COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP. v. McCafferty
Decision Date | 28 September 2000 |
Citation | 758 A.2d 1155,563 Pa. 146 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. Elaine M. McCAFFERTY, Steven Hirsh, Benjamin Mather, Gregory Joseph Skalicky, James J. Greer, George Allen, Michael Proud, Douglas Byer, Brian Walsh, David McIntyre, Phong Hoang Nguyen, Jose Cotto, Walter H. Blatz, Charles Boris, William Tindal, Wayne Zimmerman, Louis Heebner, Michael J. Hofferica, Ronald Ziajka, John Wooten, Daniel Mallon, and Stewart Scott, Appellees. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Timothy P. Wile, Harrisburg, for the Com., DOT.
Michael K. Parlos, for D. McIntyre.
Martin B. Katz, for P. Ngyen.
B. David Marcial, Philadelphia, for J. Cotto.
Bruce Wolf, Caraopolis, for W. Blatz.
George Twardy, Jr., Philadelphia, for J. Wooten.
James J. Greer, Pro Se.
William Tindal, Pro Se.
Elaine M. McCafferty, Pro Se.
Charles Boris, Pro Se.
Michael W. Cassidy, Huntingdon Valley, for Douglas Byer.
Vincent W. Furlong, for G. Skalicky.
Charles G. Nistico, Media, for S. Hirsh.
Donald M. Preminger, Philadelphia, for M. Hofferica.
Paul J. Hetznecker, Philadelphia, for B. Mather.
Ely Goldin, Media, for G. Allen.
Thomas P. Pfender, for M. Proud.
Richard K. Doty, Philadelphia, for B. Walsh.
Brian R. Williams, Philadelphia, for R. Ziajka.
Daniel L. Dolfman, for L. Heebner.
Wayne A. Zimmerman, Pro Se.
Stewart B. Scott, Pro Se.
Daniel G. Mallon, Pro Se.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
This matter comes before this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7)1 to determine whether the Court of Common Pleas ("trial court") erred in concluding that the Driver's License Compact of 1961 ("Compact"), incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1581-1585, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution;2 the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution;3 and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution4 by requiring the imposition of one-year suspensions of the driver's license operating privileges of the appellees. For the reasons that follow, we determine that the Compact comports with the relevant Constitutional and statutory provisions. We, therefore, reverse the order of the trial court.
The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. On December 10, 1996, Governor Thomas Ridge signed Act 1996-149 into law, adding sections 1581 through 1585 to the Motor Vehicle Code and making Pennsylvania a party state to the Compact. Under Article IV(a)(2) and (c) of the Compact, each party state agrees that, if a person licensed in that state is convicted in another party state for an offense "substantially similar" to driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree that renders the licensee incapable of safe driving ("DUI"), then the party state must treat the out-of-state conviction as if it occurred in that state for the limited purpose of determining whether to suspend that person's driver's license. Section 1532(b)(3) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code requires that PennDOT suspend for one year the operating privilege of any person convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a) ( ).5
Appellees, all of whom possessed valid Pennsylvania drivers' licenses at the time, were convicted of DUI offenses in other states that are parties to the Compact. Appellee Mather was convicted in Ohio; appellee Byer was convicted in Florida; appellee Scott was convicted in Virginia; and the remaining appellees were convicted in New Jersey. Pursuant to their reporting obligations under Article III of the Compact, authorities in those states reported appellees' DUI convictions to PennDOT. In accordance with the requirements of Article IV(1)(b) of the Compact, PennDOT treated appellees as if they had been convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a) and notified them that their Pennsylvania operating privileges would be suspended for one year. Thereafter, each of the appellees filed a statutory appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division.
On December 31, 1997, after conducting de novo hearings, the trial court granted appellees' statutory appeals and reversed the one-year suspensions imposed by PennDOT. Specifically, the trial court determined that the application of Article IV of the Compact to appellees violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court also determined that PennDOT's documentation was constitutionally deficient because PennDOT's certified records stated that appellees were convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a) rather than referencing the specific out-of-state statutes that furnished the basis for the underlying convictions, thereby violating appellees' procedural due process rights. On December 31, 1997, the trial court entered an Order consolidating all of appellees' statutory appeals for purposes of further appeal. PennDOT filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Because the instant appeal presents this Court with pure questions of law, our scope of review is plenary and we are not bound by the trial court's conclusions of law. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 346 n. 4, 684 A.2d 1060, 1062 n. 4 (1996). At the outset, appellee Steven Hirsh argues that there is no statutory authority for the license suspensions at issue.6 Because this Court will not address the constitutionality of an act of the legislature if there are other grounds for disposing of the issue, we will address appellee's alternative statutory claims first. See Boettger v. Loverro, 526 Pa. 510, 518, 587 A.2d 712, 715 (1991) ( ). In reviewing the claims raised by both parties, we note that the Compact is to be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose. Compact, Art. IX.
First, Hirsh contends that there is no statutory authority to implement a suspension of a Pennsylvania license for an out-of-state offense that is the equivalent of § 3731(a) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code ( ). We disagree. The Compact, which is incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, provides in pertinent part:
Definitions
As used in this compact:
Thus, by the plain terms of the Compact, whenever a person licensed to drive in Pennsylvania is convicted in a party state of DUI, Pennsylvania is required to give the same effect to the out-of-state conduct as it would give to that conduct if it had occurred in Pennsylvania. PennDOT is required to suspend the license of any Pennsylvania licensee who is convicted of DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b)(3). Therefore, under the plain language of the Compact, the same license suspension must result in Pennsylvania where a conviction arising out of that conduct occurred in New Jersey.
Next, Hirsh argues in the alternative that his license should have been suspended, if at all, under Section 1581 of the Motor Vehicle Code ( ). Hirsh prefers this result because he believes it would have made him eligible for an occupational limited license. However, § 1581 does not in itself authorize the suspension of a driver's license; instead, it merely directs the licensing state to treat the conduct underlying an out-of-state conviction as if it were conduct that occurred in the licensing state for purposes of a license suspension.7 Because PennDOT must give appellee's conduct the same effect as if it had occurred within Commonwealth borders, appellee's license was properly suspended under § 1532(b)(3).
Having concluded that we cannot affirm the Order of the trial court on the alternative statutory grounds proffered by appellee, we must now address whether the trial court erred in determining that the Compact was unconstitutional. Initially, we note that a statute is presumed to be...
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