Com. v. Blystone

• Decision Date: 26 February 1999
• Citation: 555 Pa. 565,725 A.2d 1197
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott Wayne BLYSTONE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

555 Pa. 565

725 A.2d 1197

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Scott Wayne BLYSTONE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted February 3, 1997.

Decided February 26, 1999.

Robert Brett Dunham, Philadelphia, Paul D. Boas, Pittsburgh, for S. Blystone.

John Kopas, III, Fairchance, Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, Peter U. Hook, Uniontown, for the Com.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

CASTILLE, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County denying appellant's petition for post-conviction relief.¹ For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.

On June 13, 1984, a jury convicted appellant of first degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit homicide and conspiracy to commit robbery.² Following a separate penalty proceeding, the jury sentenced appellant to death.³ On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988). On February 28, 1990, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the sentence of death. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990).

On October 12, 1995, over eleven years after his conviction, appellant filed a petition under the PCRA alleging numerous issues including claims of ineffectiveness of counsel, trial court errors and constitutional violations. After an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied appellant's petition for collateral relief by memorandum opinion and order dated January 4, 1996. This appeal followed.

This Court's standard of review from the grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited to determining whether the lower court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 117 n. 4, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n. 4 (1995),cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996). In order to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, an appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2),⁴ that the issues he raises have not been previously litigated,⁵ and that the claims have not been waived. Id.,541 Pa. at 117,661 A.2d at 356; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). It is with the above standards in mind that we examine appellant's claims.

Appellant first argues that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury because the empaneled jury was improperly death qualified.⁶ Specifically, he asserts that there is a possibility that at least one unknown potential juror was improperly stricken for cause.⁷ This claim does not entitle appellant to PCRA relief. First, appellant fails to demonstrate, as he must under the PCRA, how the alleged exclusion of this unknown juror so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.⁸ In addition, the trial court, in its post-trail motion opinion, found that: "In all, five jurors out of ninety-six subjected to voir dire in this case were excused for cause upon challenge by the Commonwealth by reason of their responses to questions concerning the imposition of the death penalty." Trial Ct. Opinion, June 10, 1986, at 58. The trial court then analyzed the questioning of each juror which the Commonwealth had challenged for cause. The court noted that "[a] review of the testimony of these jurors clearly shows that their exclusion for cause was proper." Id. at 64. We agree that the record simply does not support appellant's position that other jurors may have been excused for cause after having expressed only generalized opposition to the death penalty.⁹

Appellant next argues that the trial court violated his due process rights and his right to an impartial capital sentencing jury pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by not allowing trial counsel to life qualify the jury during voir dire.¹⁰ In support of his position, appellant cites Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), where the United States Supreme Court held that, during voir dire for a capital offense, a state trial court may not, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, refuse inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant.

The Court's decision in Morgan was not issued until well after appellant's direct appeal was finalized. Thus, we must determine whether the rule enunciated in Morgan is to apply retroactively. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the United States Supreme Court barred the retroactive application upon collateral review of a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure that is announced after a defendant's conviction is final, because all avenues of direct appeal have been exhausted.¹¹ The Teague Court held that a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, or if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Id. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060; see also Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 216, 656 A.2d 877,

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872, 116 S.Ct. 194, 133 L.Ed.2d 130 (1995) (a case which breaks with past precedent is not applicable retroactively to cases final on direct appeal but pending in a collateral proceeding); Commonwealth v. Todaro, 549 Pa. 545, 701 A.2d 1343, 1347 (1997) (even a case which breaks with past precedent that is given a fully retroactive effect is not applied to any case on collateral review unless the decision announcing the new rule of law was handed down during the pendency of the defendant's direct appeal and the issue was properly preserved on direct appeal).

Here, application of the Teague test indicates that the rule enunciated in Morgan should not be applied retroactively to appellant's case on collateral review because Morgan constituted a new rule for voir dire in capital cases. Prior to the Morgan decision, the United States Supreme Court had not imposed a mandatory requirement that a defendant be afforded a life qualifying voir dire question upon request. Additionally, prior to Morgan, Pennsylvania did not mandate that juries be questioned on life qualification. See Commonwealth v. Tilley, 528 Pa. 125, 151, 595 A.2d 575, 587-88 (1991)

(holding that life qualification of a jury was not required to insure that a fair and impartial jury was selected). Therefore, under the test enunciated in Teague, the holding of Morgan announced a new rule and placed a new obligation on the states. A new rule of law to which we give full retroactive effect, will not be applied to any case on collateral review unless that decision was handed down during the pendency of an appellant's direct appeal and the issue was properly preserved there, or, is non-waivable. Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 512 Pa. 349, 354, 516 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1986). Thus, the trial court properly precluded trial counsel's voir dire questions in accordance with the established law at the time of appellant's trial, and appellant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

Appellant next argues that the trial court's requirement that both the Commonwealth and appellant exercise their peremptory challenges immediately following their respective voir dire examinations, violated his due process rights and his right to an impartial jury under both the State and Federal Constitutions.¹² Appellant contends that this procedure was unconstitutional and violative of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1106(e)(1)(b).¹³

Appellant fails to demonstrate, as he must under the PCRA, how the court's requirements for the exercise of peremptory challenges so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. During the PCRA hearing, appellant elicited from his trial counsel the specific procedures that the trial court required of both parties. However, appellant failed to elicit any testimony that described a single instance where trial counsel wanted to exercise a peremptory challenge but was precluded from doing so because of the trial court's requirement. In fact, the one example that trial counsel provided to demonstrate the effect of the court's rule was one that impacted negatively upon the Commonwealth, not on appellant.¹⁴ Thus, the negative impact of the trial court's rule, in the single example illuminated by appellant, was at the Commonwealth's expense, not appellant's. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

Appellant next raises numerous claims of ineffectiveness of counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant bears the burden of proving: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel's action or inaction was not grounded on any reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant's interest; and (3) that the act or omission prejudiced appellant in such a way that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).¹⁵ If it is clear that appellant has not met the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone and this Court need not determine whether the first and second prongs have been met. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352 (1995),cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996).

First, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed that it could not consider appellant's statements about having robbed the victim unless the corpus delicti of the robbery was established beyond a reasonable doubt with independent evidence. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Reyes...