Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood

• Decision Date: 16 December 1921
• Citation: 193 Ky. 395,236 S.W. 562
• Parties: COLUMBIAN NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. WOOD.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

236 S.W. 562

193 Ky. 395

COLUMBIAN NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. WOOD.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 16, 1921

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Christian County.

Action by Hattie C. Wood against the Columbian National Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Wm Marshall Bullitt and Bruce & Bullitt, all of Louisville, for appellant.

Trimble & Bell, of Hopkinsville, for appellee.

SAMPSON J.

The policy of life insurance on which appellee, Hattie C. Wood brought this action and recovered in the lower court a judgment for $2,000 against the appellant, Columbian National Life Insurance Company, contains a clause insuring only:

"Against loss resulting from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means (excluding self-destruction, or any attempt thereat, while sane or insane)."

Her husband, Thomas O. Wood, the insured, committed suicide in August, 1918, by shooting himself through the head. Briefly the facts are these: Wood and his wife had become estranged and she had taken their nine months old baby, and, leaving Hopkinsville, their home, went to the home of her father in the country, where she remained a few days, later returning to the city of Hopkinsville. She had consulted an attorney about instituting divorce proceedings. Wood was an employee in the post office, but at times did and said strange and unnatural things. He was very anxious to have his wife return home, and besought her to do so. He also endeavored to procure other persons to assist him in inducing her to return home. He had pleaded with her to talk the matter over with him, and in doing so had on different occasions shed tears copiously; when she refused he said he would kill himself and their nine months old baby if she did not return to him. Their marriage relations were at this stage when on the afternoon of an August day he left the post office, and, going in the direction of home, came by the house where his wife was visiting and, seeing her at the window, he went up and asked her to come home, if not to stay, at least to talk over their difficulties. This she refused to do, whereupon he said to her, "I am going to do what I told you," he then asked to see the baby and the lady of the house brought it to the door, he took it in his arms, caressing it tenderly, declaring how much he loved it; he then walked back to the window where his wife was sitting, and again besought her to go home with him, and when she refused he said, "I am going to do what I told you." This frightened the wife, and she began to scream, whereupon he ran around the house up an alley, and, taking a pistol from his pocket, sent a bullet through the infant and into himself, killing the infant instantly and inflicting a mortal wound upon himself, but to make assurance doubly sure he placed the pistol to his head and fired another shot which caused his death immediately.

Courts generally hold a clause in a policy exempting life insurance companies from liability for death by suicide, enforceable, and this too when the act is done by the insured while "sane or insane." Our rule, we think, is somewhat more just and equitable, and allows a recovery on a policy which contains a suicide clause, "whether sane or insane," if the mind of the insured man was so far gone at the time he committed the act which resulted in his death that he did not know he was taking his life, or that the act which he was committing would likely result in his death. If he had mind enough to know that the act would probably result in his death, or if he inflicted it with that intention, it is his act in law, for which the company is not responsible. Masonic Life Ass'n v. Pollard, 121 Ky. 351, 89 S.W. 219, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 301, 123 Am. St. Rep. 198; 14 R. C. L. p. 1233.

While there were a number of witnesses introduced by the insurance company who testified that Wood acted like a normal, rational person on the day of his death and at all times previous thereto, there is enough evidence to the contrary by other witnesses to justify the submission of the question of his sanity to the jury. As it is conceded that the insured committed suicide the only remaining issue is, Was he sane or insane at the time he took his life? If he was sane or if he was rational enough to know that he was taking his own life or that the act which he was about to perform--fire a bullet from a pistol into his body or head--was likely or calculated to bring about his death, the quoted clause of the policy is operative, and there can be no recovery on the policy. If, on the contrary, Wood was so insane that he did not know or realize that he was about to kill himself, or that the act of firing a bullet from his pistol into his body or head would likely bring about his death, the policy is not...