Colvin v. Taylor, 02-1326.

• Decision Date: 02 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1326.,02-1326.
• Citation: 324 F.3d 583
• Parties: Douglas COLVIN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lynda TAYLOR, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

324 F.3d 583

Douglas COLVIN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lynda TAYLOR, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 02-1326.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 9, 2002.

Filed: April 2, 2003.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied: May 15, 2003.

Michael J. Spillane, argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

Elaine Mittleman, argued, Falls Church, VA, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, HEANEY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

In the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Missouri, petitioner Douglas E. Colvin pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing a controlled substance and one count of keeping or maintaining a public nuisance. He was sentenced to imprisonment. After exhausting his state remedies, Colvin submitted a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming his plea agreement with the State of Missouri had been violated. The district court granted the petition. The State appeals the grant of habeas relief, asserting the plea agreement was not breached. We do not believe the holding of the Missouri courts was unreasonable; therefore, we reverse the judgment below.

I

Colvin's plea agreement included a promise from the prosecutor to "stand silent upon" Colvin's request to be sentenced to an institutional treatment center for 120 days followed by probation, pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 559.115. At sentencing, while discussing Colvin's pre-sentence investigation report, defense counsel stated that Colvin had "matured" since 1984, when he was convicted of another crime, and that he had used his time in prison for that conviction to better himself. The prosecutor in turn stated:

Your Honor, I've agreed to stand silent today, but I was listening while we were arguing about the [pre-sentence investigation report]. And I do have a bit of a problem with some of the remarks [that] were made. Which is that the defendant has matured a lot in his thirteen years at the Department of Corrections, and made good use of his time, and has been able to succeed without being a danger to society.

Within a matter of — I mean this guy just got out of prison. And, right after he got out of prison, he engaged in a drug operation which involved, in part, 801 West Coates, but also involved other activities that were going on. There are complete connections between him and other members of the St. Louis area.

When this whole program of selling started, through January and April, and we started making our buys, Mr. Colvin immediately jumped into the fray, and started dealing drugs right away. Even the day that he was picked up on this offense, he made a buy — or he made a sale to our confidential informant before they tapped him that day. We even recovered the buy money off of him.

I don't think it can be said that he matured a lot, or made the most of his time. The only thing I'd add to that is the fact that apparently he didn't take his treatment program too seriously. On one of the last pages there, it says he completed out-patient treatment, a special condition of this parole, at Archways Comminutes, Inc., in 1994. But by his own admission, he continued to use drugs.

. . . . .

[H]e wasn't out [of prison for the first-degree robbery] any time before the buys were being made in this case.

And I think that is a relevant factor for the Court to consider, in light of the comments defense counsel makes about his rehabilitation.

The Missouri trial court sentenced Colvin to eight years imprisonment on the distribution counts, and to a consecutive term of five years imprisonment on the nuisance count. Colvin filed a motion under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the State had violated its plea agreement to stand silent at sentencing with regard to Colvin's request for probation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded the remarks by the prosecutor at sentencing "were fair comments upon what defense counsel had stated." The trial court further observed the State "had a duty to the Court to rebut inferences drawn by defense counsel." The court also noted "the prosecutor did not suggest a particular sentence, nor did he voice opposition to probation." The Missouri court thus concluded the State did not violate its agreement to stand silent on the probation request, and denied Colvin's motion for post-conviction relief.

The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief finding that:

In this case, the State agreed only to stand silent to Mr. Colvin's request for sentence to an institutional treatment center with a 120-day call back. The State fulfilled that promise. The prosecutor never argued that Mr. Colvin should not receive a 120-day call back or be considered for probation. The prosecutor's comments in reply to defense counsel's characterizations of Mr. Colvin as matured and rehabilitated were merely clarifications of fact before the sentencing court. As an officer of the court, the prosecutor had the duty to convey to the court facts about the case and the defendant as long as the specific terms of the plea agreement were not violated. [Stufflebean v. Missouri, 986 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo.Ct.App.1999) (reasoning: "As an officer of the court, the prosecutor had the duty to convey to the court facts about the case and the defendant so long as the specific terms of the plea agreement were not violated.")]. The prosecutor believed that the inferences drawn by the defense counsel were unfair or untrue; therefore, he rebutted the inferences. In clarifying the record for the court, the prosecutor did not breach the specific terms of the plea agreement. The motion court, therefore, did not clearly err in denying Mr. Colvin's Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. The point is denied.

Colvin v. Missouri, No. WD 57363 (Mo. Ct.App. Feb 15.2000) (unpublished, but quoted identically by both the State and Colvin).

Colvin submitted a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A federal magistrate judge considered the petition and found Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), was unreasonably applied by the Missouri courts. The district court agreed, adopted the report of the magistrate judge, granted the petition and issued the writ of habeas corpus.

II

Even in the unique context of habeas corpus review, we still review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Hoon v. Iowa, 313 F.3d 1058, 1060 (8th Cir.2002); Pitts v. Norris, 85 F.3d 348, 350 (8th Cir. 1996) (illustrating our de novo review of a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief).

The determination as to whether a prosecutor's statement violates a plea agreement is a conclusion of law. United States v. Johnson, 241 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir.2001). Thus, we will look anew at the record which was before the district court when it made its decision in this matter. Id. (explaining issues concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a plea agreement are issues of law, which we review de novo).

"The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [(AEDPA)] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas `retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). In fact, when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, an application for writ of habeas corpus may only be granted where the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (emphasis added).

[AEDPA's] "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have independent meaning. A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable.

Bell, 122 S.Ct. at 1850 (discussing Williams); see Sexton v. Kemna, 278 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir.2002) (analyzing Williams).

This latter inquiry is what concerns us on this appeal. The district court held Santobello was unreasonably applied by the Missouri courts. The sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the district court reached the correct legal conclusion. Or in other words, did the Missouri courts apply Santobello in an "objectively unreasonable" manner?

While it is not perfectly clear what "objectively unreasonable" means, Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (commenting "the term `unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define" but is nonetheless familiar to federal judges) (O'Connor J., concurring, writing for the Court), the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one. Bell, 122 S.Ct. at 1850; Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-410, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (explaining a federal habeas court may not issue a writ under the unreasonable application clause "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied...