Columbia & P.S.R. Co. v. City of Seattle

Decision Date17 December 1903
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesCOLUMBIA & P. S. R. CO. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Geo. C. Hatch, Judge.

Action by the Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad Company against the city of Seattle and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Mitchell Gilliam and Wm. Parmerlee, for appellants.

Piles Douworth & Howe, Charles H. Farrell, and Chas. S. Gleason for respondent.

HADLEY J.

The appellant city of Seattle, through its co-appellants constituting the board of public works of said city, issued to the respondent a building permit granting leave to erect a building in said city. The permit was afterwards withdrawn as far as it related to a portion of the land upon which respondent sought to build. This action was then brought to procure a mandatory injunction commanding appellants to forthwith cancel the revocation of the permit and to issue another granting leave to erect the building upon the premises as described in respondent's application. The prayer of the complaint also asks that, after such new permit shall have been issued, the appellants shall be perpetually enjoined from in any manner interfering with respondent in the erection of the building upon the said premises. The controversy arises over a dispute as to the ownership of a strip of land 13 1/2 feet in width adjoining the westerly line of lot 1, block 2, of Maynard's Plat of the town, now city, of Seattle. The city claims that this strip is a part of a public street. Respondent disputes this, and alleges that it is the owner of the land, and that the same is not now, and never was, in a public street. This dispute is made an issue in the pleadings, and the complaint asks that respondent's title and possession shall be quieted as against appellants, and that they shall be perpetually enjoined from setting up any claim of title or right of possession to said premises. The cause was tried before the court without a jury, findings of facts and conclusions of law were made, and judgment was entered thereon to the effect that respondent is the owner in fee simple of the premises in dispute, that its title thereto is quieted as against appellants, and that the injunctive relief sought by respondent is granted. This appeal is from said judgment.

It is assigned that the court erred in making the following portion of its third finding of facts: 'And by said plat the said Maynard did not intend to dedicate to the public anything west of said lot one (1), block two (2).' To make clear the contention under this assignment of error, it is necessary to review somewhat the appearances as disclosed by the plat originally filed by Maynard. Said lot 1, block 2, is in the extreme western tier of lots as shown upon said plat. The plat shows that these lots extend into the waters of Elliott Bay, some being wholly and some partially covered by water at ordinary high tide. Said lot 1, block 2, is wholly below the line of ordinary high tide, which line crosses the said block about the middle thereof, and extends in a northerly and southerly direction. It is conceded that said lot as platted, and also the strip in dispute in front of it, lie wholly within the patent line of the Maynard donation claim. By virtue of the disclaimer in the state Constitution, as heretofore frequently held by this court, the tide land within the patent line became originally a part of the donation claim. The Maynard plat was made to cover lands within said donation claim. Lines are drawn upon the plat to indicate the west boundary of the lots and blocks, but the streets running in an east and west direction are not closed by lines at the westerly limit of the plat. No street is designated upon the plat as being to the west of and adjoining to the row of lots and blocks above mentioned; but appellants reason that the intention to dedicate a street there may be inferred from the fact that, inasmuch as westerly boundary lines are designated for the lots and blocks, and no lines indicate the termini there of the streets running east and west, it was therefore intended that the streets should continue beyond the line of the lots and blocks, and should connect with another street running parallel with and abutting upon the westerly line of the lots and blocks. This argument of appellants is urged as being emphasized by a further indication appearing upon the plat. The eastern portion of the plat is wider than the extreme western portion. Three rows of blocks on the southerly side of the plat extend but little more than half the distance of the full length of the plat on the north. At the west end of said shorter portion of the plat a continuous line is drawn, which bounds the lots and blocks, and closes the streets running east and west at that place. It is therefore urged that by drawing the line across the streets in that portion of the plat the intention to close them without any connection to the west is clear, and that the absence of such a line at the further western extremity of the plat indicates an intention to leave the streets open to connect with another running at right angles to them. Upon the other hand, respondent contends that since across the extreme east side of the plat a street is designated both by boundary lines and by name, the absence of such designation on the west, either by boundary lines or by name, shows an intention not to dedicate a street on the west side of the plat.

While the intention of the person making the dedication is to be determined largely from what appears upon the plat, yet resort must also be had to the law regulating the filing of plats, and the intention must be determined from what the plat shows, in connection with requirements of law necessary to a dedication. The Maynard plat shows that it was executed May 23, 1853. The territory now comprised by this state was prior to March 2, 1853, a part of the then territory of Oregon, the act of Congress creating the territory of Washington having been passed on said date. The new territory was, however, not organized at the time the Maynard plat was filed, and the first session of Territorial Legislature did not convene until February 27, 1854. The plat was therefore governed by the laws of Oregon territory as they existed at the time it was filed. The Session Laws of that territory for 1850-51, pp. 260, 261, contain an act 'in respect to the recording of town plats.' That law was in force when the Maynard plat was filed. Section 1 of the act is as follows: 'Any person or persons, his, her, or their legal representatives, who may hereafter lay off any town within this territory, shall, previous to the sale of any lots in such town, cause to be recorded in the recorder's office of the county wherein the same may lie, a correct copy of the plat of said town, with the public grounds (if any there be), streets, lanes and alleys, with their respective widths properly marked, and the lots regularly numbered in numerical order, and the size of the lots marked by reference to the plat of said town.' It will be observed that the section requires that streets, with their respective widths, shall be properly marked. This was not done by the dedicator of the Maynard plat at the place where appellants claim he intended to dedicate a street. A blank space is left there without any marked boundaries or any designation by name. Other streets and alleys are distinctly marked by boundary lines, and the streets also by names. Maynard must be presumed to have known the requirements of the law, and, inasmuch as he so carefully complied with it in designating streets and alleys at other places, and with as much apparent care omitted to designate one at the place in question, we think, when the law and the plat are considered together, it should not be held that he intended to dedicate a street which he in no way designated. Appellants cite a number of cases which they urge in support of the rule that in the interpretation of plats force must be given to the lines appearing thereon, and that they are often as potent to convey the intention of the dedicator as the written words. The rule urged is well recognized, and is founded in good reason. But applying it to the plat in question, it appears to us that the lines made upon this plat silently say that Maynard intended to designate the streets which he indicated by lines as well as by names, and that he did not intend to dedicate more. We...

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9 cases
  • Kansas City Terminal Railway Company v. James
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1923
    ...219 S.W. 355; Donovan v. Railroad, 199 U.S. 279; Railroad v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230; Railway v. Roseville, 76 Oh. St. 108; Railway v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 513; Bacon v. Railroad, 83 Vt. Clif. Langsdale for respondents. (1) The plaintiff and the Shaw Transfer Company, seek by this suit to perf......
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    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 26, 1943
    ...act positively and unequivocally indicating such intention.' Seattle v. Hill, 23 Wash. 92, 97, 62 P. 446, 448. See, also, Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Seattle, supra; Provident Trust Co. v. Spokane, 63 Wash. 92, 114 1030; Stevens County v. Burrus, 180 Wash. 420, 40 P.2d 125. The appellants di......
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