Coltrane v. Lappin

• Decision Date: 15 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–117 (RBW).
• Citation: 885 F.Supp.2d 228
• Parties: Mary L. COLTRANE, Plaintiff–Administratrix, v. Harley G. LAPPIN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

885 F.Supp.2d 228

Mary L. COLTRANE, Plaintiff–Administratrix,

v.Harley G. LAPPIN,¹ et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–117 (RBW).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Aug. 15, 2012.

Mary L. Coltrane, Washington, DC, pro se.

Alexander Daniel Shoaibi, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Mary L. Coltrane, proceeding pro se, brings this action on behalf of herself and her deceased son, Carlton Coltrane, who was allegedly “murdered on January 18, 2010, while under the care, custody, and control of the [d]efendants at the United States Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana (“USP Pollock”).” First Amended Complaint for Monetary Damages,Declaratory Relief, Jury and Bench Trial (“Am. Compl.”) at 2–3. Currently before the Court is the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (“Defs.' Mot.”). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,² the Court concludes for the following reasons that the defendants' alternative motion to transfer must be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The amended complaint contains the following pertinent allegations. The plaintiff is a resident of the District of Columbia and the mother of the decedent, Carlton Coltrane, Am. Compl. ¶ 3, who was a federal prisoner detained at USP Pollock, id. at 1–2. “On various occasions before January 18, 2010, Mr. Coltrane had informed USP Pollock staff, verbally and in writing, that he should be separated from the assailant or assailants involved in his murder, but [they] ignored these notices” and generally failed to comply with Federal Bureau of Prisons' (“BOP”) policies in handling his complaints. Id. ¶ 18. Then, “[o]n January 18, 2010, [Mr.] Coltrane was stabbed and murdered by one or more assailants at USP Pollock.” Id. ¶ 15. The plaintiff was notified of her son's death on January 20, 2010. Id.

The plaintiff instituted this action on January 18, 2011, and subsequently amended her complaint on December 16, 2011. The amended complaint names ten individual defendants, id. at 1–2, including Harley G. Lappin, former Director of the BOP, and Gerardo Maldonado, Jr., the Regional Director of the BOP charged with overseeing USP Pollock, see id. ¶¶ 4–5. The remaining eight individual defendants were employees of USP Pollock at the time of Mr. Coltrane's death. See id. ¶¶ 6–13. They are Joe Keffer; Newton E. Kendig, M.D.; Joel Alexander; John Doe or Jane Doe Operations Lieutenant; Willis Steortz, R.N.; Andre Molina Ossers, M.D.; Willie Vasquez, P.A.; and Dalynn Lentz, R.N. Id. at 1–2. All of these defendants are sued “in their personal and individual capacities.” Id. at 2; see also ¶¶ 4–13. The United States is also named as a defendant. Id. ¶ 14.

The amended complaint sets forth three counts against the individual defendants: Count 1 asserts that the “individual [d]efendants engaged in a cover-up and conspiracy and continue to cover[ ]up the true facts of the murder of Carlton Coltrane in violation of [the plaintiff's] right to due process pursuant to [the] Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the laws of the District of Columbia”; Count 2 asserts that “[d]efendants Lappin, Maldonado, Keffer, John Doe or Jane Doe Operations Lieutenant, and Alexander maliciously deprived Carlton Coltrane of his life through their purposeful and deliberate failure to separate and protect him from the assailant or assailants that they knew or should have known were intent on doing him grievous bodily harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the laws of the District of Columbia”; and Count 3 asserts that “[d]efendants Kendig, Alexander, Steortz, Molina Ossers, Vasquez, and Lentz maliciously deprived Carlton Coltraneof his life through their purposeful and deliberate failure to provide adequate medical care and transportation in a timely manner to the proper medical facilities in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the laws of the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶¶ 21–23. Count 4 of the amended complaint asserts a tort claim against the United States for Mr. Coltrane's “personal injury and death,” id. ¶¶ 24, 14, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), id. ¶ 1.

The defendants have now moved to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), improper venue under 12(b)(3), improper service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). See Defs.' Mot. at 1. In the alternative, the defendants request that the Court transfer this case to the Western District of Louisiana. Id.³

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) authorizes a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for “improper venue.” “ ‘In considering a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court accepts the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor, and resolves any factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor.’ ” Sierra Club v. Johnson, 623 F.Supp.2d 31, 34 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Darby v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 231 F.Supp.2d 274, 276 (D.D.C.2002)). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff ‘bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.’ ” Id. (quoting Varma v. Gutierrez, 421 F.Supp.2d 110, 113 (D.D.C.2006)). If a district court determines that venue is improper, it may either dismiss the case, “or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants

1. Venue

Counts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint assert constitutional claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments against the individual defendants. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–23. The defendants move to dismiss these claims on the ground of improper venue. Defs.' Mem. at 34.

The parties initially dispute which venue provision applies here. The defendants contend that the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), ⁴ applies because Counts 1 through 3 of the amended complaint seek money damages from the defendants in their individual capacities pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), Defs.' Mem. at 34, and because “[v]enue in a Bivens case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),” Simpson v. BOP, 496 F.Supp.2d 187, 193 (D.D.C.2007) (citing, among others, Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 257 (D.C.Cir.1993)). The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) applies because she is suing the individual defendants in their “official capacities.” ⁵See Pl.'s Opp'n at 2–4.

Even giving her the benefit of her pro se status, the Court finds the plaintiff's position meritless. First, her amended complaint premises venue in this Court solely on § 1391(b); it does not mention § 1391(e). See Am. Compl. ¶ 2. Second, although the plaintiff now argues that she is suing the individual defendants in their official capacities and apparently is not advancing Bivens claims, her amended complaint asserts constitutional claims against the defendants only in their “individual capacities,” id. at 2, ¶¶ 4–13, and requests “[c]ompensatory damages from each individual [d]efendant,” id. at 12.⁶ These are quintessential Bivens claims. See Scinto v. BOP, 608 F.Supp.2d 4, 8 (D.D.C.2009) (“ Bivens by its very nature is a private damages action against individual federal employees for violating a citizen's constitutional rights”). Because “ § 1391(e) applies only to suits against government officers in their official capacities, [and] not to Bivens actions,” Cameron, 983 F.2d at 256, the controlling venue provision here is § 1391(b).⁷See Joyner v. Reno, 466 F.Supp.2d 31, 41 (D.D.C.2006) (“While § 1391(e) applies to suits against government officials acting in their official capacities, ... the proper venue provision for this and other cases in which federal officials are sued in their individual capacities based on federal question jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).” (internal citation and footnote omitted)).

Having determined the applicable venue provision, the question now becomes whether venue properly lies in this District under § 1391(b) with respect to the plaintiff's Bivens claims. Section 1391(b) provides that a civil action may be brought in any judicial district (1) “in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located”; (2) “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated”; or (3) “if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3). As the defendants argue and the plaintiff does not contest, see Defs.' Mem. at 34–35; Pl.'s Opp'n at 2–4, none of the provisions of § 1391(b) authorize venue in this District because: (1) all of the individual defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiff's claims (all of which relate to the treatment and murder of her son at USP Pollock) did not occur in the District of Columbia; and (3) there is a judicial district in which venue would be proper under § 1391(b)(2)—the Western District of Louisiana. ⁸

While not disputing the impropriety of venue in this District...