Com. v. Brown
| Decision Date | 21 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 991079. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, ex rel. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. Demetrious Eric BROWN, a/k/a, etc. |
Pamela A. Sargent, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.
Pro se.
Present: CARRICO, C.J., LACY, HASSELL, KEENAN, KOONTZ, and KINSER, JJ., and POFF, Senior Justice.
KOONTZ Justice.
In this appeal, we consider whether general district courts have the statutory authority to issue transportation orders for prisoners confined within a state correctional facility in order that they may appear in civil proceedings.
On July 23, 1996, Demetrious Eric Brown, a prisoner confined at the Buckingham Correctional Center, purchased a television at the prison commissary from Thomson Consumer Electronics (Thomson), an out-of-state corporation. On August 27, 1997, while confined in the Greensville Correctional Center to which he had been transferred, Brown filed a warrant in debt in the City of Richmond General District Court against Thomson alleging that the television was defective. Brown sought $4,000 in damages for breach of contract and breach of warranty.
Brown requested that the general district court issue witness subpoenas for "L. Cox," the business manager of the Buckingham Correctional Center, and for David Lee Wright and Lawrence Johnson, fellow prisoners of Brown at the Greensville Correctional Center. Brown met Johnson and Wright after being transferred to the Greensville Correctional Center, and neither was confined at the Buckingham Correctional Center when Brown purchased the television.
No appearance was made in the general district court by either party on the original return date of September 22, 1997. The case was rescheduled for trial on November 6, 1997. The letter informing Brown of the new trial date indicated that a transportation order would be issued for his appearance on that date.
On September 25, 1997, the general district court issued a transportation order with special instructions directing the Virginia Department of Corrections, rather than the Richmond City Sheriff's Office, to transport Brown to Richmond for the trial on November 6, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the general district court issued the subpoenas Brown had requested and issued additional transportation orders directing the Virginia Department of Corrections to transport Wright and Johnson to appear as witnesses at the trial.
The subpoena to Cox and the three transportation orders issued by the general district court were the first notice to the Department of Corrections of Brown's lawsuit. On October 21, 1997, the Office of the Attorney General, on behalf of the Department of Corrections and Cox (collectively, the Commonwealth), filed a motion to quash the three transportation orders and the subpoenas in the general district court. Citing Code § 8.01-410, the Commonwealth asserted that only circuit courts are authorized to issue prisoner transportation orders in civil cases. In addition, the Commonwealth asserted that no provision in any of the statutes governing the operation of the general district courts grants that authority to the general district courts. Accordingly, the Commonwealth contended that the transportation orders were void.
On November 12, 1997, having continued the trial of Brown's lawsuit until January 20, 1998, the general district court advised Brown, Thomson, and the Commonwealth by letter that, barring notice of an earlier hearing date or waiver of a hearing, the motion to quash would be resolved immediately prior to trial.1 On November 18, 1998, the Commonwealth responded to the general district court's letter, contending that the motion to quash was ripe for decision without the necessity of a hearing, but that if a hearing were required, it could be conducted by telephone. Brown responded by refusing to consent to the general district court's ruling on the motion to quash without a hearing.
Thereafter, the general district court, by letter to the parties, expressed concern that the Commonwealth's argument in favor of its motion to quash, if sustained, would bar the general district court from issuing prisoner transportation orders in criminal cases, and asked the parties to submit briefs on this point. The Commonwealth responded by letter brief and, relying primarily upon Code § 19.2-267, asserted that while both the circuit courts and the general district courts have the authority to issue prisoner transportation orders in criminal cases, in civil cases that authority is limited to the circuit courts. Brown's response did not directly address the court's concern, but, rather, contended that no statute prohibited the general district court from issuing prisoner transportation orders in civil cases and that he had an absolute right to be transported to court in order to conduct civil litigation.
