Com. ex rel. Sleighter v. Banmiller
| Decision Date | 17 March 1958 |
| Citation | 139 A.2d 918,392 Pa. 133 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH ex rel. Glenn SLEIGHTER, Appellant, v. William J. BANMILLER, Superintendent, Appellee. Appeal of Glenn SLEIGHTER. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Glenn Sleighter, in pro. per.
George C. Eppinger, Dist. Atty., Chambersburg, for appellee.
Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, BENJAMIN R. JONES and COHEN, JJ.
This appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County dismissing the relator's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the sixth proceeding 1 taken by the petitioner who seeks release from imprisonment imposed following a conviction for first degree murder, from which no appeal was taken.
In 1937 the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in the death of a six year old girl who had been a foster child in the relator's home. The Commonwealth's evidence, based mainly upon the relator's confession, disclosed that the child had died as the result of a beating with a leather strap administered to her by the relator and his wife because the child had told falsehoods about school incidents. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. Although motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed, the motions were subsequently withdrawn, and no appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction. The failure to appeal in this case was perhaps unfortunate because the question whether the evidence was sufficient to have warranted the conviction of first degree murder, and whether statements made during the course of the trial to the effect that the child was sexually abused were so prejudicial as to have required the grant of a new trial, should have been determined. However, issues of trial error are not now before us. Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Ashe, 335 Pa. 575, 7 A.2d 296, certiorari denied 1939, 308 U.S. 596, 60 S.Ct. 132, 84 L.Ed. 499.
On June 15, 1957, the relator filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, after the court appointed counsel to represent relator in the matter, a full argument was held. From the denial of the petition, the relator has taken this appeal. 2
The writ of habeas corpus is available to obtain discharge from imprisonment resulting from a criminal proceeding in which fundamental errors were committed or constitutional rights invaded so as to have made the proceeding a nullity and rendered the trial court without jurisdiction to impose sentence. Commonwealth ex rel. Milewski v. Ashe, 1949, 362 Pa. 48, 66 A.2d 281.
To meet these requirements, Sleighter alleges that he was unconstitutionally denied due process of law at his trial because (1) his involuntary confession was received in evidence, (2) mob hysteria influenced the court and the jury, and (3) that he was denied the effective assistance of legal counsel. The relator also contends that he was denied the equal protection of the law by reason of the failure of the trial court to supply him with a transcript of the notes of testimony.
After careful consideration, we find that the petitioner's allegations are not meritorious, and the court below did not abuse its discretion in denying the writ.
The first contention of the petitioner is that his written confession of the killing of the child was extracted from him as the result of police pressure and promises, that the confession was subsequently altered without his knowledge, and that therefore its introduction in evidence at the trial violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This argument was incorporated in the petitioner's defense at the trial, and although extensively explored, was unsupported by any evidence whatever showing that the confession was involuntary or unauthorizedly altered.
The trial judge, in his charge to the jury, discussed thoroughly the law with regard to the admissibility of confessions, and properly left with them the determination whether, in light of all the evidence, the statements were given voluntarily and without inducements. We conclude from our independent review of the undisputed facts in the record that the rejection by both the trial court and jury of this defense was justified, and its subsequent rejection by the court below, before whom the contention was presented in detail, was therefore manifestly proper.
Furthermore, petitioner himself confirmed the correctness of the contents of his confession when in his sworn application to the Board of Pardons for commutation, he admitted its text to be an accurate statement 'of all the facts in connection with the death.'
It is ture that the relator's confession was obtained while he was in custody. While there is no question but that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 'bars police procedure which violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime,' Watts v. State of Indiana, 1949, 338 U.S. 49, 55, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1350, 93 L.Ed. 1801, and interdicts the admission in evidence of a confession made by a defendant while in police custody if it results from police pressure or inducement, Fikes v. State of Alabama, 1957, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246; Watts v. State of Indiana, 1949, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Harris v. State of South Carolina, 1949, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct 1354, 93 L.Ed. 1815; Turner v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 1949, 338 U.S. 62, 63, 69 S.Ct. 1352, 93 L.Ed. 1810, a confession is not rendered constitutionally objectionable, and therefore inadmissible, by reason of being made by an accused while detained, unless the detention induced the confession. Stein v. People of State of New York, 1953, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522; Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 479, 483, 72 A.2d 575, certiorari denied 1950, 340 U.S. 844, 71 S.Ct. 9, 95 L.Ed. 619. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mallory v. United States 1957, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 is not to the contrary. That case held that a delay in arraignment in contravention of an express legal requirement, rendered a confession inadmissible as a matter of law and voided a conviction based thereon. The Mallory case, (as were its predecessors, Upshaw v. United States, 1948, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100; McNabb v. United States, 1943, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819), was based upon rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. which requires an arresting officer to bring the suspect before a United States Commissioner 'without unnecessary delay.' The Mallory decision, then, does not rest upon constitutional grounds but upon a federal rule of evidence applied in criminal proceedings to enforce rule 5(a) and does not control the determination of the question in state courts. See Gallegos v. State of Nebraska, 1951, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86.
Pennsylvania has no provision parallel with section 5(a) of the federal rules, consequently, the Mallory doctrine has no application to the present case.
Petitioner's second contention is that he was denied a fair trial because of mob hysteria which influenced the court and the jury. In the words of the petitioner: 'The local prejudice, passion, and hysteria was so prevailing and strong against the petitioner that it was necessary to remove him from the Franklin County Jail to the Dauphin County Jail for his personal safety.' * * *
In order to prove that a fair trial has been denied it is not enough to show merely that the public was beset by hysteria or passion, it must be shown that the jury was influenced thereby. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 396-397, 65 A.2d 353, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 862, 70 S.Ct. 96, 94 L.Ed. 528, rehearing denied 1949, 338 U.S. 888, 70 S.Ct. 181, 94 L.Ed. 546; Moore v. Dempsey, 1923, 261 U.S. 86, 87, 91, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543. The petitioner has failed to satisfy this requirement. The record of the relator's trial indicates that a thorough examination of each juror was made on voir dire, and that both counsel for the Commonwealth and the defendant were satisfied that an unbiased, impartial and unprejudiced jury was chosen. There is no evidence to indicate that the trial was conducted under other than peaceable and orderly circumstances. In this respect, it is significant to note that the petitioner's counsel did not see fit to move for a change of venue provided by the Act of March 18, 1875, P.L. 30, § 1, 19 P.S. § 551, and Article III, section 23 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania P.S.
Petitioner's third contention is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He bases his allegation upon the following circumstances: that he was without counsel for three weeks after the date of his arrest during which time he was held without warrant and without preliminary hearing; that the court appointed counsel failed to move for a change of venue; that counsel refused to call certain witnesses...
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Com. ex rel. Geiger v. Maroney
...is here controlling. Petitioner's contention in reliance on Mallory is foreclosed by our decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Sleighter v. Banmiller, 392 Pa. 133, 139 A.2d 918 (1958). Finally, the record fails to disclose any prejudice arising from petitioner's lack of counsel at the preliminar......