America, with headquarters at Indianapolis, Indiana — an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor. The defendant Keigley is business agent of Local Union No. 13, and Woxberg is an international or state organizer for the defendant, International Brotherhood. The defendant, Motor Carriers' Association, is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Colorado, to which all the plaintiffs and numerous other truck operators — that is to say, motor vehicle common carriers — belong.

It is then alleged that on April 12, 1938, defendant Association executed a certain contract in writing with the local, then known as Local Union No. 444 of said International Brotherhood, and with other local unions in Wyoming, New Mexico and Montana, all of which are, and were, affiliated with the International Brotherhood in the American Federation of Labor. Said contract is attached to the bill marked Exhibit A, and was, it is alleged, for the benefit of the plaintiffs and each of them and other members of the Association. The plaintiffs are parties to said contract.

The bill then pleads the terms and legal effect of said agreement (Exhibit A), alleging it was agreed neither party would interfere with, restrain or coerce employees by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment. It recites that truck operators are subject wholly to government regulatory agencies that emphasize the maintenance of uninterrupted and regular service to the public, and it was agreed the union and all other union organizations party to the contract would do everything within their power to prevent sympathetic strikes and prevent stoppage of work as the result of any controversy between the parties. That there would be no interference in the normal business of the truck operators' association, including the business of the plaintiffs, regardless of the non-union or union affiliation of any person, firm or corporation with whom the plaintiffs, or other members of the said association, may do business. That the control of cargo transported by members of the Association, including the plaintiffs, to destination must be preserved and protected, so that the handling of the same shall be at all times performed by the employees of members of the Association, including the plaintiffs, or by employees of those to whom, or for whom, such cargo might be transported. That any differences or controversies relative to the application or interpretation of the agreement, as well as matters of mutual concern not covered thereby, should be arbitrated by a board therein provided for.

It is then alleged the plaintiffs, and other truck operators, including several named operating under certificates of authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-327, have maintained joint through rates and tariffs to and from points located respectively on the lines of the several plaintiffs and points on the lines of other motor carriers, and operators named. That the joint rates have been duly approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by the terms thereof the plaintiffs, and other carriers, are in law bound to receive from each other all freight tendered to them at Denver and common points, freight consigned or destined to points on their respective lines and those of connecting carriers, and the said other carriers are likewise bound to deliver to the plaintiff at Denver, or other common points, freight originating on their lines, or beyond their lines, and handled by them and destined to points on the lines of the respective plaintiffs. Binding contracts to that effect exist between the parties to thus accept and deliver freight originating on the respective lines of the different plaintiffs and their connecting carriers. That this is generally known and referred to as "interlining" business with each other.

That the plaintiffs, in order to carry out their business as aforesaid, have established freight terminals, depots and other facilities to render the service authorized under the authority of the regulatory bodies and have procured trucks and vehicles and the necessary equipment in order to serve the public as interstate carriers by motor vehicle, and have established and ena reputation for efficient and dependable service, and thus built up a profitable business as a result thereof.

It is next alleged that prior to the unlawful acts complained of plaintiffs had transported a large volume of freight, especially "interlining" business, with other carriers and the success and value of their business is dependent on the continued regular and dependable service, on frequent and regular schedules, free from interference on the part of the union and the individual defendants, Keigley and Woxberg.

The bill then alleges (paragraph 13) that the said local union has engaged in a campaign to force all truck operators to sign closed shop contracts, which would compel them to employ only men belonging to AF of L unions and discharge all employees who are not members thereof. That there are already in force in the industry many closed shop contracts in the territory between the Mississippi River and the Pacific Coast, and the unions are thereby in a position to dominate and control all such workers and coerce the motor carriers who sign such contracts, and all other employers of labor engaged in the manufacturing, processing, dealing and merchandising of commodities shipped in interstate commerce, and that said union employers are fearful of sympathetic strikes and sundry annoyances and disturbances to their respective businesses if they fail to do so.

That the local unions demanded each of the plaintiffs enter into a closed shop contract with the union; that the plaintiffs have refused, alleging such action would violate the contract (Exhibit A), and is prohibited by its terms. That the union notified the plaintiffs the contract has no force and effect and they refuse to be bound thereby, and have threatened the plaintiffs unless they do sign a closed shop contract the union would prohibit any AF ofL union workers to handle freight for the plaintiffs, and would prevent other motor carriers from "interlining" business with the plaintiffs, and prevent customers of the plaintiffs who might have AFofL contracts, from using the transportation services of the plaintiffs.

Further, in furtherance of said objects, the local union has warned other motor carriers not to "interline" with the plaintiffs, or accept or receive from the plaintiffs any freight for transportation by the plaintiffs, and has given similar notice to many of plaintiffs' customers under threat of strike. That such other motor carriers, through fear of consequences and resulting loss, damage and injury, have complied with the union warning and refused to, and continue to refuse to, "interline" any business with the plaintiffs, or deliver or receive from plaintiffs any freight for transportation — all without any complaint in any way, or with any conduct or want of conduct on the part of the plaintiffs concerning their services.

It is then alleged such acts and conduct on the part of the union are prohibited by the contract (Exhibit A), and such conduct on the part of the union is acts and conduct that foment and produce strikes and interfere with the plaintiffs' regular and normal business. That as a result thereof the plaintiffs' business has appreciably diminished to the extent of hundreds of dollars...