Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

• Decision Date: 21 November 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 12–1872 RC
• Parties: Jeremy Pinson, Plaintiff, v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

74 F.Supp.3d 283

Jeremy Pinson, Plaintiff

v.U.S. Department of Justice, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 12–1872 RC

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 21, 2014

Jeremy Pinson, Florence, CO, pro se.

Eric Joseph Young, Carl Ezekiel Ross, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

Re Doc. No.: 102

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Transferring Plaintiff's Preliminary Injunction and Privacy Act Claim to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This action is before the Court on Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson's (“Plaintiff”) August 15, 2014, Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“preliminary injunction”), which seeks to enjoin the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) from sharing Plaintiff's inmate records in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a (“Privacy Act”). The preliminary injunction stems from an original complaint filed with this Court on November 15, 2012, and subsequently amended¹ to include other federal agencies and employees involved in the administration of the federal prison system. The operative complaint was brought pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), the Privacy Act, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (“Bivens”).²

The preliminary injunction at issue here focuses on events allegedly occurring at a United States Penitentiary (“USP”) Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence, Colorado (“ADX Florence”), where Plaintiff is currently incarcerated. Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin “DOJ from allowing its employees [at ADX Florence] to violate [P]laintiff's Privacy Act rights[ ]” by disseminating inmate records. See Pl.'s Prelim. Inj. at 1–2, ECF No. 102. Plaintiff alleges that he is under constant threat of harm from other inmates because these records detail complaints filed with prison investigators pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 15601 et seq., the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”), which identify Plaintiff as an informant. See id. at 1–3. In opposition, Defendant DOJ asks the Court to sever the preliminary injunction from Plaintiff's earlier claims³ because 1) the claims are not logically related nor do they share common questions of law or fact, and 2) the District Court of Colorado is a more appropriate venue given Plaintiff's incarceration in the state, the location of witnesses and records, and other efficiency factors. See Defs.' Opp. Prelim. Inj. at 1–2, 5–9, ECF No. 105.

For the reasons detailed below, the Court denies Defendant DOJ's request to dismiss the preliminary injunction. Pursuant to Rule 21, however, the Court grants Defendant's request to sever the preliminary injunction and sua sponte severs Plaintiff's Privacy Act claim, transferring both to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff's FOIA claim, however, will remain before this Court as a separate action, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) ; similarly, Plaintiff's Bivens claim will remain before this Court because the transferee district may lack personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought ....”) (emphasis added); In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 720 (D.C.Cir.1983) (determining that section 1404(a) expressly requires that venue in the transferee court be proper) (discussing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) ).

II. BACKGROUND

Parties named in Plaintiff's complaint include DOJ, Charles E. Samuels, Jr. (“Samuels”), Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and John Dignam (“Dignam”), Chief of the Office of Internal Affairs at BOP. Samuels and Dignam are named in both their official and individual capacities. The complaint alleges that: i) DOJ and its components violated FOIA by refusing to produce information in response to a range of requests submitted by Plaintiff; ii) Defendants Samuels, Dignam, and BOP and its employees at both ADX Florence and the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, Alabama (“FCI Talladega”) violated the Privacy Act by: a) entering false information into Plaintiff's internal files; b) refusing to remove such information upon request by Plaintiff; and c) allowing other personal information in Plaintiff's records to be disseminated to inmates at ADX Florence without Plaintiff's consent; and finally iii) Defendants BOP, Samuels, and Dignam violated Plaintiff's Constitutional rights⁴ in retaliation for Plaintiff's participation in litigation against BOP, criticism of BOP online, and continued contact with media sources.⁵ In response, Defendant DOJ filed a range of pre-answer motions on the various portions of Plaintiff's claims, requesting that the Court either dismiss Plaintiff's claims or grant summary judgment in its favor.

