Com. v. Archambault

• Citation: 448 Pa. 90,290 A.2d 72
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Leonard ARCHAMBAULT, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 20 April 1972
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

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290 A.2d 72 448 Pa. 90 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Leonard ARCHAMBAULT, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. April 20, 1972.

[448 Pa. 91]

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John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals Div., Vincent J. Ziccardi, Defender Association of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty., Milton M. Stein, Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

[448 Pa. 92] OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

Appellant Leonard Archambault, after trial by jury in 1962, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. No appeal was taken from his conviction at that time. However, in 1968 appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, ¹ alleging that he had been deprived of his right to appeal, guaranteed by Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). His petition was dismissed by the common pleas court, but on appeal this Court ordered that appellant be permitted to file post trial motions as if timely filed if he could estabklish that his previous failure to prosecute an appeal was motivated by fear of the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Archambault, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A.2d 811 (1969). Such a showing was made, but after argument appellant's motion for a new trial was denied. Appellant appealed directly to this Court, and on March 25, 1971, this Court, by a vote of three to two, affirmed the judgment of if he could establish that his previous failure timely filed, and was granted on May 28, 1971. The case was then reargued before a full Court.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in telling the jury during the charge: 'I think it would be a miscarriage of justice to find this defendant not guilty.' ² We agree with appellant and grant him a [448 Pa. 93] new trial. ³ To the same effect see Commonwealth v. Motley, Pa., 289 A.2d 724 (1972) decided this day.

We believe that when a judge expresses to the jury his opinion that the accused is guilty, he invades the province of the jury and thereby violates the accused's fundamental right to trial by jury, a right that has been guaranteed by the Constitution of this Commonwealth since 1776. ⁴

In a criminal case the direction of a verdict of guilty by a trial judge is not

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allowed. ⁵ For an accused has a right to trial by jury, and if a trial judge directs the jury to return a verdict of guilty, the accused has had no jury trial at all. Our constitutional system of trial by jury is founded upon the firm conviction that the peace and dignity of our society are best maintained, and the highest degree of criminal justice is achieved, if the power to convict individuals of crimes lies solely with the jury.

Justice Brandeis' observations on the question of whether a trial judge may express his opinion on the guilt of an accused, expressed over fifty years ago, still ring true today:

'(I)t is still the rule . . . that the judge [448 Pa. 94] is without power to direct a verdict of guilty although no fact is in dispute. What the judge is forbidden to do directly, he may not do by indirection. The judge may enlighten the understanding of the jury and thereby influence their judgment; but he may not use undue influence. He may advise; he may persuade; but he may not command or coerce. He does coerce when without convincing the judgment he overcomes the will by the weight of his authority.' ⁶

Justice Brandeis has not been alone in his observation that a trial judge cannot indirectly effect a directed verdict of guilty. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently noted:

'In a criminal case a court may not order the jury to return a verdict of guilty, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt. This principle is so well established that its basis is not normally a matter of discussion. There is, however, a deep undercurrent of reasons. Put simply, the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers finally exacted from the king would be meaningless if the king's judges could call the turn. Bushel's Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). In the exercise of its functions not only must the jury be free from direct control in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contemporaneous and subsequent. Commonwealth v. Anthes, 1857, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 209--210; Rex v. Larkin, (1943) K.B. 174; P. Devlin, Trial by Jury 14, 56, 75--91 (3d impr. with addendum, 1966); T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 137--38 (5th ed. 1956); Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv.L.Rev. 582 (1939).' ⁷

[448 Pa. 95] The now-apparent weakness in some of our previous decisions ⁸ was the supposition that the trial judge could express his personal opinion on the guilt of the accused, and even tell the jury, as the trial court did here, that: 'I think it would be a miscarriage of justice to find this defendant not guilty,' and yet somehow still leave 'the ultimate decision to the jury' and not 'interfere with its responsibility.' ⁹ This

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assumption fails to recognize the actualities of the judge-jury relationship.

An expression by the judge that in his opinion the accused is guilty leaves an indelible imprint on the minds of the jury. The jury is undoubtedly going to attribute to the judge, because of his experience in criminal cases, special expertise in determining guilt or innocence. As Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Kephart stated for this Court:

'The judge occupies an exalted and dignified position; he is the one person to whom the jury, with rare exceptions, looks for guidance, and from whom the litigants expect absolute impartiality. An expression indicative of favor or condemnation is quickly reflected in the jury box . . .. To depart from the clear line of duty through questions, expressions, or conduct, contravenes the orderly administration of justice. It has a tendency to take from one of the parties the right to a fair and impartial trial, as guaranteed under our system of jurisprudence.' ¹⁰

Or, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946):

"The influence of the trial judge on [448 Pa. 96] the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight,' . . . and jurors are ever watchful of the words that fall from him. Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word.' ¹¹

A judge's expression of his opinion on the guilt of an accused has an even greater coercive effect on the jury when as here the judge states that it would be a 'miscarriage of justice' to find the defendant not guilty. 'A juror may not mind disagreeing with a judge on factual matters but he would dislike very much placing himself in the category of a person who has participated in a miscarriage of justice, judicially proclaimed.' Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 210, 194 A.2d 150, 158 (1963) (dissenting opinion). ¹²

In light of the decisive effect that a jury is likely to give to a judge's statement that in his opinion the accused is guilty, it is clear that cautioning instructions to the effect that the jury is the final arbiter of the verdict are insufficient to vitiate the impact of the judge's statement. In a lengthy charge such as the one that was given to the jury at appellant's trial, the judge's statement that 'I think it would be a miscarriage of justice to find this defendant not guilty' is the one part of the charge that no juror will forget or fail to understand. Cautionary instructions will be unable to remove the indelible impact of such a statement. [448 Pa. 97] Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

In holding as we do today, that a trial judge may not suggest a verdict of guilty or not guilty nor directly express an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, we are merely reaching a result which is in harmony with our latest decisions in this general area--Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 434 Pa. 397, 254 A.2d 24 (1969),

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and Commonwealth v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968). In both of these cases the trial judge in his charge had reminded the jurors of their responsibility to the Almighty to bring in a proper verdict. We reversed on the grounds that the "jurors Might have concluded . . . that the court was threatening them with the wrath of God should they bring in a verdict of not guilty." Commonwealth v. Wilmer, supra, 434 Pa. at 400, 254 A.2d at 25 (quoting from Commonwealth v. Holton, supra, 432 Pa. at 19, 247 A.2d at 232). Certainly a direct statement by a judge that in his opinion the accused is guilty invades the province of the jury just as much as, if not more than, a judge's statement implying that he can discern the will of the Almighty and that God's wrath will be visited upon the jury if they fail to return a verdict of guilty.

Our holding in this case also eliminates a number of anomalies that would exist under the opposite rule. For example, we recently held in Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971), that a new trial was required when the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion of the defendant's credibility in the presence of the jury. We reasoned that the prosecutor 'thereby clearly and improperly intrud(ed) upon the jury's exclusive function of evaluating the credibility of witnesses.' Id. at 287, 285 A.2d at 493. ¹³ If a prosecutor[448 Pa. 98] cannot express his personal opinion of a defendant's credibility without intruding upon the jury's function, A fortiori we cannot permit a judge, whose opinion on the guilt of an accused has a far greater impact on the jury, to express such an opinion on the guilt of an accused.

In addition, we have held many times that new trials would be granted where the judge in a jury case...