Columbia Air Services v. Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 18142.,18142.
• Citation: 977 A.2d 636,293 Conn. 342
• Parties: COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

977 A.2d 636

293 Conn. 342

COLUMBIA AIR SERVICES, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.

No. 18142.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 6, 2009.

Decided September 8, 2009.

Ralph J. Monaco, with whom were Patrick J. Day, New London, and Nicholas W. Burlingham, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Paul K. Pernerewski, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

This appeal arises from an action brought by the plaintiff, Columbia Air Services, Inc., against the defendants, the department of transportation (department)¹ and its commissioner, Stephen E. Korta II (commissioner), in connection with the proposed development of certain land located at the Groton-New London Airport (airport). The plaintiff appeals² from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendants after the trial court had granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all counts of the plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss with regard to three of the counts. We conclude that the entire action is barred by sovereign immunity and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The department owns and operates the airport, which functions as a general aviation airport serving air traffic other than large commercial carriers. Aviation services at the airport, such as fueling and aircraft maintenance, are provided by entities that lease parcels of land from the department.

In 2003, the plaintiff, which was providing certain aviation support services at the airport, requested the opportunity to lease and develop an additional 2.6 acres of land immediately abutting its existing leasehold at the airport (parcel). The commissioner thereafter issued a public invitation for proposals regarding the development and operation of the parcel. The invitation stated that, after reviewing proposals submitted in response to the invitation, the commissioner would approve one proposal and then negotiate with that applicant to reach an agreement.³ The invitation further stated that the commissioner, in his sole discretion, had the right to "cancel all negotiations and terminate the proposal process at any time prior to" the state's execution of a final agreement, and such cancellation would be without recourse by the selected applicant.

After the plaintiff was notified that it was the successful applicant, the department and the plaintiff engaged in negotiations regarding the plaintiff's proposed lease and development of the parcel. Following negotiations that lasted approximately two and one-half years, but did not result in a final agreement, the department notified the plaintiff that it was terminating the proposal process. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought the action underlying this appeal, seeking, inter alia, compensatory damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the entire action on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding, primarily, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. "A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [decision to] grant ... the motion to dismiss will be de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546, 550, 903 A.2d 217 (2006). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 51, 794 A.2d 498 (2002); see also Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).

As we recently have explained, "[t]rial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case.... [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.... Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed.

"When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader....

"In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint.... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts].... If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings.... If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations ... or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question ... the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein....

"Finally, where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). In the present case, the jurisdictional issue was decided on the basis of the undisputed facts in the record.

On appeal, the plaintiff makes numerous claims of impropriety regarding the trial court's dismissal of its claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; and (3) deprivation of constitutional rights. In response, the defendants assert that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss because all of these claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We agree with the defendants that sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's action. We therefore do not reach the plaintiff's remaining claims on appeal.

"Sovereign immunity relates to a court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and therefore presents a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.... In so doing, we must decide whether [the trial court's] conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.... The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law.... It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law.... Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is in effect, against the state.... Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).

"[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute. There are [three] exceptions: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity; Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 86, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987); and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority. Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 497, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled in part by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003)." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, supra, 284 Conn. at 720-21, 937 A.2d 675. For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, "this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed.... Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284...