Com. v. Cartagena

Decision Date14 February 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-P-349,91-P-349
Citation586 N.E.2d 43,32 Mass.App.Ct. 141
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Andres F. CARTAGENA.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Margaret Helen Carter, Salem, for defendant.

Judith Ellen Pietras, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before FINE, JACOBS and PORADA, JJ.

FINE, Justice.

The defendant and one Julian Sarabaez were convicted by a jury of trafficking in cocaine. On appeal, the defendant claims, first, that the Superior Court judge erred in admitting Sarabaez's hearsay statements implicating the defendant as the supplier of the drugs; second, that the judge failed to instruct the jury with regard to the use of those statements; third, that the judge improperly allowed testimony that the defendant owned the USA gym; and, fourth, that the jurors were improperly exposed to prejudicial information concerning earlier narcotics investigations. We conclude that there was no reversible error and, therefore, we affirm the conviction.

1. Admission of codefendant's hearsay statements. The judge held a preliminary hearing to determine whether Sarabaez's hearsay statements could be used against the defendant. At that hearing, Detective Louis Rodriguez, an undercover member of the Western Massachusetts Narcotics Task Force, testified that at around 4:00 P.M. on February 3, 1988, he and Sarabaez met in Westfield to discuss the purchase of one and a half ounces of cocaine. Sarabaez told the detective that he would be able to obtain the drugs within an hour. When Detective Rodriguez and Sarabaez met later that afternoon, a price of $2,800 was set and arrangements for the exchange were made. At around 6:15 P.M., Detective Rodriguez and Sarabaez met again and drove to the USA gym. Sarabaez entered the gym, came out a few minutes later, and said that he had spoken with the supplier. When Detective Rodriguez asked Sarabaez whether the supplier worked at the gym, Sarabaez replied that the supplier owned the gym and used it as a front for the profits from his cocaine operation.

After they waited about ten to fifteen minutes, Sarabaez left to make a phone call. Upon his return, he reported to Detective Rodriguez that the supplier would meet them at the Burger King parking lot on Main Street. Detective Rodriguez told Sarabaez that he only had $1,900 and wanted to make a new deal for that amount. Sarabaez agreed to try. They proceeded to the Burger King parking lot. At around 7:00 P.M., a yellow IROC Camaro automobile pulled up behind Detective Rodriguez's car in the Burger King parking lot. Sarabaez told Detective Rodriguez that the driver of the Camaro was the supplier and asked for the money. Detective Rodriguez handed the money to Sarabaez. Detective Rodriguez watched Sarabaez as he spoke to the driver of the Camaro and handed him the money. When Sarabaez returned to Detective Rodriguez's car, he stated that the supplier would recut the cocaine and deliver one ounce for $1,900 at the parking lot of Rocky's Hardware Store, also on Main Street. About a half hour later, a Dodge Swinger automobile entered that lot, where Sarabaez and Detective Rodriguez were waiting. Sarabaez walked over to the Dodge, was handed a package containing one ounce of cocaine, and returned to Detective Rodriguez's car. The defendant was not among those in the Dodge.

Officer Robert Schultz, also a member of the Narcotics Task Force, testified that he conducted a surveillance of Detective Rodriguez and Sarabaez during the day's events. Officer Schultz identified the defendant as the driver of the Camaro at the Burger King parking lot. He further testified that he knew that the defendant was the owner of the USA gym, but he did not explain the basis of his knowledge.

After hearing the testimony of Detective Rodriguez and Officer Schultz, the judge found that the Commonwealth had established a prima facie showing of a joint venture and that the hearsay statements in issue were made during the course of and in furtherance of the joint venture. The judge made a preliminary ruling that Sarabaez's hearsay statements implicating the defendant as the supplier would be admissible against the defendant. At trial, Detective Rodriguez and Officer Schultz repeated the testimony offered at the preliminary hearing, but in somewhat greater detail.

The judge's preliminary ruling on admissibility was correct. Hearsay statements of one made outside the presence of a criminal defendant may be admitted against that defendant if they were made during the course of and in furtherance of a common criminal enterprise (whether a conspiracy or a joint venture) and if there is sufficient nonhearsay evidence to establish "an adequate probability" that the declarant and the defendant were engaged in the criminal enterprise. Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 709 n. 7, 352 N.E.2d 904 (1976). See Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 337 n. 3, 366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977); Commonwealth v. Soares, 384 Mass. 149, 159, 424 N.E.2d 221 (1981). " 'In making this determination, the conspiracy may be, and usually is, proved by circumstantial evidence.' Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 50, 206 N.E.2d 672 (1965)." Commonwealth v. Soares, 384 Mass. at 159, 424 N.E.2d 221.

Given the visit to the gym and the phone calls in the course of making arrangements for the drug buy, it was a reasonable inference that Sarabaez was not working alone in the effort to deliver the cocaine. Nonhearsay testimony from Officer Schultz and Detective Rodriguez, in combination, adequately linked the defendant to that effort. According to their testimony, the defendant appeared in the parking lot where Detective Rodriguez and Sarabaez, by prearrangement, were waiting for the drugs and parked directly behind Detective Rodriguez's car; Sarabaez took the $1,900 purchase money from Detective Rodriguez, walked towards the defendant's car, and handed it to the defendant; Sarabaez spoke with no one else after making a new deal for delivery of drugs for $1,900; and only a short while later, consistent with that new deal, one ounce of drugs was delivered. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this testimony was sufficient to give rise to an inference that the defendant not only was present at a crucial point in the criminal venture, but also was a participant. The defendant does not argue on appeal, nor could he do so persuasively, that, if the showing of participation in the enterprise was established, the statements were not in furtherance of that enterprise.

2. Jury instructions. When hearsay statements of an alleged joint venturer are to be used against a defendant, the jury should be instructed that they may...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Com. v. Braley
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 12, 2007
    ...probability" exists, the evidence is to be viewed in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 32 Mass. App.Ct. 141, 144, 586 N.E.2d 43 (1992), and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Soares, Mass. 149, 159, 424 N.E.2d 221 (1981), and cas......
  • Com. v. Washington
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 17, 2007
    ...only if they determine on the basis of independent nonhearsay evidence that a joint venture existed."13 Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 32 Mass. App.Ct. 141, 144, 586 N.E.2d 43 (1992). However, the trial judge was not required, sua sponte, to provide a limiting instruction where there was no obj......
  • Commonwealth v. Mendes
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • September 5, 2012
    ...the lack of an instruction influenced the jury on this point. See id. at 489, 869 N.E.2d 605. See also Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 141, 145–146, 586 N.E.2d 43 (1992).11 5. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' convictions are affirmed. So ordered. 1. Two agai......
  • Com. v. Ali
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • September 26, 1997
    ...if nonhearsay evidence is sufficient to establish "an adequate probability" of the criminal enterprise. Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 141, 143-144, 586 N.E.2d 43 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 709 n. 7, 352 N.E.2d 904 (1976). This exception to the ru......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT