Com. v. Chambers
| Decision Date | 28 October 1991 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Cheryl Benita CHAMBERS, Appellee. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Robert W. CHAMBERS, Jr., Appellee. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Rebecca KIRKLAND, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Claire C. Capristo, Deputy Dist. Atty., Kemal A. Mericli, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for Com.
Michael D. Sayles, Philadelphia, for Cheryl Benita Chambers.
Byrd R. Brown, Pittsburgh, for Robert W. Chambers.
Michael D. Foglia, Pittsburgh, for Rebecca Kirkland.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
These consolidated appeals raise the issue of whether the lower courts erred in holding that evidence seized during the search of a residence must be suppressed because of a violation of the "knock and announce" rule.
On February 16, 1987 at 1:03 p.m., four police officers from the Municipality of Penn Hills initiated the execution of a search warrant at the residence of Robert Chambers. The Appellees, Robert Chambers, Cheryl Chambers, and Rebecca Kirkland, were in the residence at that time, along with two other individuals. Two detectives went to the back of the house and the other detectives knocked at the front door.
Robert Chambers began to open the door. Simultaneously, the police officer pushed the door open, pushing Mr. Chambers backwards. Having drawn his weapon before the door was opened, the police officer pointed the weapon at Mr. Chambers. He identified himself as an officer and stated that he had a search warrant for the premises. He told Mr. Chambers to "Get up against the wall and don't move."
The four detectives entered the premises with their weapons drawn. All of the people in the house were taken into the living room, searched, and advised of their rights. The officers then searched the premises. During the search, drugs and drug paraphernalia were seized and several statements were obtained from Mr. Chambers.
The Appellees were charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine, possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia (except for Rebecca Kirkland), and criminal conspiracy. Omnibus pre-trial motions seeking, inter alia, to suppress the evidence obtained through the execution of the search warrant were filed by the Appellees. After a suppression hearing, the motion to suppress the evidence was granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
The court suppressed the evidence on the basis that Rule 2007 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure had been violated as a matter of law because the detectives did not properly announce their purpose and had simultaneously forced the door to the residence open while announcing their identity. No exigent circumstances justifying a forcible entry were demonstrated by the Commonwealth. The Superior Court affirmed, concluding that the evidence supported the court's finding that the police violated the knock and announce rule by failing to wait a reasonable period of time after announcing their identity before forcibly entering the premises. 385 Pa.Super. 605, 561 A.2d 1257. We granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal and now affirm.
The standard of review of an appeal from a suppression ruling is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986). The Commonwealth concedes that the police actions in this case of forcibly entering the premises through a partially opened door simultaneously with the announcement of their identity and purpose was a violation of Rule 2007. The Commonwealth contends, however, that the suppression of the evidence was not the appropriate remedy for the violation of Rule 2007.
The "knock and announce" rule, embodied in Rule 2007, originated in the English common law and was adopted in the United States. Both our Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the manner of a warrant's execution. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968). Absent exigent circumstances, an announcement of both authority and purpose is required.
Rule 2007, the procedural rule that embodies the common law rule, states:
RULE 2007. MANNER OF ENTRY INTO PREMISES
(a) A law enforcement officer executing a search warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice of his identity, authority and purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the warrant, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.
(b) Such officer shall await a response for a reasonable period of time after his announcement of identity, authority and purpose, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.
(c) If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable period, he may forcibly enter the premises and may use as much physical force to effect entry therein as is necessary to execute the search.
The purpose of the "knock and announce" rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an occupant's privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry of unknown persons, and to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054 (1988), citing Commonwealth v. McDonnell, 512 Pa. 172, 516 A.2d 329 (1986). The purpose may be achieved only if the police officer awaits a response for a reasonable period of time after his announcement of identity, authority, and purpose.
The Commonwealth contends that the failure to await a response for a reasonable period of time should not result in the suppression of evidence. The Commonwealth argues that the suppression issue should focus on whether the action of the police reasonably worked to prevent mistaken resistance by Mr. Chambers. Suppression of evidence is not limited, however, only to instances in which violence, physical injury, and property damage have actually resulted from a violation of the "knock and announce" rule.
The rule is intended to protect individuals from searches and seizures that are unreasonable because of the manner of the execution of a warrant. Instances in which the police conduct complained of was found not to have defeated the purpose of the rule, include when:
1. the occupants of the premises remain silent after repeated knocking and identification;
2. the police are virtually certain that the occupants of the premises already know their purpose;
3. the police have reason to believe that an announcement prior to entry would imperil their safety; and
4. the police have reason to believe that evidence is about to be destroyed.
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. at 97, 534 A.2d at 1056. In each of those instances, the execution of the warrant was held to be valid not because the defendants failed to establish that the police conduct resulted in violence, physical injury, or property damage, but because the police officers' conduct was reasonable under those circumstances.
No justification for the police officers' conduct exists in this case. The Appellees did not remain silent after the police officer knocked; nor does the record show that the Appellees knew of the officer's purpose. The police were neither concerned for their safety nor concerned that evidence was about to be destroyed.
We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth's argument that suppression of the evidence was unnecessary based upon Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054 (1987), Commonwealth v. McDonnell, 512 Pa. 172, 516 A.2d 329 (1986), and ...
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