Columns Properties, Inc. v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 18 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. A94A2002,A94A2002
• Citation: 222 Ga.App. 800,476 S.E.2d 86
• Parties: COLUMNS PROPERTIES, INC. v. COLEMAN et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 86

476 S.E.2d 86

222 Ga.App. 800

COLUMNS PROPERTIES, INC. v. COLEMAN et al.

No. A94A2002.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Sept. 18, 1996.

Neal C. Scott, Mary P. Vilmos, for appellant.

The Sherwinter-McElroy Law Group, Emily Sherwinter, James G. McElroy, Atlanta, for appellees.

BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge.

In Coleman v. Columns Properties, 266 Ga. 310, 467 S.E.2d 328, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court in Columns Properties v. Coleman, 216 Ga.App. 428, 454 S.E.2d 546, holding that under the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment, a workers' compensation award was a binding determination that Catherine Coleman was not an invitee on Columns Properties' premises, and returned the appeal to this Court for consideration consistent with that opinion. Therefore, our prior judgment in this appeal is vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court on the issue of whether res judicata and collateral estoppel prevented Catherine Coleman from relitigating her status on Columns Properties' premises. This reversal, however, does not end our inquiry because Columns Properties also contends that, notwithstanding the res judicata and collateral estoppel issue, the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment.

After Catherine Coleman's workers' compensation claim was denied, "[t]he Colemans then filed this action, alleging that Catherine Coleman was injured while at the job site 'at the invitation and permission' of Columns Properties to pick up her pay check. The record shows that Catherine Coleman had visited her husband's trailer on several occasions and used the same entrance each time. Before entering this door, she had to use a metal step that was attached to the trailer by its manufacturer. The step had no railings. Although the step was wet and muddy because it had rained that day, Catherine Coleman safely entered the trailer. When she started to leave, however, she put her foot on the step without looking and then slipped and fell. At a deposition given as part of her workers' compensation claim, Catherine Coleman testified she did not know what caused her to slip and fall." Columns Properties v. Coleman, supra at 429, 454 S.E.2d 546. Catherine Coleman's husband, Dennis Coleman, also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. Held:

1. The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment are announced in Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474.

2. In this appeal, Columns Properties' motion for summary judgment asserted that regardless of Catherine Coleman's status as either a licensee or an invitee she cannot recover. We agree.

"The owner or occupier of land is under a duty to invitees to discover and either keep the premises safe from or warn of hidden dangers or defects not observable to such invitees in the exercise of ordinary care. However, there is no duty to warn against obvious or patent dangers which may be observed and avoided by the exercise of ordinary care." (Punctuation omitted.) Cowan v. Waffle House, 217 Ga.App. 273, 275, 456 S.E.2d 762. " '[W]here there is nothing to obstruct or interfere with one's ability to see such a "static" defect, the owner or occupier of the premises is justified in assuming that a visitor will see it and realize the risk involved.' " Gaydos v. Grupe, etc., Investors, 211 Ga.App. 811, 813, 440 S.E.2d 545.

Catherine Coleman had visited the trailer numerous times using the same step even though there was another entrance she could have used. Further, she knew there was no handrail at the step.

Additionally, Catherine Coleman testified at deposition that after entering the trailer by use of the step, when she left, she stepped from the trailer without looking at the step, placed her right foot on the wet step, and slipped and fell to the ground. She testified that she does not know what caused her fall. " 'Proof of nothing more than the occurrence of plaintiff's fall is insufficient to establish defendant's negligence.' " Wilson v. Duncan, 211 Ga.App. 814, 815, 440 S.E.2d 550; Lee v. Peacock, 199 Ga.App. 192(3), 404 S.E.2d 473.

Although at a session of her deposition a year later, Catherine Coleman testified several times that she fell because the "step gave way," she did not explain the contradiction between this testimony and her earlier testimony that she did not know what caused her fall even after the contradiction was called to her...