Com. v. Allen
Decision Date | 05 February 1990 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Frederick W. ALLEN, Third. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Jack M. Atwood, Plymouth, for defendant.
Linda M. Fleming, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.
After a jury-waived trial before a judge in the Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty of unlawful cultivation of marihuana, unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and unlawful possession of marihuana with intent to distribute, and was sentenced to concurrent one-year terms followed by three years' probation on each of the charges. The defendant filed an appeal in the Appeals Court and we transferred the case here on our own motion. The defendant's sole argument on appeal is that there was error in the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The defendant contends that the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. We agree with him, and therefore reverse the judgments.
On November 9, 1984, Officer William E. Curtis of the Plymouth police department applied for and was issued a search warrant for the defendant's house. The affidavit that Curtis submitted in support of the application for the warrant relied almost exclusively on information supplied by three unnamed informants, who shall be referred to as informants A, B, and C. With regard to those three informants the affidavit was as follows:
The only other arguably relevant fact contained in the affidavit was that the defendant had been convicted of possession of marihuana in 1980.
In order to determine whether an affidavit that relies on information from unnamed informants sets forth facts sufficient for a finding of probable cause, the affidavit must be evaluated under the standards first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and adopted by this court for challenges under the State Constitution in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985) (Upton II ). A magistrate must Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 566, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983) (Upton I ). Each prong of the Aguilar- Spinelli test must be independently considered and satisfied. Upton II, supra 394 Mass. at 375-376, 476 N.E.2d 548. In reviewing a finding of probable cause, only the facts revealed on the face of the affidavit and any reasonable inferences therefrom may be considered. Commonwealth v. Jean-Charles, 398 Mass. 752, 757, 500 N.E.2d 1332 (1986). Commonwealth v. Smith, 370 Mass. 335, 338 n. 3, 348 N.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944, 97 S.Ct. 364, 50 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976).
Turning to the specifics of this affidavit, the motion judge concluded, and the Commonwealth does not dispute, that informants A and B did not pass the Aguilar- Spinelli basis of knowledge test. According to the affidavit, the only information these two informants imparted to the affiant was hearsay gained from third parties whose reliability was not established. There was nothing in the affidavit to indicate that the undetailed information from informants A and B was anything more than a "casual rumor or a mere reflection of the reputation of the supposed actor." Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 381 Mass. 301, 303, 408 N.E.2d 871 (1980). Therefore, as the judge concluded, the affidavit as to those informants was ineffective. See Commonwealth v. Kuszewski, 385 Mass. 802, 805, 434 N.E.2d 203 (1982).
In contrast, informant C's basis of knowledge was apparent in the affidavit. Unlike the other two informants, informant C, according to the affidavit, had been inside the defendant's house and had purchased drugs there. First-hand receipt of information through personal observation satisfies the basis of knowledge prong of Aguilar- Spinelli. Commonwealth v. Parapar, 404 Mass. 319,...
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