Com. ex rel. Marshall v. Gedney

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Before JONES; ROBERTS
• Citation: 321 A.2d 641,456 Pa. 570
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Ruby MARSHALL v. Dewaine GEDNEY, Director Release on Recognizance Program.
• Decision Date: 01 July 1974

Page 641

321 A.2d 641 456 Pa. 570 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Ruby MARSHALL
v.
Dewaine GEDNEY, Director Release on Recognizance Program. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 1, 1974.

[456 Pa. 571] Steven H. Goldblatt, Chief of Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee.

[456 Pa. 570] Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

Page 642

OPINION OF THE COURT

[456 Pa. 571] ROBERTS, Justice.

Ruby Marshall was arrested by Philadelphia police on a fugitive warrant prompted by an extradition request from the governor of Kansas. This appeal is from the denial by the court of common pleas of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the only issue presented is whether appellant may be extradited, jurisdiction on appeal is properly in the Superior Court. We therefore transfer the appeal to that court. ¹

The Superior Court has appellate jurisdiction in appeals from all final orders of the courts of common pleas except in that class of appeals within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of either this Court or the Commonwealth Court. Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. III, § 302, 17 P.S. § 211.302 (Supp.1974). The question is whether an appeal from the grant or denial of a writ of habeas corpus is within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction when the crime charged in the demanding state is felonious homicide.

Appellant asserts two bases for the contention that her appeal is properly in this Court. We can accept neither.

It is first urged that this is an appeal from a final order of a court of common pleas in a case of felonious homicide over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant[456 Pa. 572] to section 202(1) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, 17 P.S. § 211.202(1) (Supp.1974). However, the inquiry in extradition appeals is narrow; it includes no consideration of the substance of the crime charged in the demanding state. Commonwealth ex rel. Flood v. Pizzo, 434 Pa. 208, 211, 252 A.2d 656, 657 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Hendrick, 430 Pa. 575, 577, 243 A.2d 438, 439 (1968). The scope of the asylum state's inquest is the same whether the alleged fugitive is charged with simple assault or murder in the first degree. Thus in Pennsylvania appellant is not charged with felonious homicide, but with being a fugitive.

The Superior Court has recently faced the question of the scope of section 202(1). After reasoning that jurisdiction must be determined by reference to the Pennsylvania charge against an accused, the court held that when a fugitive charge is involved appellate jurisdiction is in the Superior Court. Commonwealth ex rel. Colcough v. Aytch, 227 Pa.Super. 527, 530, 323 A.2d 359, 360--361 (1974). We are in complete agreement with this conclusion.

Appellant's alternate statutory argument is predicated on section 7 of the Act of May 25, 1951, P.L. 415, § 7 as amended, 12 P.S. § 1907 (Supp.1974). As originally framed the 1951 Act read:

'From the decision of any judge upon any petition for a writ of habeas corpus, or upon any order made pursuant to a hearing on the writ, an appeal may be taken as in other cases. When the basis of the petition is an alleged defect or illegality in a criminal proceeding, the appeal shall be to the court which has appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the crime with which the person imprisoned or detained is charged or of which he has been convicted. In all...