Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott
| Decision Date | 30 October 1996 |
| Citation | 546 Pa. 241,684 A.2d 539 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellant, v. Ronald C. SCOTT, Jr., Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Eugene A. Bonner, Media, for R.C. Scott.
Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and NIGRO, JJ.
The issue presented in the instant case is whether the Commonwealth Court erred as matter of law in concluding that a motorist who had been provided with a legally sufficient O'Connell 1 warning, could still establish that, upon request to submit to chemical testing under the Implied Consent Law, he was so confused about the applicability of his Miranda 2 rights that he did not knowingly or consciously refuse to submit to the testing. For the reasons that follow, we find that the Commonwealth Court committed an error of law in finding that a motorist, who had been adequately apprised of his O'Connell warnings, could avoid the consequences of his refusal to submit to chemical testing as mandated by the Implied Consent Law. 3
The facts which prompted the present appeal can be briefly summarized. On October 9, 1992, Officer Jerome J. Cartmell of the Tredyffrin Township Police Department observed appellee's vehicle proceed at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit. Upon stopping the vehicle the officer noticed that appellee exhibited signs of intoxication, his speech was slurred, his eyes were glassy, he smelled of alcohol, and he swayed when he walked. Officer Cartmell asked appellee to perform field sobriety tests. Appellee was unable to perform the tests. Officer Cartmell then placed appellee under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75 Pa.S.C. § 3731.
Officer Cartmell transported appellee to Paoli Memorial Hospital for a blood alcohol test. At the hospital Officer Cartmell advised appellee of the Implied Consent Law 4 and read to him the following warning:
As a police officer, it is my duty to explain to you that the constitutional rights due you in a criminal prosecution as set forth in the Miranda decision do not apply to chemical testing under the implied consent law. Specifically, you do not have a right to consult with a lawyer or anyone else prior to taking the chemical test nor do you have the right to remain silent when a police officer asks you to submit to a chemical test. Your continued request to speak to a lawyer or anyone else after this explanation is given, or your silence when asked to submit to a chemical test, will be considered as a refusal of the chemical test subjecting you to the suspension of your driving privilege. [See Reproduced Record at 37a].
Even after being given these warnings, appellee refused to submit to the blood test and continued to request to speak with his attorney. Officer Cartmell then told appellee that because this was a drunk driving case he was not entitled to consult with an attorney at that time. Appellee continued to refuse to submit to the blood test until he was first afforded the opportunity to speak with counsel. Officer Cartmell then transported appellee to the Tredyffin Township Police Station. At the police station appellee was again read the above cited warnings. Appellee again refused to submit to chemical testing without first consulting his attorney. Another officer, Officer Marc A. Reider, explained the O'Connell warnings once again to appellee, reiterating that he was not entitled to speak to counsel before the blood test. Appellee continued to refuse and to demand that he see his attorney. At that point a refusal was noted.
As a result, the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT), notified appellee that his driving privileges would be suspended for one year. Appellee appealed the suspension to the Court of Common Pleas. The trial court rescinded the suspension finding that because appellee believed he was entitled to consult with an attorney, he did not knowingly or consciously refuse to submit to the blood test. The trial court reasoned that although appellee was properly provided with O'Connell warnings, when Officer Cartmell then told appellee that "because this is a drunk driving case you do not have the right to counsel," that misstatement of law increased appellee's confusion, thus, vitiating the properly given O'Connell warnings.
DOT appealed the rescission of the suspension to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that appellee's confusion was justified following Officer Cartmell's misstatement regarding appellee's right to counsel. Allowance of appeal was granted to review whether, as a matter of law, a fact finder is free to find that a refusal is not knowing where the police officer has adequately complied with his duty under O'Connell.
In reviewing a decision of the trial court in a license suspension case, the standard of review of an appellate court is to determine if the factual findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. O'Connell, 521 Pa. at 242, 555 A.2d at 875. Questions of credibility are for the trial court. Id. Before a license suspension will be sustained DOT must establish:
That the driver involved: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was specifically warned that a refusal would result in the revocation of his driver's license.
