Com. of Va. ex rel. Halsey v. Autry

• Decision Date: 08 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13,13
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, etc., ex rel. Helen HALSEY v. Kenneth AUTRY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 53

293 Md. 53

441 A.2d 1056

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, etc., ex rel. Helen HALSEY v. Kenneth AUTRY.

No. 13.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 8, 1982.

Joseph B. Spillman, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Warren B. Duckett, Jr., State's Atty. for Anne Arundel County and Cynthia M. Ferris, Asst. State's Atty., Annapolis, on brief), for appellant.

Steven F. Brown, Glen Burnie (The Legal Clinics of Cawley & Schmidt, P.A., Glen Burnie, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This case presents the question whether a Maryland court, acting pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 89C, has the authority to order a parent to support an illegitimate child, notwithstanding the fact that a court in another jurisdiction has vacated its prior order imposing a duty of support.

On 4 January 1972, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Bergen County, New Jersey (New Jersey Court), adjudicated the appellee, Kenneth Autry (father), to be the father of Cynthia Halsey (child), born 31 October 1971. The New Jersey Court ordered the father to pay $10.00 per week to the Bergen County Welfare Board for the support of the child. On 23 April 1973, the New Jersey Court ordered the father to pay $20.00 per week for the support of the child. On 4 June 1975, the New Jersey Court, at the request of the child's mother, vacated the 23 April 1973 order of support, reserving any arrearages to the Bergen County Welfare Board. ¹

Since 1 May 1978, the child has been in the physical custody of Helen Halsey, her maternal grandmother (grandmother). She has resided with her grandmother in Virginia, and has received public assistance benefits from that state. The grandmother has been designated as the payee of these benefits.

On 14 November 1979, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Wythe County, Virginia (Virginia Court), the Virginia Department of Welfare filed a petition on behalf of the grandmother pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Va. Code § 20-88.19 (1950, 1975 Repl.Vol.). The petition sought support in the amount of $119.00 per month and reimbursement for public assistance paid from 1 May 1978.

At the time the petition was filed the father was residing in Glen Burnie, Maryland. The Virginia Court, pursuant to Va. Code § 20-88.22, transmitted the petition to Maryland where it was filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County pursuant to Md. Code, Art. 89C, § 18.

On 14 October 1980, after a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition. In that order, the trial court, relying on Chance v. LaPausky, 43 Md.App. 84, 402 A.2d 1329 (1979), stated:

"It appears to the Court that the New Jersey Court at Complainant's request by Order dated June 4, 1975, circumscribed the obligation of Respondent, Kenneth Autry, to pay support reserving only the New Jersey Welfare Support arrearages. By doing so it left no obligation imposed or imposable within the meaning of Section 7 of Article 89C.

"It is significant that Petitioners here provided support for the child from May 1, 1978 to the present, such support beginning after the New Jersey Court had terminated Autry's obligation to pay any support.

"Assuming that the New Jersey Court's Order of June 4, 1975 means what it says and does in fact terminate Autry's duty to support (either imposed or imposable as referred to in Section 7 of Article 89C) then there is no right in Virginia to collect from Autry that which Autry has no lawful obligation to pay." (Emphasis added.)

The Virginia Department of Welfare appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari before consideration by that Court. We shall vacate the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant statutory provisions of Art. 89C are § 2(g), § 4, and § 7.

Section 2(g) provides:

" 'Duty of support' includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial separation, separate maintenance or otherwise." (Emphasis added.)

Section 4 provides:

"Duties of support arising under the law of this State, whether applicable under § 7, bind the obligor, present in this State, regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee." (Emphasis added.)

Section 7 provides:

"Duties of support applicable under this article are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown." (Emphasis added.)

The general purposes of Art. 89C are to improve and extend the enforcement of duties of support. Art. 89C, § 1. ² More particularly, one of the purposes of Art. 89C is to provide liberal enforcement in Maryland of the claims of nonresident parents and children entitled to support. Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285, 300-01, 104 A.2d 573, 580 (1954). Still another purpose is to provide liberal enforcement in Maryland of the claims of out-of-state welfare departments which have made support payments to nonresident parents and children entitled to support. Art. 89C, § 8. ³ The Act has broad remedial purposes and, therefore, should be liberally construed. E.g., Lambrou v. Berna, 154 Me. 352, 356, 148 A.2d 697, 700 (1959); State of Illinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling, 248 Minn. 266, 274, 80 N.W.2d 13, 19 (1956); Davidson v. Davidson, 66 Wash.2d 780, 785, 405 P.2d 261, 265 (1965); see, e.g., Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 589, 420 A.2d 261, 266 (1980); James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 335, 418 A.2d 1173, 1184 (1980); Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130, 48 A.2d 754, 762 (1946); see also 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 60.01-02 (4th ed. C. Sands 1974).