In an order entered December 12, 1997, the general district court ruled that because any reference to general district courts is "expressly" omitted therein, Code § 8.01-410 does not preclude the issuance of prisoner transportation orders by general district courts in civil cases. The court reasoned that construing the statute otherwise would result in an unconstitutional deprivation of a prisoner's due process rights. The court concluded that Code § 16.1-69.27, which authorizes a general district court to "issue all appropriate orders ... in aid of the jurisdiction conferred upon" the court, grants the general district court the authority to issue transportation orders of prisoners in both civil and criminal cases.
On December 22, 1997, the Commonwealth appealed the decision of the general district court to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond (the trial court). The trial court received letter briefs from Brown and the Commonwealth reiterating the positions they had taken in the general district court.
By letter opinion dated January 19, 1999, the trial court stated that Code § 8.01-410 did not preclude general district courts from issuing transportation orders and that "[t]he matters other than § 8.01-410 to be considered" as discussed by the general district court in its ruling led the trial court to conclude that "it is within the power and right of the General District Court to order the transport[ation of prisoners] as witnesses in proceedings there." By order dated February 22, 1999, the trial court adopted by reference the reasoning set forth in the general district court's December 12, 1997 order, and dismissed the Commonwealth's motion to quash. We awarded the Commonwealth this appeal.
Initially, we stress that the issue we consider in this appeal is limited to a determination of the authority of the general district courts to issue prisoner transportation orders in civil cases. While the record reflects that in the proceedings below the Commonwealth appears to have recognized that these courts have the authority to issue such orders in criminal cases, that issue is not before us. See Code § 19.2-267. Accordingly, nothing in this opinion is to be construed to limit the authority of the general district courts to issue prisoner transportation orders in criminal cases.
As a general proposition, the authority of any court to issue prisoner transportation orders in civil cases is undoubtedly an outgrowth of legislative recognition of the modern view that prisoners, after judgments of conviction and while incarcerated, have a right to bring civil actions. See Dunn v. Terry, 216 Va. 234, 239, 217 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1975); see also Cross v. Sundin, 222 Va. 37, 38-39, 278 S.E.2d 805, 805-06 (1981). It does not necessarily follow, however, that such prisoners have an absolute right, as Brown contends here, to be transported to court in order to conduct civil litigation initiated by them. After all, prisoners, as a result of their conduct in committing criminal offenses, have forfeited their unfettered freedom of movement during their period of incarceration. Their right to conduct civil litigation in the courts of this Commonwealth during that time is necessarily limited by that circumstance and appropriately balanced against public safety concerns presented by transporting prisoners from prisons to court.
The current version of Code § 8.01-410,2 in clear and unambiguous terms, specifically addresses just such situations and provides the judicial authority and the mechanism by which the patent conflict between prisoners' incarceration and their ability to exercise the right to conduct civil litigation is appropriately resolved. This statute provides that:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Castillo v. Commonwealth
...instances of conduct, where Rule 2:607(a)(viii) concerns the admission of impeachment evidence generally. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 706, 529 S.E.2d 96 (2000) ("[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject generally and another deals with an element of that subject specifically, the ......
-
Blevins v. Commonwealth
...scope of the statute.’ ” Conkling v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 518, 522, 612 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704–05, 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000)). Simply stated, when reviewing a statute, the appellate court must conclude that the General Assembly meant what......
-
Miller & Rhoads Bldg., L.L.C. v. City of Richmond
...S.E.2d 392, 395 (2001) ; Government Emples. Ins. Co. v. Hall , 260 Va. 349, 355, 533 S.E.2d 615, 617 (2000) ; Commonwealth v. Brown , 259 Va. 697, 704–05, 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000) ; Board of Supervisors v. Wilson , 250 Va. 482, 485, 463 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1995) ; Turner v. Wexler , 244 Va. 1......
-
Vince v. Commonwealth
...arises that omitted terms were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute.'" (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05, 529 S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000))). We decline to read an exception for expert witnesses into the applicable Virginia statute, in contradiction of its ......