Com. v. De'Amicis

• Decision Date: 13 December 2007
• Docket Number: SJC-09980.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Marcus DE'AMICIS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

877 N.E.2d 925

450 Mass. 271

COMMONWEALTH v. Marcus DE'AMICIS.

SJC-09980.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued October 1, 2007.

Decided December 13, 2007.

David M. Skeels, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

Benjamin S. Halasz, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, & BOTSFORD, JJ.

CORDY, J.

Having been adjudged and committed as a sexually dangerous person under G.L. c. 123A, Marcus De'Amicis filed a motion in the Appeals Court to enter his appeal without the payment of entry fees on the basis of indigency. A single justice of that court denied the motion, apparently concluding that De'Amicis did not meet the more onerous indigency requirement applicable to an "inmate." G.L. c. 261, §§ 27A, 29.¹ See Commonwealth v. Clark, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 832, 834-835 n. 6, 858 N.E.2d 768 (2006) (suggesting in dicta that inmate appealing commitment as sexually dangerous person must follow procedure in G.L. c. 261, § 29, to obtain fee waiver). De'Amicis thereafter filed an appeal from the denial of his motion. We granted his application for direct appellate review.

On appeal, De'Amicis contends that the provisions of G.L. c. 261, § 29, do not apply, and were never intended to apply, to individuals who are appealing from their commitments to the treatment center at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater (treatment center) as sexually dangerous persons. He also contends that to apply the provisions of § 29 in these circumstances would be unconstitutional. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (State court costs that prevent indigent mother from appealing from parental termination order violates Federal Constitution because proceeding quasi criminal in nature). We conclude, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the requirements of § 29 do not apply to an inmate appealing from his commitment as a sexually dangerous person. We also conclude, however, that G.L. c. 261, § 27D, governs the appeal from denied requests for fee waivers, and, insofar as De'Amicis's appeal was untimely under that statutory provision, it must be dismissed.

1. Procedural background. On February 13, 2006, after a jury-waived trial, a judge in the Superior Court found that De'Amicis was a sexually dangerous person, and committed him to the treatment center for an indeterminate period under G.L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). On February 16, 2007, De'Amicis filed a motion to enter his appeal in the Appeals Court without prepayment of fees. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit of indigency that stated that he was "presently in custody at the Massachusetts Treatment Center at Bridgewater" and had been "represented by the Committee for Public Counsel Services throughout the adjudication of [his] case."² Attached to the affidavit was an "inmate transaction report" showing a six-month average balance of $1,708.22 in his account at the treatment center. On February 16, a single justice in the Appeals Court denied the motion, ruling that the "appeal shall be entered upon the payment of the $300.00 filing fee on or before 9 MAR 07."³ On March 6, 2007 (eighteen days after the denial of his motion), De'Amicis filed a notice of appeal. We granted his application for direct appellate review.

2. Applicable statutes. General Laws c. 261, §§ 27A-27G, and § 29, govern requests by indigent individuals for, among other things, the waiver of certain costs and fees incident to civil and criminal litigation, including court filing fees for civil cases and the fees for docketing civil appeals. Section 27A defines the terms applicable to §§ 27A-27G, and includes a definition of the term "[i]ndigent." Section 27B provides, in relevant part, that "[u]pon or after commencing or answering to any civil, criminal or juvenile proceeding or appeal in any court ... any party may file with the clerk an affidavit of indigency and request for waiver, substitution or payment" of the fees. Section 27C sets forth a procedure for processing fee waiver requests. Section 27D governs the appeal process in "any case where the court denies a request for waiver, substitution or payment by the commonwealth of fees and costs, pursuant to [§ 27C] or any other provision of law."⁴

Sections 27A-27G were originally enacted in 1974, at the same time the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated. St.1974, c. 694, § 3. In their original form, these provisions appeared to provide for fee waivers, substitutions, or payments for indigent persons only in the trial courts. In 1978, the Legislature directed the Supreme Judicial Court to file a report on fees and indigency standards to assist the effort of making "uniform standards of indigency to be employed by each court in the commonwealth." St.1978, c. 478, § 337. Thereafter, in 1980, the Legislature amended the provisions of §§ 27A-27G, by, among other things, broadening the applicability of § 27B to include "appeal[s] in any court," thereby enabling indigent persons to obtain waivers of fees and costs for all appeals, civil and criminal. St.1980, c. 539, § 6.