Article 89C embodies a statutory scheme by which nonresident parents and children entitled to support, as well as welfare departments, can enforce duties of support across state lines. URESA, 9A U.L.A. 748 (1979). A URESA proceeding is commenced when a person to whom a duty of support is owed files a petition, Art. 89C, § 9, ⁴ in a court of the initiating state, the state in which that person resides. Art. 89C, § 2(c). ⁵ After determining that a duty of support exists, the court in the initiating state forwards the petition to a court of the responding state, the state where the parent allegedly owing a duty of support resides. Art. 89C, § 14(a). ⁶ The court of the responding state, Art. 89C, § 2(d), ⁷ must obtain jurisdiction over the parent, Art. 89C, § 18(a)(1), ⁸ hold a hearing, Art. 89C, § 18(b), ⁹ and determine whether a duty of support exists, and if so, the extent of that duty. Art. 89C, § 23. ¹⁰ In determining whether and to what extent a duty of support is imposed or imposable, ordinarily it is the law of the responding state, and not the law of the initiating state, which governs. Art. 89C, §§ 2, 4, & 7. E.g., Engelson v. Mallea, 180 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Iowa 1970); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Me. 161, 163, 125 A.2d 863, 864 (1956); Mahan v. Read, 240 N.C. 641, 648, 83 S.E.2d 706, 712 (1954); Childers v. Childers, 19 N.C.App. 220, 224-25, 198 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1973); see McCabe v. McCabe, 210 Md. 308, 314-15, 123 A.2d 447, 450 (1956). If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, it may order the parent to furnish support or reimbursement, and may take appropriate steps to enforce compliance with that order. Art. 89C, § 23. ¹¹ The remedies provided by the Act are in addition to any other remedies that may exist. Art. 89C, § 3. ¹² See Barrell v. Barrell, 288 Md. 19, 22, 415 A.2d 579, 580-81 (1980).

Here the record shows that at the time the petition was filed, the child resided in Virginia and the father resided in Maryland. The petition was filed in a court in Virginia, the initiating state, and was forwarded to a court in Maryland, the responding state. Thus, whether and to what extent a duty of support is imposed or imposable is governed by Maryland law. Art. 89C, §§ 2, 4, & 7.

At common law, a father of an illegitimate child owed no duty of support. Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 358, 123 A.2d 316, 320 (1956); see 10 Am.Jur.2d Bastards § 68 at 895 (1963). As long ago as 1781, such a duty was imposed in Maryland by a statute that provided criminal penalties for nonsupport of an illegitimate child. ¹³ Thereafter, this Court, applying that Act and its successors, has consistently enforced a father's duty to support an illegitimate child. Dorsey v. English, 283 Md. 522, 529-30, 390 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1978); State v. Hardesty, 132 Md. 172, 176, 103 A. 461, 462 (1918); Oldham v. State, 5 Gill 90, 93 (1847).

In 1962, as part of a broad legislative plan to restructure the criminal bastardy laws, Art. III, § 38 of the Maryland Constitution was amended. ¹⁴ The amendment expressly provides that a father's obligation to support an illegitimate child is a duty enforceable by attachment and imprisonment. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 282, 412 A.2d 396, 401 (1980).

The Paternity Act, Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol.), Art. 16, §§ 66A to 66P, was enacted by the 1963 Maryland Laws, ch. 722. That Act repealed Md. Code (1957), Art. 12 "Bastardy and Fornication," the then most recent successor to the 1781 Maryland Laws, ch. 13, § 1, and transformed the character of the proceeding in which a father's paternity and his duty to support an illegitimate child were determined from criminal in nature, Oldham, 5 Gill at 93, to civil in nature. Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 490-91, 404 A.2d 269, 271 (1979).

The primary purposes of the Paternity Act are to impose the basic obligations and responsibilities of parenthood upon...