Com. v. Blinn

• Decision Date: 22 January 1987
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Brian P. BLINN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 25

503 N.E.2d 25

399 Mass. 126

COMMONWEALTH v. Brian P. BLINN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Essex.

Argued Nov. 5, 1986.

Decided Jan. 22, 1987.

John S. Legasey (Michael J. McLane, Danvers, with him), for defendant.

Robert J. Bender, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The defendant, Brian P. Blinn, appeals from a judgment of conviction by a jury of six in the Salem Division of the District Court. The defendant was found guilty of violating G.L. c. 140, § 27 (1984 ed.), ¹ for refusing to produce a motel register when requested to do so by a State trooper. The defendant now argues that G.L. c. 140, § 27 (1984 ed.), violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. ² We allowed the defendant's petition for direct appellate review. We disagree and affirm the conviction.

The facts are not in dispute. On September 21, 1984, Massachusetts State Trooper Robert Smith went to the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge in Danvers. Trooper Smith asked the defendant, the manager of the motel, to produce the motel's guest register for inspection. The defendant refused to allow Trooper Smith to see the register unless Trooper Smith obtained a search warrant. Trooper Smith left the motel and returned with a copy of G.L. c. 140, § 27, and again demanded to see the register. Even though the statute required the defendant to show the register to the police, the defendant refused to do so because the State trooper did not have a search warrant. The trooper again left the motel and returned with two other troopers about an hour and a half later. At this time, the defendant produced the register, but he was subsequently charged with violating G.L. c. 140, § 27, for failing to produce the register for inspection when first requested to do so. At no time did Trooper Smith obtain a search warrant requiring the defendant to produce the guest register for inspection.

Our inquiry begins by examining whether the conduct of the trooper constituted a search in the Fourth Amendment sense. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches per se, but it does bar police intrusions into areas where a defendant has a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular circumstances." Commonwealth v. Podgurski, 386 Mass. 385, 387, 436 N.E.2d 150 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1222, 103 S.Ct. 1167, 75 L.Ed.2d 464 (1983), quoting Sullivan v. District Court of Hampshire, 384 Mass. 736, 741-742, 429 N.E.2d 335 (1981). Thus, if the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel register, the trooper's request pursuant to G.L. c. 140, § 27, does not require a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the government "has 'greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property' because 'the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home.' " Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 1826, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986), quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2538, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981). The Court has emphasized that, unlike a homeowner's interest in his dwelling, "[t]he interest of the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from any inspections." Id. The test in determining whether a particular defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy is essentially an objective one: whether the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292, 104 S.Ct. 641, 646, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984).

Based on the facts presented at the defendant's trial, we conclude that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel's guest register. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on several factors. First, as noted above, in business premises a person enjoys less of an expectation of privacy than in a home. Second, the guest register at issue was required to be kept by statute, thereby placing the defendant on notice that the register was subject to police inspection. The fact that a statute gives advance notice of warrantless inspections, though not determinative, is a factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant's expectation of privacy is legitimate. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972). 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.2(c), 221 (1978). Third, all motel guests are presumed to be aware that the defendant was required by law to keep an accurate register because the laws regarding the register are required to be posted. G.L. c. 140, § 31 (1984 ed.). Thus, the defendant's argument that he could withhold the register in order to protect the privacy of his guests must fail because the guests had no legitimate expectation that their names in the register could be withheld from the police.

Finally, it is important to note that the defendant was not the target of a criminal investigation by the State police. Had the police sought the register for the purpose of obtaining evidence against the defendant in a criminal proceeding, the defendant arguably may have had an expectation of privacy in the register. However, where, as here, the police are seeking the register to ascertain whether a criminal suspect is registered at the hotel, the hotel manager's expectation of privacy in the register is significantly diminished, if it exists at all. The record...