Com. v. Brown
| Decision Date | 08 June 1983 |
| Citation | 450 N.E.2d 172,389 Mass. 382 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. James E. BROWN (and three companion cases). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Patricia A. O'Neill, Boston, for defendant.
David B. Mark, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and LYNCH, JJ.
James E. Brown was convicted by a jury on July 24, 1981, on three indictments charging armed robbery and on so much of a fourth indictment as charged unarmed robbery. He appealed to the Appeals Court, which affirmed the judgments. Commonwealth v. Brown, 14 Mass.App. 995, 440 N.E.2d 1179 (1982). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review, and we now reverse.
There was evidence of the following facts. On October 20, 1979, at about 3:30 A.M., two Boston police officers observed a yellow station wagon automobile, driven by Brown, exit a one-way street the wrong way. The station wagon almost hit the police cruiser, and a high speed chase ensued. The police eventually managed to stop the station wagon, and arrested Brown, a black male, and his passenger, Charles Stiles, a white male. Brown and Stiles were taken to the District 2 police station and were informed of their Miranda rights.
At the station, Brown heard a police officer repeat aloud a telephone report from a police dispatcher that the yellow station wagon had been taken during an armed robbery on October 14, 1979. Brown volunteered that he "had nothing to do with the robbery" but had merely been the operator of the motor vehicle. He then began to confess to a series of eleven street robberies which he and Stiles had committed after stealing the station wagon. Because these robberies occurred in police District 4, Brown was taken to the District 4 police station for further questioning. There Brown stated that he wanted "to start [with] a clean slate" and confessed that he and Stiles had committed approximately twenty to twenty-four armed robberies during the prior week. None of the defendant's statements were reduced to signed statements; no notes of the interviews were produced nor were the statements recorded by a tape recorder. The police found reports in their files of several robberies which matched the description given by Brown. 1
Three police officers testified at trial to the statements made by Brown at the District 2 and District 4 police stations. Their testimony constituted the strongest evidence against Brown. 2 Two of the victims of the robberies also testified at trial. One victim testified that she had been robbed on October 18, 1979, at about 3 P.M. by one white male and one black male, who drove off in a yellow station wagon. She testified that she was uncertain that the white male was Stiles, but that the black male resembled Brown. Another victim testified that she had been robbed on October 18, 1979, at 10:30 P.M. by a black male who looked like Brown. The prior testimony of two other victims at a probable cause hearing in the District Court was read to the jury. Their testimony was that they were robbed on October 18 at 7:40 P.M. by a male whom they later identified as Stiles. The police found certain personal belongings of these victims in the yellow station wagon. The transcript of the cross-examination of these victims by Brown's attorney also was read to the jury, but the judge refused to allow the cross-examination by counsel for the codefendant Stiles to be read. 3 Brown did not testify.
Brown argues two points before us. First, he claims reversible error in the admission of his confessions as to crimes for which he was not on trial. Second, he claims error in the exclusion of the probable cause transcript disclosing the cross-examination of the two victims by counsel for the codefendant Stiles.
1. A fundamental rule of evidence is that evidence of the commission of other, independent crimes cannot be admitted to show commission of the crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Welcome, 348 Mass. 68, 70-71, 201 N.E.2d 827 (1964). However, when the evidence of other crimes is not too remote or is connected with the facts of the case, it may be admitted to establish knowledge, intent, motive, method, or other facts relevant to proof of the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 377 Mass. 682, 695, 387 N.E.2d 559 (1979). In the instant case, the evidence of Brown's statements was admitted to show the precise circumstances of Brown's confession to the crimes charged. 4 Since the thrust of Brown's defense was that the police fabricated the confessions, 5 the judge appeared to reason that proof of a pattern of robberies by Brown and Stiles "had some tendency to show the confessions to have been reliable." Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 14 Mass.App. at 996, 440 N.E.2d 1179.
It is difficult to see, however, how the alleged confessions as to the other robberies served to show that the confessions had not been fabricated. Giving the jury "a complete picture" of the circumstances of the confessions, without more, is an insufficient basis for admitting Brown's statements in their entirety. The confessions to the crimes charged would not have been rendered unintelligible if the references to the other robberies had been omitted. Contrast Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384 Mass. 572, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2196, 2202, 428 N.E.2d 289. We also note that the oral testimony of the police officers could have been limited easily to avoid references to the other robberies.
The Commonwealth argues that the confessions were admissible in their entirety to show a common scheme or plan. 6 Even if the confessions in their entirety had some tendency to show a common scheme, they would not have been admissible. Brown's confession to committing the robberies for which he was charged would have served this purpose adequately. The incremental value of the references to other robberies was minimal and did not outweigh the undue prejudice. 7 The admission of the confessions as to other crimes was therefore error. 8
During oral argument before this court, the Commonwealth argued that the admission of the entire confession, if error, was harmless. Its argument is that once the jury had accepted that the confessions were not fabricated, it did not matter whether Brown was said to have confessed to four robberies or to twenty-four robberies. The difficulty, however, is that we cannot say with confidence that the evidence of the other robberies did not make the jury more inclined to accept the authenticity of the confessions. The error was not harmless.
2. Since the issue is likely to arise at a new trial, we address Brown's second claim of error. He argues that the exclusion of a portion of the transcript of the prior testimony of the two unavailable witnesses...
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