Com'r v. Jenks.

• Decision Date: 23 November 1948
• Citation: 135 Conn. 210,62 A.2d 773
• Parties: WALSH, Tax Com'r v. JENKS.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

135 Conn. 210

62 A.2d 773

WALSH, Tax Com'r

v.JENKS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 23, 1948.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Questions Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; Inglis, Judge.

Action by Walter W. Walsh, Tax Commissioner, against Aldro Jenks, Assessor of the City of Waterbury, for a declaratory judgment determining whether defendant has the right to grant tax exemptions to veterans not domiciled in the state of Connecticut at time of induction, and other questions, brought to the superior court, and reserved by the court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Questions answered in accordance with opinion.

Frank W. Flood, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William L. Hadden, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for plaintiff.

Philip N. Bernstein and George J. Crocicchia, both of Waterbury, for defendant.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

This reservation presented, upon facts alleged and admitted in the pleadings, raises issues as to the interpretation and validity of certain statutes granting limited exemptions from the property tax to those who are or have been in the armed service of the United States or to their dependents. The plaintiff tax commissioner claims that these statutes are to be interpreted as restricted to those who are serving or have served as a portion of the quota assigned to this state. The best approach to the issue so raised is to give a history of tax exemptions of this nature which the General Assembly has from time to time granted.

The first act was passed in 1871. It exempted to the amount of $1000 the property of soldiers and sailors who served in the army or navy of the United States ‘in the war of the rebellion, * * * who enlisted from and were credited on the quota of this state,’ and who were receiving a pension from the United States, and the property of the widows and mothers of such soldiers and sailors who were receiving a like pension. Public Acts 1871, Chap. 126. In 1872 the exemption was extended to include the pensioned widows and mothers of soldiers and sailors who served in the army or navy of the United States in wars previous to ‘the war of the rebellion.’ Public Acts 1872, Chap. 105, § 1. In 1879 the exemption was granted to pensioned soldiers and sailors who served during the latter war and were credited on the quotas of other states but who had been residents of this state for five years. Public Acts 1879, Chap. 23. In 1880 the exemption was extended to ‘all pensioned soldiers and sailors who have served in the army or navy of the United States.’ Public Acts 1880, Chap. 48. In 1881 a law was passed giving to all pensioned soldiers and sailors of the United States who lost a leg or arm, or suffered similar disabilities, the same exemption as that allowed blind persons; Public Acts 1881, Chap. 85; the next year the amount of their exemption was stated to be $3000. Public Acts 1882, Chap. 85. In 1884 the law of 1880 was amended to make it apply to ‘all pensioned soldiers and sailors resident in this state.’ Public Acts 1884, Chap. 84. In 1885 an exemption of $1000 was granted to the pensioned widows and mothers, resident in this state, of soldiers and sailors. Public Acts 1885, Chap. 32.

The Revision of 1875 had incorporated the act of 1871, with its limitation to soldiers and sailors who enlisted from and were credited to the quota of this state, Rev.1875, p. 154, § 12; later acts had in effect done away with this requirement; but in 1886 the General Assembly passed an act apparently intended to codify the statutes and clear up any doubt as to the limitation. The first section exempted to the amount of $1000 the property of ‘residents of this state’ who had served in the army or navy of the United States and had been honorably discharged, and the property of ‘resident widows or widowed mothers' of such soldiers and sailors and of pensioned widows and mothers; and the second section expressly repealed the portion of the Revision of 1875 containing the limitation as to those who had enlisted from and were credited to the quota of this state. Public Acts 1886, Chap. 137. It would serve no purpose to refer in detail to a long series of amendments to the statute thereafter made. Its provisions were divided into separate statutes or subdivisions of statutes, and the enumeration of wars or warlike activities in which soldiers and sailors of the United States had served was much broadened; but none of the statutes made it a condition of the exemption that the recipient should have been one who was credited to the quota of this state, and all applied to ‘residents of this state’ who fulfilled the specified requirements. The most far-reaching statute granting exemptions to veterans took its final form in an amendment to subsection (19) of § 1163, and is § 158f of the 1941 Supplement to the General Statutes, a copy of which is given in the footnote. ¹

