Columbian Fuel Corp. v. Skidmore

• Decision Date: 05 November 1948
• Citation: 308 Ky. 447,214 S.W.2d 761
• Parties: COLUMBIAN FUEL CORPORATION v. SKIDMORE.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

214 S.W.2d 761

308 Ky. 447

COLUMBIAN FUEL CORPORATION v. SKIDMORE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

November 5, 1948

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County; R. Monroe Fields, Judge.

Action by H. L. Skidmore against the Columbian Fuel Corporation for breach of contract with respect to drilling of a gas well wherein defendant filed a counterclaim. From a judgment the defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Hobson & Scott, of Pikeville, for appellant.

P. B Stratton, of Pikeville, for appellee.

STANLEY Commissioner.

By a parol contract the Columbian Fuel Corporation employed H. L. Skidmore to drill a gas well for $2.40 per foot. This was the extent of the express contract. Skidmore had previously drilled a number of wells for the corporation and it may be assumed that the parties understood the necessary details. It is not controverted that the contract was for a completed well, as might be determined by the company. Nor is the legal implication of reasonable skill and care and proper workmanship questioned. The evidence shows that it was understood if the driller failed through his own fault to drill to a point where gas was found, it would be his duty to skid his outfit to another location and drill a new well at his own expense.

When a depth of 1,984 feet had been reached, the tools became fastened because of cave-ins. The driller struggled for three weeks to extricate them. An effort to 'drill by' also failed. Not only were the efforts to loosen the drilling tools unavailing, but some of the fishing tools became fastened. Finally, Skidmore prepared to use an explosive, which is simply called 'gelatine,' to shoot the well for the purpose of loosening the tools that he might continue the drilling. The method to be employed is fully described in the record and seems to be well known in the business. Learning of Skidmore's preparation, the officers of the company sent a subordinate employe to the well to direct him not to shoot it. Construing the message and other acts of the company's agent as a wrongful interference with the drilling, and as taking over the job, Skidmore abandoned the contract. He filed this suit to recover damages for its breach, compensation for use of his drilling rig, damage to an engine and the value of his lost tools. He claimed $4,641.60 for work done, being at the contract price of $2.40 a foot for 1,934 feet, and stated sums for the other items.

The defendant denied its breach, and charged that the plaintiff broke the contract by deliberately and wrongfully abandoning the job. It counterclaimed for certain damages and expenses incurred in removing the casing, and for loss of part of it not recovered. It also sought recovery of the difference of 35 cents a foot that it was required to pay another contractor for drilling another well to a depth of 3,115 feet.

The court transferred the action to the equity docket on the defendant's motion because of the complicated accounts and details. The judgment is in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed for drilling, $4,641.60; for damages to his engine, $250; and for the loss of drilling tools, $643.06. The court disallowed an award of $750 reported by the master commissioner for the use of the plaintiff's machinery, and dismissed the counterclaim.

The point on which the case turns is which party violated the contract. Other issues are subordinate.

The technical and expert evidence as to the propriety of shooting the well in order to extricate the tools is conflicting. Skidmore had twenty-five years' experience in drilling oil and gas wells. His proposed action was a customary method, he and others testified. It was to be taken in reliance not only upon his own judgment but that of other experienced drillers whom he consulted. The company's officers thought that discharging the explosive would do no good and might injuriously affect the production of other wells on the lease. It may be that under such circumstances and in the absence of definite contractual limitations, the driller has the right to exercise his judgment where the only contract is to drill a well, becoming responsible to the other party for resulting damage to his property. It is of significance that afterward, Williamson, the general field representative of the company, tried to get Skidmore to go back, telling him he could shoot the well or do what he pleased with it. But in the present case, the decision of the trial court in favor of the driller is regarded as a finding of fact on the issue. It is entitled to the same consideration as a verdict of a jury properly instructed on the question of whether it was a proper or an improper course to take.

We summarize the other evidence. Van Patten, the company's general superintendent, instructed Crum, a field superintendent, either to go himself or send some one to tell Skidmore not to shoot the tools off or put in a shot at that depth, as it would ruin the hole, and for him to start a new well. Crum sent Carney, a subordinate employe. This message, the company's officials say in evidence, was the equivalent of a positive order. Before going Carney told Crum that Skidmore would quit and leave, for he had heard him say that morning he would do so if the company interfered. Crum replied that he did not want the workmen to go. Carney testified he instructed him to ask them to stay on the job; but Crum denied having told Carney to hire the drillers. Skidmore's wife also warned one of the field superintendents that would be the result of interference.

Carney delivered the message to Skidmore, and told him if he could not clean the well out without shooting the well, the company would take it over. He responded that he 'would turn it over to them and let them have it.' Carney asked if he would leave the four men there and Skidmore replied they would be working for the company; also, that he would expect $50 a day for the use of his rig. Carney's testimony is: 'I told Skidmore the company did not want the well shot, and he said he was going to quit. So, I went on, and we talked around there, and he told the men to gather up their stuff and get ready to go in, he had quit. When he told them that, I told him that Mr. Crum wanted the men to stay in there, and he asked them if they wanted to stay and work for the company according to what Mr. Crum told me, that he wanted the men to stay in there. I thought he wanted them to work for the company; and Mr. Skidmore told me they had to have a stem and a bailer and told me where to get them, and I took the truck and hauled them and some rock.'

Skidmore's evidence is more specific. Three of the workmen testified to like effect. So there is really no material difference in the evidence as to what occurred at the time.

Crum had instructed Carney to get certain tools and some crushed rock and take to the well for use in the process of getting out the drilling tools. He did that after Skidmore left and reported it to Crum that night, though it does not appear he then reported to Crum that Skidmore had abandoned the job. The men continued their efforts to loosen the tools for about a week, and then damaged the gas engine so it could not be used without extensive repair. It was then, according to the company's operating officers, they learned that Skidmore had abandoned the job. When he refused to undertake it again, the company pulled out as much of its casing as it could, and had a well drilled by another contractor.

The appellant denies Carney had any authority to take over the well or that it ratified his action. Carney was a general handy-man, collecting the daily reports of the various wells carrying messages, etc. It is true he had no general authority under which he could take over the contract, but it is a fair conclusion that the officers who had that authority, particularly the field superintendent, Crum, did in fact...