Com. v. Cao

• Decision Date: 01 February 1995
• Citation: 419 Mass. 383,644 N.E.2d 1294
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Thinh Van CAO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1294

644 N.E.2d 1294

419 Mass. 383

COMMONWEALTH v. Thinh Van CAO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 4, 1994.

Decided Feb. 1, 1995.

Brownlow M. Speer, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston (John D. Fitzpatrick, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him), for defendant.

Michael Adam Chinman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

The defendant was convicted on November 12, 1991, of three counts of armed robbery and four counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of a photographic identification made by one of the victims, Jerry Yinchaun Chi. The motion was denied. The defendant claims on appeal that the motion to suppress should have been allowed because the photograph from which Chi identified the defendant as the robber was obtained during an allegedly illegal seizure of the defendant's person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.

We recite the relevant facts found by the judge who heard the motion to suppress. These findings are "binding in the absence of clear error ... and [we] view with particular respect the conclusions of law which are based on them" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Correia, 381 Mass. 65, 76, 407 N.E.2d 1216 (1980). However, because the issue before us is one of constitutional dimensions, the judge's findings of fact and rulings of law are open for reexamination by this court. Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 661 n. 6, 436 N.E.2d 1228 (1982). We properly leave questions of credibility for determination by the motion judge, as he had the witnesses before him. Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 557, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39, 100 S.Ct. 1092, 63 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980).

On January 6, 1991, several armed men entered the Lotus Flower Restaurant in Framingham, after closing, and robbed the employees. One of the employees, Jerry Chi, saw the face of the first robber as he entered the restaurant. The entrance hallway was well lit and Chi was near the front door when the man entered. Chi was able to describe the man's build, facial features, and clothing. ¹

On January 31, a few weeks after the robbery, Chi was shown an array of about 100 photographs by Boston police. Chi chose a photograph of the defendant from the array and identified him as the robber he saw enter the restaurant. ²

The photograph from which Chi identified the defendant was taken by a Boston police detective in November or December of 1990, some months before the robbery, pursuant to a Boston police department policy requiring police in Chinatown to conduct "Field Interrogation Observations" of young men they suspect may be involved with Asian gangs. The motion judge found: "Under this Field Interrogation Observation (FIO) procedure, the police question suspicious looking Asian males asking them to identify themselves, to give their date of birth and a physical description (including height, weight and tatoos), and to take their photograph with a Polaroid camera." The motion judge also found that during an FIO, the individuals approached by the police officer(s) are "free to go and to refuse having their picture taken." As to this defendant, the judge found further: "The police did not ... give the defendant any reason to believe that he was not free to go, and they asked his permission before taking the picture. Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave and to refuse to be photographed. Therefore, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated."

The evidence before the judge warrants his findings. Boston police Detective Waiman Lee testified that while on foot patrol in Chinatown in November or December, 1990, he conducted an FIO of the defendant and three of his friends, all youths. Lee testified that he conducts FIOs when he suspects someone of being a member of an Asian gang. Lee, dressed in full uniform, approached the group as they were walking together in a parking lot and asked them several questions including their names, dates of birth, addresses, and physical descriptions. Lee testified that the youths stopped when he approached them and answered the questions. ³ After he asked the questions Lee performed an outstanding warrant check on the youths. ⁴ The process of questioning and checking for warrants took "no more than 5 minutes." Lee testified that after he had checked for warrants, Detective John Bean came on the scene. At Lee's request, Bean retrieved a Polaroid camera from his car. When Bean returned with the camera he asked the youths, including the defendant, "you don't mind if we take a picture of you, right?," to which the defendant replied, "No, I didn't do anything wrong, go ahead." Lee testified that at no time during these few minutes did the detectives indicate to the group that they were not free to leave. The defendant spoke with his friends during the encounter and appeared to be under no physical distress nor did he indicate that he wanted to leave.

The question of what constitutes a "seizure" triggering an individual's constitutional rights has been the subject of much case law and commentary over the years. The United States Supreme Court recently had occasion to address the issue once again in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). In Hodari D., the Court revised its previous definition of seizure as a situation between a law enforcement officer and an individual in which, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter and leave. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). The Hodari D. Court explained that whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave was only part of the seizure equation. California v. Hodari D., supra 499 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 1551. In addition to a show of authority which would indicate to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave, the Court held that there can be no seizure until the individual in question submits to that show of authority. Id. at 628-629, 111 S.Ct. at 1551-1552. ⁵

Since the Hodari D. decision, Massachusetts courts have not been faced with a case that has required us to interpret art. 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution in light of the Hodari D. holding. ⁶ Massachusetts courts have adhered to the test set forth in the Mendenhall- Royer line of cases decided prior to Hodari D. as the proper analysis whether a seizure has occurred under article 14 to the Massachusetts Constitution, i.e., "a person has been 'seized' ... if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 791, 482 N.E.2d 314 (1985), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). See Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 543, 573 N.E.2d 979 (1991); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 403 Mass. 640, 643-644, 531 N.E.2d 1256 (1988). See also Commonwealth v. Harkess, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 626, 628-632, 624 N.E.2d 581 (1993).

Because both the Federal and the Massachusetts Constitutions require some objective indicia that a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter with the law enforcement officer before there can be a seizure, we analyze the facts of the instant case under that standard. Cases applying a standard such as the one we apply here are necessarily fact-specific and thus the instant case can be properly decided only on a careful examination of the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter. In the case at bar, Detective Lee approached the defendant and his friends in uniform and asked them several questions concerning their identities. All of the information given was recorded by Lee on a small notecard as was his normal practice when conducting FIOs. There was no evidence that Lee ordered the group to answer his questions or otherwise indicated that they could not terminate the encounter. The FIO was conducted in public, while the defendant was walking with friends in a parking lot, not while the defendant was in a confined space or in a car. Lee testified that during the encounter the defendant spoke with his friends and did not appear to be under any physical distress nor did he indicate at any time that he wished to leave. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonable person would have been sufficiently intimidated so as to feel that he or she could not terminate the encounter and walk away. Therefore, there was no seizure. ⁷

The defendant argues that his case is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). The defendant is mistaken. In Brown, the defendant was approached by officers who had no reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity and demanded he identify himself. Id. at 48-49, 99 S.Ct. at 2639-2640. When Brown refused and attempted to walk away he was frisked and then arrested. Id. at 49, 99 S.Ct. at 2639. It is clear that in Brown there was a seizure of the defendant's person. Brown attempted to terminate the encounter with the police and was detained in response. The Court did not hold that Brown was seized prior to the officers' preventing him from walking away.

The defendant also points to Commonwealth v. Phillips...