Com. v. Chester
Decision Date | 24 June 1999 |
Citation | 733 A.2d 1242,557 Pa. 358 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Frank CHESTER, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Mark Lancaster, Jeffrey Francis Orchard, for F. Chester.
Alan M. Rubenstein, Robert A. Graci, Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, and SAYLOR, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from the denial of petitioner's request for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 For the reasons set forth herein, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
Petitioner and his co-defendant, Richard Laird, were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on May 21, 1988.2 This court affirmed the convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367 (1991). The docket reflects that a "pro se" "Petition Requesting Evidentiary Hearing on After discovered Evidence" was filed on June 2, 1995. The requested evidentiary hearing was held, in fact a portion of the testimony was heard on May 25, 1995, prior to the docketing of petitioner's "pro se" petition. The evidentiary hearing was concluded on April 1, 1996. These hearings related to an allegation of jury tampering which is discussed more fully, later in this opinion. The discrepancy in docketing of the petition after the evidentiary hearing had already begun was due to the difficulty petitioner encountered in communicating with counsel; the court and counsel discussed this fact on September 8, 1995. (N.T. 9/8/95 p. 7). Also on September 8, 1995, counsel received leave of court to withdraw the pro se petition for evidentiary hearing and incorporate the allegations therein in a post-conviction petition. On April 17, 1996 a counseled PCRA petition was filed. On July 18, 1996 current PCRA counsel entered his appearance. A hearing on the PCRA petition was held January 21st through the 28th, 1997. An opinion and order denying PCRA relief was entered on September 2, 1997. This appeal followed.3
This court in the opinion on direct appeal summarized the facts underlying the conviction for first degree murder as follows:
Before discussing the substantive issues presented we must first address the PCRA court's ruling that only issues arising from the guilt phase of petitioner's original trial were cognizable under the current PCRA. The PCRA court reasoned that as penalty phase issues relate to the imposition of sentence, rather than the determination of guilt, penalty phase issues do not provide a basis for relief under the current PCRA. The PCRA court did permit the introduction of testimony as to penalty phase issues, and granted leave for PCRA counsel to submit additional written proffers of evidence that would be presented if penalty phase issues were cognizable so that a record would be available to the appellate court. (N.T.1/23/97). In its opinion denying PCRA relief the court did not address the merits of any issues relating to the penalty phase of petitioner's trial.
Petitioner's initial objection to the PCRA court's ruling is that this PCRA petition was filed prior to the effective date of the new amendments. This claim is belied by the docket which clearly records the filing date of the petition as April 17, 1996. The amendments at issue became effective January 16, 1996. This argument fails and the lower court correctly applied the PCRA as amended. Section 3(1) of Act 1995 (Spec.Sess. No. 1), Nov. 17, P.L. 1118, No. 32, effective in 60 days.
As we conclude that the amended PCRA does apply to petitioner's claims, we must address petitioner's allegation that the PCRA court erred in finding that the PCRA now bars review of claims arising from the penalty stage of a capital case. The PCRA court reached this conclusion by reference to the 1995 amendments to the PCRA. The lower court found that the amendments limit review of claims to only those issues that "so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place" 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(2)(i) and (ii).4 Focusing on the highlighted language, the PCRA court held that issues regarding the penalty phase of a capital case do not affect the truth-determining process as they do not impact upon the reliability of the verdict for the underlying murder. Finding that penalty phase issues relate only to the sentence, and not guilt or innocence, the lower court held that such claims are not cognizable. The PCRA court reasoned that with the deletion of former subsection (v), which had provided for relief upon "a violation of the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States which would require the granting of Federal habeas corpus relief to a State prisoner", the PCRA now limits sentencing claims to allegations that the sentence is beyond the lawful maximum.5 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(2)(vii). Finding none of petitioner's penalty phase issues to raise a question regarding the lawful...
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