Stufflebean v. State
| Decision Date | 12 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 986 S.W.2d 189 |
| Parties | Kenny L. STUFFLEBEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. 55749. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Martin D. Warhurst, Kansas City, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., John Munson Morris, Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before ROBERT G. ULRICH, P.J.; JAMES M. SMART, J. and EDWIN H. SMITH, J.
Kenny Stufflebean appeals the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 24.035 for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Stufflebean sought to vacate his convictions for two counts of first degree child molestation, section 566.067, RSMo 1994, and concurrent sentences of seven years imprisonment. He claims that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered because (1) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement to recommend probation by cross-examining a defense witness, and (2) his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be able to withdraw his plea if the court did not follow the State's sentence recommendation. The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.
Kenny Stufflebean was charged by felony complaint with four counts of class C felony first degree child molestation, section 566.067, RSMo 1994. The complaint alleged that Mr. Stufflebean subjected his stepdaughter, who was less than twelve years old, to sexual contact. Thereafter, Mr. Stufflebean filed a petition to enter a plea of guilty in which he represented, "On at least 2 occasions, I would get into bed with my stepdaughter ... and massage her back and neck and breast for the purpose of sexual gratification." Mr. Stufflebean also stated in the petition that he understood the charges against him, the range of punishment, and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. He also stated that in exchange for his guilty plea, the prosecuting attorney promised to recommend a suspended execution of sentence on two counts and dismiss the remaining two counts. He acknowledged he had been advised that the court was not bound by the prosecutor's promise and that he was not promised by anyone that he would receive probation or parole.
At the guilty plea hearing, the court inquired into Mr. Stufflebean's understanding of the charges, the range of punishment, and the constitutional rights he was waiving in pleading guilty. Mr. Stufflebean again acknowledged that he had not been promised leniency or probation. The court accepted Mr. Stufflebean's plea finding that it was voluntarily and intelligently made. A presentence investigation was ordered.
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended probation. The court sentenced Mr. Stufflebean to two concurrent seven-year terms of imprisonment. Thereafter, Mr. Stufflebean filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief, which was later amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied Mr. Stufflebean's motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Mr. Stufflebean claims that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. He argues that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered because (1) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement to recommend probation by cross-examining a defense witness, and (2) his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be able to withdraw his plea if the court did not follow the State's sentence recommendation.
Appellate review of the denial of a postconviction relief motion is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 378, 139 L.Ed.2d 295 (1997). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Roll, 942 S.W.2d at 375.
A. Breach of Plea Agreement by Prosecutor
In Mr. Stufflebean's first point on appeal, he claims that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered because the prosecutor breached the plea agreement to recommend probation by cross-examining a defense witness at the sentencing hearing. Mr. Stufflebean called a psychologist at the sentencing hearing who testified that prison would not promote his treatment. The prosecutor then cross-examined the witness as follows:
On re-cross, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and the witness:
Where a plea bargain is based to a significant degree on a promise by the prosecutor, to the extent that it is part of the inducement or consideration for entering the plea, the promise must be fulfilled. Sharp v. State, 908 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo.App. E.D.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007, 116 S.Ct. 2529, 135 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1996). If the prosecutor, therefore, fails to fulfill a promise that induced a guilty plea, the defendant is entitled to relief. Id.
In this case, the prosecutor fulfilled his promise to recommend probation. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that pursuant to the plea agreement, he was recommending probation. During closing remarks by counsel, the prosecutor reiterated his recommendation for probation:
The prosecutor agreed only that he would dismiss two counts of the complaint and recommend probation in exchange for Mr. Stufflebean's guilty plea. He did not agree that he would not cross-examine witnesses called by the defense. Cross-examination is the traditional means to test the truth and credibility of a witness. State v. Tolliver, 562 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Mo.App.1978). As an officer of the court, the prosecutor had the duty to convey to the court facts about the case and the defendant so long as the specific terms of the plea agreement were not violated. See People v. Komeshak, 42 Ill.App.3d 775, 1 Ill.Dec. 444, 356 N.E.2d 632, 635 (1976)(prosecutor's cross-examination of defense witness did not constitute a breach of the State's agreement to recommend probation). The prosecutor's cross-examination of the defense witness did not undermine his recommendation for probation....
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...this testimony was not credible, and we defer to themotion court on determinations of witness credibility. Stufflebea[n] v. State, 986 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Mo. [Ct.] App. . . . 1999). Furthermore, [Petitioner] faced strong evidence of his guilt, including: a black ski mask found at the scene of......
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Krider v. State
...except to the extent that it impinges upon the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea[s] [were] made." Stufflebean v. State, 986 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999). "The movant bears the burden of proving his post-conviction claims, including a claim of ineffective assistance of c......
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Colvin v. Taylor, 02-1326.
...facts about the case and the defendant as long as the specific terms of the plea agreement were not violated. [Stufflebean v. Missouri, 986 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo.Ct.App.1999) (reasoning: "As an officer of the court, the prosecutor had the duty to convey to the court facts about the case and t......
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State v. Thomas
...plea agreement the defendant had reached with the State. Id.; Comstock v. State, 68 S.W.3d 561 (Mo. App. W.D.2001); Stufflebean v. State, 986 S.W.2d 189 (Mo.App. W.D.1999). However, the aforementioned cases are all distinct in one specific and critical regard: there was evidence in each cas......