State of Ohio (odhs), ex rel. Scioto County Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., Mildred Walton v. Raymond Adams

• Decision Date: 23 July 1999
• Docket Number: 98CA2617,99-LW-3412
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO (ODHS), ex rel. SCIOTO COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, ex rel., MILDRED WALTON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RAYMOND ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

STATE OF OHIO (ODHS), ex rel. SCIOTO COUNTY CHILD SUPPORTENFORCEMENT AGENCY, ex rel., MILDRED WALTON Plaintiff-Appellee v. RAYMOND ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant

No. 98CA2617.

99-LW-3412 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Scioto

July 23, 1999

Jay S Willis, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant.

Matthew W. McFarland, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellee.

DECISION

Harsha J.

Raymond Adams appeals from a judgment of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas that ordered him to continue paying child support until his daughter reached twenty-one years of age. He assigns three errors for this court's review:

"1.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY RULING THAT NEW YORK LAW APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION OF A MINOR IN VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, AS CODIFIED IN FORMER OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 3115.06.

"2.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY CONFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION IN THIS MATTER;

"3.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT RULING ON WHICH STATE'S LAW APPLIED REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS IN A TIMELY FASHION IN VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW."

We overrule each of these assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

Mildred Walton, fka Mildred Adams, and the appellant were divorced in New York in 1990. While married they had two children: Deana Adams (date of birth, Feb. 28, 1973) and Debora Adams (Nov. 4, 1977). The "Final Decree of Divorce," entered by an Oneida County, New York court awarded "primary physical custody" of both children to Ms. Walton. The divorce decree ordered the appellant to pay child support in biweekly installments of $120 ($30 per child, per week). The decree also ordered the appellant to pay $15 per month toward the children's health insurance and forty percent of the children's uninsured medical expenses.

Following the divorce, the appellant moved to Ohio while Ms. Walton and the children remained in New York. In September 1992, Ms. Walton initiated a petition in the Family Court of Oneida County, New York under the Uniform Child Support Enforcement Act (URESA).^[1] Her petition stated that the appellant had not paid his court-ordered obligations since July 1992. Ms. Walton's petition sought enforcement of an existing support order and collection of arrearages; the petition did not seek registration of the New York support order in Ohio. The Oneida County Family Court certified the appellee's petition and forwarded it to the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, where it was filed in November 1992. Appellee Scioto County Child Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA") pursued the matter on behalf of Ms. Walton.

Less than one month after the appellee's URESA petition was filed in the Scioto County court, the parties executed an "Agreed Entry" that the court adopted. The court set child support "in accordance with the New York order of $30.00 per week for child support plus $15.00 per month for medical support." The court also continued the matter concerning the amount of arrearages owed by the appellant, noting that "the parties [sic] oldest child (Deana] was emancipated in June, 1991." In May 1993, the court signed another agreed entry, which set the total arrearages at $870.44 and ordered the appellant "to pay $5.00 per week on the arrears * * * in addition to the current support and medical support [appellant] is currently paying." As a result of these agreed entries, the appellant owed a continuing support obligation for Debora only.

In November 1995, the CSEA filed a motion for contempt on behalf of Ms. Walton. The motion alleged that the appellant failed to make payments in accordance with the trial court's order in the 1992 URESA proceeding. The appellant ultimately admitted being in arrears on his support obligations. However, he sought to clarify whether he had a continued obligation to support Debora. The appellant contended that, as of Debora's eighteenth birthday on November 4, 1995, he was no longer obligated to provide support under Ohio law. See R.C. 3109.01 (age of majority in Ohio is eighteen). In response, the appellee contended that New York law governed the scope of the appellant's support obligation and that the appellant therefore had the duty to support Debora until she reached twenty-one years of age. See Section 32, New York Domestic Relations Law (parent has obligation to support child under twenty-one years of age); Section 413[1](a), New York Family Court Act (parents are chargeable with support of child under age of twenty-one years).

