Columbus R. Co v. Waller

• Citation: 12 Ga.App. 674,78 S.E. 52
• Decision Date: 06 May 1913
• Docket Number: (No. 4,705.)
• Parties: COLUMBUS R. CO. v. WALLER.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

(12 Ga.App. 674)

78 S.E. 52

COLUMBUS R. CO.

v.WALLER.

(No. 4, 705.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 6, 1913.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Street Railroads (§ 117^*) — Collision with Automobile—Ordinances—Reasonableness.

The question whether a municipal ordinance is reasonable and valid is one of law for the court. In the present case it was error, requiring the granting of a new trial, to charge the jury that they should examine the facts and circumstances in the evidence and determine whether or not the municipal ordinance prescribing the maximum rate of speed at' which automobiles could be propelled along a specified part of the highway was reasonable and valid. The ordinance was reasonable, and the only question for the jury was as to its applicability to the facts of the case on trial.

[Ed Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 239-257; Dec. Dig. § 117.*]

2. Review.

Other than as above indicated, there is no error in the record.

Error from City Court of Columbus; G. Y. Tigner, Judge.

Action by R. A. Waller against the Columbus Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

F. U. Garrard and A. W. Cozart, both of Columbus, and A. S. Bradley, of Swainsboro, for plaintiff in error.

Wynn & Wohlwender, of Columbus, for defendant in error.

POTTLE, J. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for an injury to his automobile, resulting from a collision with a street car of the defendant, and the defendant excepts to the overruling of its motion for new trial.

1. An ordinance of the city of Columbus was introduced in evidence, prohibiting the running of an automobile on any bridge in the city at a greater rate of speed than three miles per hour. Complaint is made that the court refused a written request to charge the jury that, if the plaintiff ran his automobile on an approach to a bridge at a rate of speed of over three miles per hour, he would be guilty of an act of negligence, as a matter of law; and that the court instructed the jury that if they should find that the plaintiff ran his automobile upon a bridge (which would include its immediate abutments and approaches) at a greater rate of speed than three miles per hour, and if they should find, from the facts and circumstances and the location, that the ordinance was reasonable and valid, and the plaintiff's injury was caused by running his machine at such a rate of speed, and not by reason of the negligence of the company, he would not be entitled to recover. The criticism upon this charge is, we think, well founded. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the damage to the plaintiffs machine occurred on an approach to a bridge, and also as to the rate of speed at which the plaintiff was propelling his machine. According to his testimony, the injury occurred about 40 feet from the end of the bridge, and he was driving along very slowly. According to some of the testimony for the defendant, the automobile was being propelled about 10 or 12 miles per hour, and the street car was running at a rate of about 5 or 6 miles per hour. The automobile was struck just as the street car turned off the bridge. It will thus be seen that the evidence was in sharp...