Once [DOT] meets its burden, it is the driver's responsibility to prove that he was not capable of making a knowing and conscious refusal to take the test.
The trial court herein determined that DOT did not meet its burden of proof. (tr. ct. slip op. at 9). The trial court premised its ruling upon its finding that appellee believed he had a right to speak with an attorney and that his right to do so was being denied. The trial court found the testimony of appellee on this point to be credible. The trial court in so ruling committed an error of law.
As set forth above, DOT's burden in a license suspension case is met once it has established that the motorist was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol; the motorist was asked to submit to chemical testing for blood alcohol; the motorist refused to submit to chemical testing; and the motorist was specifically warned that a refusal would result in the revocation of his operating privileges. O'Connell, supra.
In finding that DOT did not meet its burden the trial court focused upon the fourth prong of the above stated test: the motorist was specifically warned that a refusal would result in the revocation of his operating privileges. Although the trial court did find that proper O'Connell warnings were given, the court then went on to conclude that when the officer followed the first O'Connell warning with the statement: "you do not have the right to an attorney because this is a drunk driving case," the effect of the previous proper warning was dissipated. The trial court ignored the fact that proper O'Connell warnings were given to appellee two more times following this one misstatement by Officer Cartmell. To find that Officer Cartmell's misstatement, sandwiched in between three properly worded O'Connell warnings, would have the devastating effect of nullifying all the correct statements of law provided to appellee, is a conclusion unjustified on the basis of this record. The pertinent portion of appellee's testimony is as follows:
"I was told that because I was arrested for drunk driving I was not allowed to have an attorney at this time." (N.T. 51)
As the testimony of appellee reveals, it was not this misstatement that created the problem; rather, appellee refused to believe the substance of the O'Connell warnings. Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, DOT satisfied its burden of proof, including full compliance with the fourth element as required in O'Connell.
The trial court compounded its error by then going on to conclude that DOT failed to prove that appellee made a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. However, it was appellee's burden, not DOT's burden, to establish that he was "not capable, of making a knowing and conscious refusal to take the test." O'Connell, supra. [emphasis supplied]. In essence, the trial court determined that although the officers had advised appellee of his O'Connell warnings, as appellee refused to believe the officers, his subsequent refusal to submit to chemical testing was not a knowing and conscious refusal. A motorist's subjective beliefs are an insufficient justification for refusing to comply with the mandates of the Implied Consent Law. Refusing to believe the substance of the O'Connell warnings as given does not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Reitter, 98-0915
... ... a Notice of Intent to Suspend Reitter's driver's license. Reitter was transported to the Racine ... See id. at 654. In Department of Transp. v. O'Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989), ... State Dep't of Licensing, 31 Wash.App. 334, 641 P.2d 717 (1982); Ehrlich ... Traffic Facts Book, published by the Bureau of Transportation Safety, Department of ... See Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Scott, 546 Pa. 241, 684 A.2d 539, 546 (1996); ... ...
-
Commonwealth v. Bell
...BAC testing. Id. These laws are based on the notion that driving is a privilege rather than a fundamental right. PennDOT v. Scott , 546 Pa. 241, 684 A.2d 539, 544 (1996). When partaking in the privilege of driving on Pennsylvania's roads, motorists must comply with Pennsylvania's implied co......
-
Kurecka v. State
...to situations where defendants had not been confused by a previous reading of the Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Scott, 546 Pa. 241, 684 A.2d 539, 546 (1996); Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. McCann, 533 Pa. 456, 626 A.2d 92, 93–94 (1993). However, the O'Connell li......
-
Correll v. COM. DEPT. OF TRANSP.
...of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 535 Pa. 314, 318, 635 A.2d 124, 126 (1993). See also Department of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 546 Pa. 241, 250, 684 A.2d 539, 544 (1996); Krall v. Department of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A.2d 63, 64-65 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996......
-
Administrative hearings
...Administrative Hearings §825 Motorist’s Receipt of O’Connell Warnings Negates “Confusion” Defense In Dept. of Transportation v. Scott , 684 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1996), the Court ruled that a motorist who received a warning proscribed in Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. O’Connell , 555 A.2d 873 (P......