Com. v. Anthony
| Decision Date | 18 August 1992 |
| Citation | 418 Pa.Super. 82,613 A.2d 581 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Fred ANTHONY, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Peter Scuderi, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before McEWEN, KELLY and HOFFMAN, JJ.
In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether in a proceeding for the return of property, a Court of Common Pleas is collaterally estopped from undertaking an independent review of an order granting a suppression motion entered by the Philadelphia Municipal Court in a prior criminal prosecution. We conclude it is not and reverse.
Armed with a search warrant, police seized from the home of appellee, Fred Anthony, $3,709.00, two telephones, and other documents purportedly establishing appellee's involvement in an illegal gambling operation. On August 10, 1988, the Philadelphia Municipal Court suppressed all of the seized evidence on the grounds that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause. The Commonwealth did not appeal this suppression ruling, but rather chose to withdraw the charges of illegal bookmaking and conspiracy.
On August 15, 1988, appellee filed a petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 324 1 in the Court of Common Pleas for the return of the confiscated money and telephones. The Commonwealth challenged appellee's petition, arguing that this seized money constituted derivative contraband subject to forfeiture under Pa.R.Crim.P. 324(b). 2
The trial court found itself bound, by operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, to the previous order granting suppression in the Municipal Court, and ordered the property returned. 3 On March 23, 1990, the trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration. This timely appeal followed
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in considering itself bound by the Municipal Court's probable cause determination. The gravamen of the Commonwealth's argument on appeal is that the trial court, in a petition for the return of property, exercises appellate jurisdiction over the validity and propriety of prior Municipal Court suppression rulings. Acting in such a capacity, the Commonwealth asserts, the trial court is immunized from the operation of collateral estoppel, and it is fully authorized to independently review suppression motions entered by the Municipal Court. The Commonwealth submits that the trial court's failure to independently review the Municipal Court suppression ruling resulted in the return of property to appellee that should have been otherwise forfeited as derivative contraband.
In response, appellee contends that the trial court properly concluded that the operation of collateral estoppel precluded it from re-litigating the propriety of suppression rulings entered by the Municipal Court in a prior criminal proceedings, especially since the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that had not been already presented to the Municipal Court that would justify such a review. Appellee argues that this result is compelled by the well established prohibition against courts of equal jurisdiction entering diverse rulings based on the same record. Because, appellee maintains, the trial court stands on equal jurisdictional footing as the Municipal Court, permitting review under these circumstances is impermissible.
In granting appellee's motion for the return of property, the trial court essentially embraced appellee's position on appeal. After a careful review of the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court erred in doing so.
Initially, we note that the Commonwealth's burden in forfeiture proceedings is a preponderance of evidence standard. See Estate of Peetros v. County Detectives & District Attorney's Office, 341 Pa.Super. 558, 492 A.2d 6 (1985) (citing Commonwealth v. Landy, 240 Pa.Super. 458, 362 A.2d 999 (1976)). Despite the lesser standard, the quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture proceedings is undisputed. See Petition of Maglisco, 341 Pa.Super. 525, 491 A.2d 1381 (1985). Disgorging from individuals property linked to criminality manifests the underlying purpose of such proceedings to punish those engaged in illegality. See One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886)).
This is not to say, however, that the Commonwealth's right to seek forfeiture is contingent upon the result in a criminal prosecution. Commonwealth v. One 1988 Ford Coupe VIN # 1FABP41A9JF143651, 393 Pa.Super. 320, 574 A.2d 631 (1990). 4 Regardless of whether a conviction can be gained from the evidence, the Commonwealth may seek to forfeit property as long as it establishes However, it is a well-settled proposition of law that the Commonwealth may not permanently acquire derivative contraband which it has initially seized unconstitutionally. 5 Because of the underlying penal purpose of the forfeiture proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has long ago determined that the remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, extends to forfeiture proceedings. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra.
that the property constitutes contraband. There are two distinct categories of contraband subject to forfeiture. First, contraband per se is property which is inherently illegal, and which absent further evidence, subjects its possessor to criminal sanction. Second, derivative contraband is property which is itself innocent, but which nonetheless, constitutes the fruit of some criminal enterprise, or is used to perpetrate an unlawful act. Estate of Peetros v. County Detectives & District Attorney's Office, supra. The status of property deemed to be contraband per se effectively precludes repossession under all circumstances, since its return would require the Commonwealth to subvert the legitimacy of laws prohibiting its possession. In sharp contrast, the inherently innocent nature of derivative contraband requires the Commonwealth to prove that the property seeking to be forfeited is the fruit of, or an instrument used to further illegality
In the instant case, the trial court did not reach the ultimate question of whether the Commonwealth had established that the evidence was sufficiently linked to illegal bookmaking. Instead, the trial court refused to grant the Commonwealth's request for forfeiture based on the Municipal Court's determination that the alleged derivative contraband was illegally seized. This, we conclude, was error.
The general rule regarding collateral estoppel is well settled:
According to the rule of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, when an issue of law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the same parties, whether on the same or a different claim. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982); Clark v. Troutman, supra, , 502 A.2d at 139. In re Estate of R.L.L., supra , 409 A.2d at 324-4 n. 8. Accord: Schubach v. Silver, 461 Pa. 366, 336 A.2d 328 (1975).
[A] plea of collateral estoppel is valid if, 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the later action, 2) there was a final judgment on the merits, 3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and 4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the question of a prior action.
In re Estate of R.L.L., supra, 487 Pa. at 228,409 A.2d at 323-4 n. 8, quoting Safeguard Mutual Insurance Company v. Williams, supra , 345 A.2d at 668; Gulentz v. Schanno Transportation, Inc., 355 Pa.Super. 302, 308, 513 A.2d 440, 443 (1986); Derry Township School District v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 345 Pa.Super. 487, 491, 498 A.2d 928, 930 (1985); Matson v. Housing Authority of Zarnecki v. Shepegi, 367 Pa.Super. 230, 238-40, 532 A.2d 873, 877-78 (1987) (en banc ).
the City of Pittsburgh, 326 Pa.Super. 109, 112, 473 A.2d 632, 634 (1984).
In Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477, 509 A.2d 863 (1986), however, our Supreme Court carved an exception to this general rule. There, the Commonwealth had proceeded separately against the defendant, Lagana, on related charges of burglary and a firearm violation which stemmed from the same arrest. The burglary charge surfaced first. Arguing that police had unconstitutionally arrested him, Lagana successfully sought suppression of what later proved to be fruits of a burglary. The Commonwealth did not appeal this ruling. The firearms charge subsequently surfaced before a different trial court which, concluding that collateral estoppel precluded a re-litigation of the suppression issues previously disposed of during the first suppression proceedings, ruled that the fruits of the arrest relating to the firearms count must be suppressed as well.
On appeal to our Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argued that the trial court had erred in its application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In part, our Supreme Court agreed. Balancing the various competing policy interests involved the Court held:
In the present context we believe that some limited form of collateral estoppel is dictated, since it would have the beneficial effect of discouraging the relitigation of the same issues based on the same evidence, while at the same time...
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