Com. v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 18 March 1971
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert CAMPBELL, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 64

275 A.2d 64

442 Pa. 313

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert CAMPBELL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 18, 1971.

[442 Pa. 314] H. David Rothman, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Carol Mary Los, Robert L. Campbell, Asst. Dist. Attys., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

The sole issue presented by this direct appeal from a judgment of sentence following a jury verdict of first degree murder is whether the admission of defendant's confession into evidence was error and violated the principles of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). We hold that defendant must be granted a new trial, for he was never warned of his absolute right to remain silent. The facts as found by the suppression hearing court are as follows.

On the afternoon of November 29, 1963, one Gust Georges was murdered in his home in Allegheny County. He had operated an amusement business and customarily kept the receipts in his house. When he came home, he was seized, bound, beaten, and eventually murdered by two men attempting to discover the location of the money.

Robert Campbell was arrested on January 30, 1964, along with two other men in connection with the Georges murder. After lengthy questioning, he was released. He was taken into custody again at approximately 1 P.M. on February 5, having been implicated in the Georges murder by one of the other men who had remained in custody. Campbell was questioned intermittently that afternoon by the police. At 4:30 P.M. the question of counsel arose. The lieutenant interrogating Campbell stated: 'There is the phone, call the lawyer if you want one.'

Campbell replied, 'What do I need a lawyer for, I haven't done anything.'

Later the same afternoon, Campbell conferred with Swidowski, the man who had implicated him. Campbell then indicated his willingness to make a statement.

Both prior to and following his confession, Campbell was asked whether the confession was voluntary and made of his own free will. To these questions Campbell replied, 'Yes.' However, at no time during his entire interrogation while in custody was Campbell ever warned of his absolute right to remain silent.

At the suppression hearing, Campbell offered testimony that he had been under the influence of benzedrine pills at the time of his confession. The hearing court specifically disbelieved his testimony on this point and held the confession voluntary and admissible. ¹

Pursuant to appellant's motion, the suppression hearing judge did not sit at trial. Trial commenced on January 18, 1965, and the jury returned a verdict of first degree murder, setting the sentence at life imprisonment. During the trial, appellant was represented by court appointed counsel.

Appellant's motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment were argued before the court en banc and subsequently denied on April 25, 1967. A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed on September 22, 1967. No appeal was taken from the judgment of sentence.

In May, 1968, appellant filed a pro se petition for allowance of appeal as though timely filed. We remanded to have the trial court determine whether appellant had waived his right of appeal. The trial court found no waiver had occurred and issued an order on March 31, 1970, allowing appellant to take an appeal.

In this instance the date of appellant's trial determines the legal principles that govern the propriety of his custodial interrogation and confession. Since this trial commenced subsequent to June 22, 1964 and prior to June 13, 1966, the controlling rules are those set forth in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, rather than Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968); Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).

The holding in Escobedo has been summarized by the United States Supreme Court as follows:

'* * * the precise holding of Escobedo was that statements elicited by the police during an interrogation may not be used against the accused at a criminal trial, '(where) the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. * * *'. * * *'

Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. at 733--734, 86 S.Ct. at 1781 (brackets in original) (citations omitted).

Our Court has made it clear beyond doubt that, in its view, the initial inquiry under Escobedo is whether the accused was warned of his right to remain silent. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Jefferson, supra, we said:

'It is now settled that under Escobedo, an individual subject to police questioning is not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel unless such assistance is requested and denied. * * * Hence, since Jefferson made no request for counsel, the absence thereof, or an effective waiver of the right thereto, did not ipso facto render testimony of the statements constitutionally inadmissible. But, Jefferson was also not advised of her right to remain silent and this, in our opinion, under the teaching of Escobedo precluded evidentiary use of the statements made to Officer Zevtchin.' ²

Id., 423 Pa. at 544, 226 A.2d at 767 (footnote and citations omitted).

We have reiterated this principle often. For example, in Commonwealth v. Banks, supra, we stated:

'Under Escobedo, as explicated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384...