Under §§ 27A-27G, as they appeared before 1999, the term "indigent" was defined broadly. In 1999, through St.1999, c. 127, §§ 180-182, the Legislature amended this statutory scheme as part of a series of statutes "modeled after, but ... more expansive than, the Federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) ... an act that Congress passed `with the principal purpose of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation by instituting economic costs for prisoners wishing to file civil claims.'"⁵ Longval v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 434 Mass. 718, 719, 752 N.E.2d 674 (2001) (Longval), quoting Murray v. Dosal, 150 F.3d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1467, 143 L.Ed.2d 551 (1999). In particular, the Legislature changed the definition of "[i]ndigent" in § 27A by adding a proviso applicable to inmates, and added § 29, which, like the PLRA, refashioned the procedures prisoners must observe when seeking to proceed without the payment of costs in civil actions. Section 29 makes it more difficult for an inmate bringing such an action to be adjudged indigent, by establishing far more rigorous standards for determining indigency than those generally applicable to indigency determinations and set forth in the definition of "[i]ndigent" appearing in § 27A.⁶

Section 29 requires an inmate who commences a civil action against a State or county agency, official, or employee and who "requests a waiver of filing fees or court costs due to indigency pursuant to [§] 27B," to submit or cause to be submitted certain documentation to the court. Thus, once the inmate makes the waiver request, under § 29 (a) the court directs a prison official to file a "copy of a current account statement of the inmate's account and a copy of the inmate's activity sheet for the preceding six months." Section 29 (b) then obligates the inmate to file a signed affidavit reporting assets including, but not limited to, "cash, monies in bank accounts, real property, other investments and all assets of a spouse to which the inmate has legal access; income received in the past six months and income expected to be received in the next six months." Once all the required information is filed, "[t]he court shall order the inmate to pay, as a partial payment of any filing fees and court costs, 20 per cent of the preceding six months' average balance in the inmate's account and, thereafter, monthly payments of 10 per cent of the average monthly balance in the inmate's account, until all such fees are paid, provided that the payment amount to be drawn from the inmate's account is equal to or greater than $10." § 29 (d) (1). The court must issue this order unless it "finds that the inmate is incapable of making payments under such a plan or if the court determines, at any time, that such order imposes an undue administrative burden upon the court." § 29 (d) (2).

3. Discussion. Ordinarily, if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the legislative intent. See Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839, 494 N.E.2d 1008 (1986). "However, time and again we have stated that we should not accept the literal meaning of the words of a statute without regard for that statute's purpose and history." Id. In sum, "a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words ... considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished." Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934).

a. Section 29. In Longval, supra at 721-723, 752 N.E.2d 674, we followed Federal precedent and, applying the rational basis test, held that § 29 (as applied in civil actions) did not violate an inmate's right of access to the courts or to equal protection under either the Massachusetts or Federal Constitution. The question we must answer in this case is a narrower one, whether the indigency determination provisions set out in § 29 apply to an appeal brought by an inmate from his commitment to the treatment center as a sexually dangerous person.

The plain language of § 29 suggests that its provisions do not apply in the circumstances that De'Amicis presents. While De'Amicis is an "[i]nmate," as defined in § 27A, § 29 applies only to an "action" that an inmate "brings" against governmental agencies or officials. An "action" is "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice [through] which one party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense." Black's Law Dictionary 31 (8th ed.2004). An "appeal," in contrast, is "undertaken to have a decision reconsidered" by a...