III. SEVERING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

Before electing to transfer a claim,⁶ the court must first sever the relevant claims into separate cases, so that one may be transferred in its entirety. See Spaeth v. Michigan State Univ. Coll. of Law, 845 F.Supp.2d 48, 57 n. 13 (D.D.C.2012) (severing claims prior to transferring, per § 1404(a) ); Abuhouran v. Nicklin, 764 F.Supp.2d 130, 132 (D.D.C.2011) ( “[B]ecause § 1406(a) contemplates the transfer of a ‘case,’ ... the claims must first be severed into separate cases ....”); accord Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618–19 (2d Cir.1968) (recognizing that claims must first be severed into separate actions prior to being transferred or retained under § 1404(a) ). For the reasons discussed below, the Court i) severs Plaintiff's preliminary injunction because it involves factual events distinct from those forming the basis of the complaint, and ii) severs Plaintiff's Privacy Act claim because it is wholly unrelated to his FOIA claim.

A. Legal Standard

The court is entitled to sever any claim against a party, either in response to a motion or sua sponte, and to proceed with each separately.⁷ See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 ;⁸ see, e.g., Davidson v. D.C., 736 F.Supp.2d 115, 119 (D.D.C.2010) ; Lucas v. Barreto, 2005 WL 607923, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2005) ; 21 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1689 (3d ed. 1998) (“[A]lthough the primary significance of Rule 21 is in the context of joinder of parties, it does have an effect on the joinder of claims.”). In determining whether to join or sever claims, courts employ the permissive joinder requirements articulated in Rule 20(a), which permits claims to be joined if: 1) the claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 2) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs arose in the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a) ;⁹ see alsoMontgomery v. STG Int'l, Inc., 532 F.Supp.2d 29, 35 (D.D.C.2008) ; Disparte v. Corp. Exec. Bd., 223 F.R.D. 7, 10–11 (D.D.C.2004). Even if the requirements of Rule 20(a) are met, the final decision to sever claims remains with the court. See M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 137 (D.D.C.2002) (“The determination of a motion to sever is within the discretion of the trial court.”) (citation omitted).

First, to satisfy the “same transaction or occurrence” prong of Rule 20(a), the claims must be logically related. See Davidson v. D.C., 736 F.Supp.2d 115, 119 (D.D.C.2010) (“ ‘[A]ll ‘logically related’ events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence.' ”) (quoting Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir.1974) ). This logical relationship test must remain flexible because “the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 10 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ). The movant, however, cannot join parties “who simply engaged in similar types of behavior ... [but are] otherwise unrelated; some allegation of concerted action ... is required.” Spaeth v. Mich. State Univ. College of Law, 845 F.Supp.2d 48, 53 (D.D.C.2012) (citation omitted). The second prong of Rule 20(a) “requires only that there be some common question of law or fact as to all of the plaintiffs' claims, not that all legal and factual issues be common to all the plaintiffs.” Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 11 (citing Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334 ). In deciding to sever claims, however, the court should consider whether the decision risks prejudicing a party or causing undue delay. See Davidson, 736 F.Supp.2d at 120 (citing M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 138 (D.D.C.2002) (internal citation omitted)); see also Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 12 (recognizing that in applying Rule 20(a), the court should avoid prejudicing the parties or confusing the jury) (citation omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendants ask the Court to sever the preliminary injunction from Plaintiff's broader claims because the two are not logically related, nor are they governed by common questions of law or fact. See Defs.' Opp. Prelim. Inj. at 6, ECF No. 105. Citing Rule 20(a), Defendants argue that the claims are “separated by time, distance, and circumstances [and][o]ther than the fact that they both arise under the Privacy Act, Plaintiff has ‘offered nothing to suggest the claims are logically related in any way.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Defendants claim that whereas the complaint alleges a pattern of retaliation and the inclusion of false information into files at FCI Talladega, the preliminary injunction focuses on the dissemination of records at ADX Florence, thereby indicating that Plaintiff is pursuing “separate [legal] theories unlikely to present common questions of law or fact.” Id. at 6–7.

Plaintiff's reply argues that Rule 20 and 21 are inapplicable here because the two are “meant to...