Com'Rs of Rice Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank

Decision Date17 January 1877
Citation23 Minn. 280
PartiesBOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF RICE COUNTY <I>vs.</I> CITIZENS' NATIONAL BANK OF FARIBAULT.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Gordon E. Cole, for defendant.

Geo. P. Wilson, Attorney General, and Geo. N. Baxter, for plaintiff.

CORNELL, J.

Is real property, lawfully owned and used as a place for the transaction of its business by a bank created and existing under the national banking law, taxable eo nomine against the bank, under Laws 1874, c. 1, it being conceded that the specific provisions of that statute require the assessment and taxation of all the shares comprising the entire capital stock of the association in the name of the respective shareholders, and at their actual cash value, without any deduction on account of the real property so held by the bank, and in which a portion of its capital is invested? This is the sole question for consideration in this case, and its determination depends upon the character and effect of that statute.

The general policy of the law is to avoid duplicate taxation. No one subject of taxation ought to be required to contribute more than once to the same public burden, while other subjects of taxation, belonging to the same class, are required to contribute but once. In the exposition of any tax law, therefore, a construction leading to any such result should be avoided, unless the cogency of some express provision or unavoidable implication of the statute compels its adoption. Says Judge Cooley, in his valuable treatise on the law of taxation: "It is a fundamental maxim in taxation that the same property shall not be subject to a double tax payable by the same party, either directly or indirectly; and, when it is once decided that any kind or class of property is liable to be taxed under one provision of the statute, it has been held to follow, as a legal conclusion, that the legislature could not have intended the same property should be subject to another tax, though there may be general words in the law which would seem to imply that it may be taxed a second time." Cooley on Taxation, 165, and authorities cited in the notes. Especially should this rule obtain in the courts of a state whose constitution contains an express provision requiring equality and uniformity in the imposition of taxes upon property, according to a cash valuation.

The aggregate capital stock of any corporation is but the representative of its entire property, including the corporate franchise, and the actual cash value of the former depends wholly upon the productive character and real cash value of the latter. Intrinsically it possesses no value, and can have none, as separate and distinct from the corporate property it represents; nor is the property, character, or value of such stock increased, or in any way affected, by its division into a given number of shares, unless the proposition be conceded that all the parts are greater or less than the whole. Each share but represents a proportional interest in the corporate property, determined by the exact ratio existing between it and the entire stock, and it possesses a like corresponding value. Sever the connection between the stock and the shares comprising it, on the one hand, and the corporation and its property, on the other, and nothing remains to the former but a mere shadow, to which no real property or commercial value can be imparted by any legislative device whatever. The authorities bearing upon these propositions are very fully collated and cited by Judge Cooley, in his work on taxation, pages 164 and 166, inclusive, and the notes appended thereto, although no authority would seem necessary to establish their correctness.

Any legislation, therefore, which requires, for the purpose of taxation, an ad valorem assessment of all the shares of stock in a bank, as property, without allowing any deduction on account of the value imparted to them as the representatives of the corporate property and franchise of the bank, and also a like assessment of the corporate property itself under its own proper designation, necessarily provides for double taxation, and, in order to give the statute under consideration that effect, it must clearly appear to have been intended by some express provision or necessary implication.

The law under consideration (Laws 1874, c. 1) contains specific provisions for listing and assessing the property of every incorporated and unincorporated company or association, (§ 28,) and of "every bank, whether of issue or deposit, (other than a national bank,)" and of "every banker, broker, or stock-jobber." § 29. It is not disputed that these specific provisions are so far exclusive in their character that other clauses of the statute, relating generally to the assessment and taxation of real and personal property, can have no application whatever to cases clearly falling within the purview of these sections, unless made applicable by express reference or necessary implication; and, that there might be no doubt as to the legislative intent, it is expressly declared that the taxation of banking corporations "is specifically provided for in this act." § 28. That the phrase, "banking corporations," as here used, is to be understood as including not only every corporate body doing a general banking business, whether under state or national authority, but also all property employed in banking whether owned by corporations or individuals, is evident from the sections immediately following the one containing this declaration of legislative intent. Section 29 in terms relates to banks created under state...

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44 cases
  • City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1914
    ...is not favored and is never presumed. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. loc. cit. 137 [6 Sup. Ct. 645, 29 L. Ed. 830]." In Rice Co. Com'rs v. Bank, 23 Minn. 280, it was "The general policy of the law is to avoid duplicate taxation. No one subject of taxation ought to be required to contribu......
  • Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • September 25, 1928
    ...277 Ill. 474, 115 N. E. 633; Greene v. E. H. Taylor, Jr., & Sons, 184 Ky. 739, 212 S. W. 925; Board of County Com'rs Rice Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank of Faribault, 23 Minn. 280; State v. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485, 12 So. 477; State ex rel. Pearson v. Louisiana & M. R. R, Co., 196 Mo. 523, 94 S. ......
  • City of St. Louis v. United Railways Company of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • January 25, 1915
    ...is unmistakable; but double taxation is not favored and is never presumed. [Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 129.] "In Rice Co. Comrs. v. Bank, 23 Minn. 280, it was said: general policy of the law is to avoid duplicate taxation. No one subject of taxation ought to be required to contribute ......
  • Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Commission
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • September 25, 1928
    ... ... 739, 212 S.W. 925; Board of County Com'rs ... Rice Co. v. Citizens' [147 S.C. 143] Nat. Bank of ... ...
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