Com. v. Baird, No. 23 WAP 2007.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Saylor
• Citation: 975 A.2d 1113
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Scott D. BAIRD, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 22 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 23 WAP 2007.

975 A.2d 1113 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee
v.
Scott D. BAIRD, Appellant. No. 23 WAP 2007. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 2, 2009. Decided July 22, 2009.

[975 A.2d 1114]

Michael J. DeRiso, DeRiso & DeRiso, Pittsburgh, for Scott D. Baird.

Peter Glenn Flanigan, Westmoreland County District Attorney's Office, Greensburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, GREENSPAN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

We allowed appeal to consider whether, for the purpose of assessing the government's compliance with the prompt-trial requirement of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, notice to an attorney of a judicial proceeding serves as sufficient notice to the defendant-client.

In February 2003, Appellant Scott D. Baird was arrested and charged by written complaint with burglary, robbery, and resisting arrest. He was released that same day after posting bond, and he executed documents reflecting his agreement to be present for all legal proceedings. Two weeks later, Appellant's counsel appeared on the date scheduled for the preliminary hearing, waived the hearing on Appellant's behalf, and signed the notice of arraignment, scheduled for April 25, 2003. Apparently, neither the district magistrate nor Appellant's counsel furnished Appellant with actual notice of the arraignment date.

Appellant had other burglary cases pending. Upon learning of the additional charges, the common pleas court revoked Appellant's bond, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On March 18, 2003, Appellant surrendered to law enforcement and was lodged in Allegheny County Jail, through and after the date set for the arraignment. Neither Appellant nor his counsel appeared, and a bench warrant was issued. On May 7, 2003, despite the outstanding bench warrant, Appellant was released for drug rehabilitation, and, while in the program, he cooperated with a joint county task force investigating burglaries.

In December 2003, Appellant appeared in court, pled guilty to six other burglary charges, and was sentenced to time served plus probation (with the leniency due to his cooperative efforts). Following sentencing,

975 A.2d 1115

Appellant reported monthly to his probation officer, remained gainfully employed, lived at his listed address, and continued to work in collaboration with the law enforcement task force.

In June 2004, Appellant was detained for a motor vehicle violation in a neighboring county and arrested pursuant to the outstanding bench warrant pertaining to his failure to appear at the scheduled April 2003 arraignment proceeding. At the subsequent hearing, when asked what he thought happened to the case against him, Appellant indicated that he was never informed of the date of arraignment. More specifically, Appellant explained:

I asked [my attorney] about it. He said, exactly what he said, "I wouldn't stir up the bees. Let it go. See what happens," is his exact words.

N.T. June 22, 2004, at 4. The following day, Appellant executed a waiver of arraignment and was released on bail. His trial was scheduled for April 4, 2005.

Prior to the trial date, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to relevant provisions of Pennsylvania's prompt-trial rule. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (requiring that trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on bail, is to commence no later than 365 days from the date the complaint is filed, subject, inter alia, to the exclusion of periods of delay resulting from the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant's attorney). Following an evidentiary hearing, the common pleas court granted the motion and dismissed the charges, finding that Appellant lacked notice of his April 2003 arraignment date and that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in bringing Appellant to trial.

A divided, en banc Superior Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that it is the responsibility of defense counsel to advise a defendant of court proceedings requiring the defendant's presence. See Commonwealth v. Baird, 919 A.2d 258, 261 (Pa.Super.2007). Writing for the majority, then-Judge (now Justice) McCaffery initially explained that a defendant on bail who fails to appear at a court proceeding, of which he has been properly notified, is deemed unavailable from the time of that proceeding until he is subsequently apprehended or until he voluntarily surrenders himself. See id. at 260 (citing Commonwealth v. Cohen, 481 Pa. 349, 356, 392 A.2d 1327, 1331 (1978)).¹ The majority determined that notice to Appellant's counsel constituted proper notification to Appellant of the date of his arraignment and, as such, Appellant's failure to appear rendered him unavailable for trial. See Baird, 919 A.2d at 260-61 (citing Commonwealth v. Snyder, 373 Pa. Super. 582, 542 A.2d 95 (1988)). The majority reasoned:

Where defense counsel has actual notice of a proceeding and fails to so inform his or her client, the onus and consequences of such failure fall upon the defendant. [Appellant]'s failure to appear at the court proceeding, therefore, renders [Appellant] unavailable during the entire period between the date of the proceeding and [Appellant]'s subsequent apprehension by police.

Baird, 919 A.2d at 261.

Thus, the Superior Court held that the period between April 25, 2003 (Appellant's original arraignment date), and June 21, 2004 (the date Appellant was apprehended), was excludable time for purposes

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of determining the time within which the Commonwealth was required to commence Appellant's trial under Rule 600. Given its analysis, the majority viewed the matter of the Commonwealth's diligence, considered by the common pleas court, to be irrelevant to the outcome.

Judge Joyce, joined by Judges Stevens, Klein, and Panella, authored a concurrence, framing the issue as "what is reasonable and/or proper notice." Baird, 919 A.2d at 262 (Joyce, J., concurring). Given that Appellant's counsel was notified of the arraignment date, Judge Joyce concluded that it was reasonable to assume counsel would have informed Appellant of that date. Judge Joyce emphasized Appellant's awareness of the proceedings against him, reasoning that Appellant's disregard of, or apathy toward, the criminal action against him should not result in a windfall to him. See id. at 262-63.

President Judge Ford Elliott, joined by Judges Musmanno and Panella, also concurred, agreeing that the delay caused by counsel's failure to inform Appellant of the arraignment date, resulting in Appellant's failure to appear, is excludable time for Rule 600 purposes. However, she disagreed with the majority's broader, bright-line holding that the "onus and consequences" of such an omission falls upon the defendant. Rather, Judge Ford Elliott believed that the determination should be case-specific, thus suggesting a broader assessment of the totality of the circumstances. See Baird, 919 A.2d at 264 (Ford Elliott, P.J., concurring).

Judge Bender authored a dissent, in which he emphasized the trial court's factual finding that Appellant was not properly notified of his scheduled arraignment. He reasoned that Appellant's failure to appear did not constitute a willful failure for excludable time purposes. Additionally, the dissent suggested that the majority's approach conflicted with the applicable state and local court rules, which require that notice be provided by the court, not by counsel. See Baird, 919 A.2d at 266-67 (Bender, J., dissenting).²

Presently, Appellant maintains he has no obligation to be available where he is not properly made aware of his arraignment date. Appellant's argument substantially tracks Judge Bender's dissenting opinion in its emphasis on the...