The reservation is broad in its scope and questions the application of a considerable number of the statutes on the ground that they do not include any limitation as regards service by persons who enlisted from or formed a portion of the quota of this state. Thus § 1163 of the General Statutes, subsections (18), (20) and (23), provides limited exemptions for residents of this state who have served or are serving in the army, navy, marine corps or coast guard and who are receiving pensions from the federal government; for widows, residents of this state, of persons who so served; and for pensioned fathers or mothers, residents of this state, of those who so served. Section 258g, Sup.1943, grants a limited exemption to ‘any resident of this state’ who has served or is serving in the armed forces of the United States and has a disability rating by the veterans administration of the United States. Section 260g provides a limited exemption for any person who is serving in those forces; § 259g makes the provisions of the latter section applicable to persons serving in the merchant marine of the United States or any women's auxiliary organized under an act of the Congress and affiliated with any branch of the armed services; but by § 268g and § 286i, Sup.1947, the right to these exemptions terminated on December 31, 1947, except that exemptions to persons who were on the permanent list of those entitled to them are continued so long as the recipients remain residents of the town where their exemptions are recorded. Another statute grants a limited exemption as regards the property of ‘any resident or nonresident of this state’ who is in the armed services of the United States and has been detailed to give instruction to the Connecticut national guard. Cum.Sup.1935, § 370c. There is a statute which grants a limited exemption to ‘any resident of this state’ who has enrolled in the United States maritime service for at least ninety days during the second world war, Sup.1945, § 276h; but that statute ceases to be effective after December 31, 1948. Sup.1945, § 280h; Sup.1947, § 286i. Still another statute exempts to a limited extent the property of any person ‘who is a citizen of the United States,’ was ‘during the world war’ in the military or naval service of a government allied or associated with that of the United States, was ‘a resident of the United States' at the time of his enlistment or enrolment, and whose certificate of honorable discharge has been recorded by the town clerk of the town where he resides. Cum.Sup.1935, § 371c.

One of the questions propounded in the reservation asks whether, if it should be decided that under these statutes the exemptions could not properly be granted to persons not residents of this state at the time of their enlistment or induction, the defendant or the municipality concerned, through its proper officers, should recover from any such persons to whom exemptions have been given the amount of taxes which they should have paid. To any action to decide that question the persons who have received exemptions would be necessary parties, and in their absence we could not properly answer it. Brennan v. Russell, 133 Conn. 442, 445, 52 A.2d 308. We are concerned only with the statutes applicable to the tax assessments now being made or which shall be made in the future.

We shall first consider § 158f. The fact that the statute in which it originated was restricted to persons credited to the service quota of this state, that it was shortly amended to include those who had resided in this state for five years though they were a part of the quota of another state, that thereafter statutes were passed applicable generally to residents of this state, that the limitation to persons credited to the quota of this state as it appeared in the Revision of 1875 was expressly repealed, and that in the same statute, and since, the exemption has been granted to any resident of this state who meets the further conditions specified, leaves no doubt that it was not the legislative intent in § 158f to restrict the grant to persons who served as a part of the quota from this state. We point out also that there is nothing in the terms of the statute which suggests any such limitation and, aside from the considerations we have stated, we could not read such a provision into it. Forman Schools, Inc., v. Litchfield, 134 Conn. 1, 8, 54 A.2d 710; Borino v. Lounsbury, 86 Conn. 622, 625, 86 A. 597; Washburn v. LaMay, 116 Conn. 576, 578, 165 A. 791; State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 416, 11 A.2d 856; McManus v. Jarvis, 128 Conn. 707, 711, 22 A.2d 857.

The plaintiff tax commissioner has confined his argument before us to the claim that the statutes should be interpreted as not applicable to persons who did not form a portion of the quota of this state, and has made no claim that, if such persons are included, the statute is unconstitutional. In the questions propounded we are asked whether, if the statutes are not so limited, exemptions can...