Com. v. Brown
| Decision Date | 01 October 1991 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. William D. BROWN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Elliot M. Weinstein, Boston, for defendant.
Lauren Inker, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.
The defendant appeals from his convictions of murder in the second degree, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (two indictments), and unlawfully carrying a firearm. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm the convictions.
The criminal activities in this case occurred at a bar in Chelsea during the early morning hours of July 18, 1987. A jury could have found that the defendant was not a stranger to the bar and occasionally "help[ed] the barmaids out." On this occasion, the defendant helped a barmaid at closing time by collecting glasses from the tables. To expedite his task, the defendant announced to those in the back room, This provocative declaration evoked from a patron, one Doucette (whose death resulted in the murder indictment) the question, "Are you talking to me?" The defendant responded, The defendant then fumbled in his jacket, extracted a pistol, and pushed it into the area of Doucette's stomach. He fired twice.
Another patron, one Zackular, who was standing nearby, grappled with the defendant, pulling him to the floor. The defendant retaliated by shooting him in the calf and after Zackular stood up, while he was leaning against the bar, the defendant shot him twice in the thigh.
The terror continued when still another patron, one Ciulla, tried to take the gun from the defendant's hand while the latter was on the floor with Zackular. The defendant shot Ciulla in the right index finger and the stomach and, when Ciulla fell to the floor, the defendant shot Ciulla again, this time in the left hip. A group of customers then chased the defendant out of the bar.
A police officer came upon the scene and was told that there had been a shooting in the bar. He was given a description of the defendant. The officer found the defendant in a nearby doorway. When the police officer frisked him, the defendant said, "I'm the guy who did it." The defendant had "puncture wounds" on his right side, a wounded knee, and abrasions on his head.
The defendant raises four issues: (1) the denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty on the murder indictment at the close of the Commonwealth's case; (2) the denial of his motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from cross-examining the defendant's character witnesses concerning the defendant's military record; (3) error in the charge to the jury concerning malice; and (4) the refusal of the judge to instruct the jury concerning the Commonwealth's failure to conduct certain scientific tests.
1. The denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty. The defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a required finding of not guilty if the Commonwealth fails to introduce some evidence which would satisfy a rational trier of fact of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Walker, 401 Mass. 338, 340, 516 N.E.2d 1143 (1987).
There is no merit to the defendant's argument for such a finding in the face of the testimony of witnesses who saw the defendant pull a gun from his jacket pocket and shoot Doucette and the others. From the circumstances, the jury were warranted in concluding that there was malice. The jury were not required to accept the defendant's version which calls for the conclusion that he was acting out of self-defense.
The defendant's position is that Doucette lunged at him and was on top of him when he shot Doucette in self-defense. The defendant argues that, based on the testimony of the medical examiner as to the path of the bullet, the defendant's theory of the case was sustained and, therefore, a required finding of not guilty should have been ordered. 1 However, the jury were free to reject this theory and that part of the testimony of the medical examiner.
2. Motion in limine. When defense counsel told the judge that he was going to call witnesses who would testify to the reputation of the defendant for truthfulness, he asked the judge to rule that the Commonwealth not be permitted to cross-examine these witnesses about false statements made by the defendant regarding his military service record. The defendant planned to call three character witnesses. The judge conducted a voir dire of one of these three witnesses in order to decide whether the Commonwealth should be permitted to interrogate the witnesses on the question of the defendant's giving allegedly false statements as to his military record. At the conclusion of the voir dire examination of this witness, defense counsel represented to the judge that the other two witnesses would testify quite similarly.
The Commonwealth has a right to cross-examine a witness who testifies to the reputation of the defendant for...
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