William Dunbar Co. v. Painters & Glaziers Dist. Coun.

• Decision Date: 12 January 1955
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5255-54.
• Citation: 129 F. Supp. 417
• Parties: WILLIAM DUNBAR CO., Inc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. PAINTERS & GLAZIERS DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 51 et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

129 F. Supp. 417

WILLIAM DUNBAR CO., Inc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. PAINTERS & GLAZIERS DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 51 et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 5255-54.

United States District Court, District of Columbia

January 12, 1955.

J. E. Bindeman, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Martin O'Donoghue, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

KIRKLAND, District Judge.

Historically, this case began by the filing of a complaint for an injunction and declaratory judgment in this Court on December 11, 1954. In the main it sets out that there had been an agreement between the parties signed on the 15th day of May, 1953, whereby a certain sum, to wit, 10 cents an hour, was to be paid into a painters' trust fund.

There was an allegation that two corporate plaintiffs had not paid, and as a result of the nonpayment the union had threatened to terminate the May 15, 1950 agreement.

The plaintiffs sought then to enjoin the trustees of the welfare fund from collecting payments and to restrain the union from terminating the agreement.

A motion for a preliminary injunction was filed on the 29th of December 1954, and on the 31st of December, 1954, there was an amended complaint which added another party defendant, to wit, the International Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America.

On January 4, 1955, the defendant union answered to the complaint and asserted a counterclaim.

On the 5th of January, 1955, there was opposition filed on behalf of the union to the motion for preliminary injunction, and on the 7th day of January, 1955, a motion for a temporary restraining order was filed.

This present Court, sitting as a motion court, on the date of January 8 overruled the motion for preliminary injunction and advanced the case for a hearing on its merits.

The case came on for trial January 11, 1955, and at that time waiver of demand for jury trial was filed by praecipe, and there were added four additional parties plaintiff. As against the possibility of a class action suit, it is pointed out that the six plaintiff contractors who have not paid into this special welfare fund from about January 1954, until the latter part of September 1954, are now in the cause as a group of six plaintiffs.

In the amended complaint there were four counts set forth. The first count, which in the main sets forth a grievance, alleges a failure of remedy at law and seeks a declaratory judgment, and prays also for an injunction. Counts II and III have been dismissed by praecipe before the case began. Count IV apparently is still in the case. It claims an infraction, and claims compensation, as well as triple damages.

It is apparent, therefore, from the pleadings, that there are six plaintiffs suing a group of defendants who, in the main, represent two unincorporated labor groups, as well as individual defendants.

The first question before the Court is that of its jurisdiction. In that connection the Court points out that under the Norris-LaGuardia Act the jurisdiction of the federal courts to employ the injunctive process has been, broadly speaking, denied.

Section 113(c) 29 U.S.C.A. states that the term " `labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."

One will observe that that is a very broad definition of a labor dispute.

Section 107 of 29 U.S.C.A. denies jurisdiction to courts of the United States to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case, involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as defined in Section 101-115 of the said Title 29, with five exceptions:

One, that unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will continue unless restrained.

Two, that substantial and irreparable injury to plaintiff's property will follow.

Three, that greater injury will be inflicted upon the plaintiff by denial of relief than would be inflicted upon the defendant by granting of relief.

Four, that there is no adequate remedy at law.

And, five, that public officers charged with the duty to protect plaintiff's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

In the main, the application of such injunctive power seems to have been limited to conditions involving unlawful acts which entail violence. Colorado-Wyoming Express v. Denver Local Union No. 13, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 155, decided by the District Court of Colorado in 1940, held that Title 29, Section 107 of the United States Code Annotated, sets out the only conditions under which a federal court may issue injunctions in labor disputes. And in Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 3 Cir., 105 F.2d 948, decided in 1939, it was held that the unlawful acts mentioned were construed to be acts of violence.

It is apparent, therefore, that under this definition of a labor dispute, in view of the positive prohibitions, federal courts generally do not have injunctive powers in labor disputes.

A new and very important element entered into this picture in 1947 when Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, which is reported at 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. It is necessary to understand what Section 186 — also referred to in the statutory bill as Section 302 — actually provides. Modifying the general denial to federal courts of injunctive powers in labor disputes, Congress has seen fit in this Act to open the door just a bit, and to define a narrow path for federal courts to trod.

This section provides, in general, that it will be unlawful for any employer to pay, or for any representative of any employees to receive from the employer, money or other thing of value in an industry affecting commerce except "with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents."

The Congress then laid down certain conditions under which the trust fund, as such, should be established. It provided first that the moneys must be held in trust for the purpose of paying for the benefit of employees or their families for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance.

That is a very broad definition, but in the main it declares that these moneys be earmarked, these moneys be set aside, these moneys be used for the specific purpose of what one might properly call welfare benefits.

The second requirement is that the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer.

Three, that the employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of the fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon; and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break it, then to shorten it, an umpire is to be designated, and if the parties cannot agree on him, the District Court of the United States where the trust fund has its principal office shall appoint such person.

And, lastly, the trust fund shall also contain provisions for an annual audit, a statement of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons.

Essentially, that is the keystone of this case, by which it must be tested. It is true that there is provision for a fine of ten thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than a year, or both, for a wilful violation. And it is provided specifically, and this is interesting, in subsection (e) of the same section, that the district courts of the United States "shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown * * * to restrain violations of this section, without regard to the provisions of section 17 of Title 15 and section 52 of this title, and the provisions of sections 101-115 of this title."

With regard to those sections that involve title 15, they deal, in the main, with anti-trust violations.

So there is this very narrow opening in the theretofore solid wall of denial of the power of injunction in cases of labor disputes. It therefore becomes necessary for this particular Court, as a finder of facts, to pass upon a series of elements.

The first thing which addresses itself to the trial court is whether or not there ever was in existence as a document or as a compelling agreement what has been referred to as Plaintiff's No. 9 for identification and now in the record as Court Exhibit No. 1, to wit, a six-page mimeographed agreement which bears typewritten names purportedly representing the signatures of the signatories to it.

In the year 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration, there is testimony that some representatives of both management and labor went to New York City and Brooklyn, New York, and made inquiry and investigation into the operations of a welfare fund which was then operating in that state.

There is testimony before this Court that the welfare fund in suit in the District of Columbia is the second one in the history of labor. At all events, there has been testimony that with the information gained from that investigation the parties began to draft a composite trust agreement that might work in the District of Columbia. The Court finds that was done and is the fact.

It is borne out by such perfectly unbiased testimony as that of the representative of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, who testified that in the month of April, 1947 there was received in his office an inquiry as to whether, if that...