Just as in the prior URESA proceeding, the parties reached an accommodation that formed the basis for an agreed entry. In March 1997, the trial court entered an "Agreed Judgment Entry" that found the appellant in contempt for nonpayment of his child support obligations and medical payments owed through November 4, 1995. The court granted a lump sum judgment to Ms. Walton for these amounts. The entry also stated that the parties "agree that the issue of which law applies as the emancipation date of [Debora Adams] as and between New York or Ohio law shall [be] submitted to the Court by legal briefs * * *." The court ordered the appellant to continue paying support for Debora, in accordance with the prior URESA order, until the court ruled on this issue. In the event that Ohio law applied, Debora would have reached the age of majority on November 4, 1995 and the appellant would be obligated to pay support only until his arrearages were paid. In the event New York law applied, Debora would not have become emancipated as a matter of law until November 4, 1998, and the appellant would have been obligated to continue paying the child support orders previously set by the court.

The parties completed their briefing to a magistrate. The magistrate's decision stated that the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitution demanded the application of New York law and ordered the appellant to comply with the child support order until Debora reached the age of twenty-one. The trial court overruled the appellant's objections and confirmed the magistrate's decision in September 1998. The appellant commenced this appeal.

II.

The first assignment of error presents the principal issue on this appeal. The appellant contends that the trial court erroneously relied on full faith and credit principles in ruling that New York law determined the duration of the appellant's obligation to pay support for Debora. The appellant insists that a reliance on full faith and credit is unnecessary because URESA's choice of law provision, formerly codified in Ohio at R.C. 3115.06,^[2] dictated application of Ohio law. We conclude that the appellant is incorrect, as the trial court properly applied New York law. we also hold that the result is supported by both URESA and full faith and credit principles.

A.

we begin our analysis with an overview of the URESA statutory scheme. URESA'S purpose was to provide a practical method to enforce the legal obligations of child support when an obligor left the state in which the children resided. Porter v. Porter (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 123, 126; Levi v. Levi (1960), 170 Ohio St. 533. The URESA process commences when the obligee, i.e. the custodial parent, files a petition in the state in which the obligee resides. Paton v. Brill (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 826, 829 (discussing former R.C. 3115.01(B)(2)). If the court in this "initiating state" reviews the petition and determines that the obligor owes a duty of support, the proceeding is certified to the ,responding state," i.e. where the obligor resides. Id. (citing former R.C. 3115.01(B)(3) and 3115.12). The "responding court" must then issue an order to enforce the obligor's pre-existing support obligation from the initiating state. This URESA process merely enforces a support order that was previously established by an initiating state. McClure v. McClure (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 76, 79.^[3] Thus, when Ohio is the responding state in a "traditional" URESA proceeding to enforce a duty of support, the court must conform its order to the amount determined in the previous support order. See San Diego v. Elavsky (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus.

In this case, the URESA process began with Ms. Walton's petition in the Family Court of Oneida County, New York. The New York court, as the initiating court, determined that the appellant owed a duty of support arising from a prior divorce decree and forwarded the petition to Ohio. In accordance with its duty as a responding court, the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas conformed its order to the amount set in the New York divorce decree. See Elavsky, supra, 58 Ohio St.2d 81 at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court entered a judgment for the arrearages due and imposed a child support obligation for Debora that was identical to the level set by the New York divorce decree. This judgment did not involve Deana, the older daughter, because she apparently had become emancipated.

URESA also contains a choice of law provision applicable to actions alleging a support obligation. This provision, which Ohio codified at former R.C. 3115.06, states:

"Duties of support applicable under sections 3115.01 to 3115.34, inclusive, of the Revised Code, are those imposed under the laws of any state where the obligor was present for the period during which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown."

Under the terms of former R.C. 3115.06, the law of the responding state therefore applies in determining an obligor's duty of support, so long as the...