Com. v. Chumley

• Citation: 394 A.2d 497,482 Pa. 626
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Randall Hoyt CHUMLEY, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 18 November 1978
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 497

394 A.2d 497

482 Pa. 626

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Randall Hoyt CHUMLEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 26, 1978.

Decided Nov. 18, 1978.

[482 Pa. 633] Dominick Motto, New Castle, Court-appointed, for appellant.

Donald E. Williams, Dist. Atty., New Castle, for appellee.

Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

Appellant pled guilty to murder generally. After a degree of guilt hearing, appellant was convicted of murder of the second degree and on November 2, 1976, was sentenced to life imprisonment. New counsel was appointed to assist appellant in taking an appeal. On August 15, 1977, we remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County for an evidentiary hearing on effectiveness of trial counsel and to allow appellant to file a petition to withdraw his guilty plea as if timely filed. After a consolidated hearing pursuant to both orders, the trial court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and held that trial counsel was not ineffective. Appellant now appeals and we affirm. ¹

Appellant and an accomplice, Gene Reno, entered the home of the victim, Mrs. Merriman, during the night of April 29-30, 1976, to steal money. During the course of their search of the house, Mrs. Merriman awoke. Appellant inflicted multiple blows upon Mrs. Merriman, resulting in her death. The next night, Reno was arrested on unrelated charges. He later made a statement implicating himself in the burglary and stated that appellant was responsible for Mrs. Merriman's death. On the basis of this statement, an arrest warrant was issued and appellant was apprehended on May 2, 1976.

I

In Commonwealth v. Willis, 471 Pa. 50, 369 A.2d 1189 (1977), we held that inquiry into six areas is mandatory in every guilty plea colloquy. ² Failure to inquire into defendant's understanding of these subjects generally requires reversal. Accord, Commonwealth v. Kulp, 476 Pa. 358, 382 A.2d 1209 (1978); Commonwealth v. Dilbeck, 466 Pa. 543, 353 A.2d 824 (1976). Our first inquiry is whether appellant understood the nature of the charges against him. Appellant was charged with murder generally. By his plea he subjected himself to conviction for any degree of criminal homicide, including murder of the third degree. Appellant contends that the trial court's explanation of the mens rea element of murder of the third degree was erroneous and therefore inadequately informed him of the nature of the charges against him. Appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly informed him that legal malice exists where there is a specific intent to kill and thus "could have lead (sic) him to believe that an intentional killing is murder in the third degree instead of murder in the first degree."

The trial court instructed appellant that legal malice was an essential element of third degree murder and that "Legal malice consists either of a specific intent to inflict great bodily injury or from a wickedness of disposition, a hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life."

The court then went on to explain:

"Murder in the third degree embodies all of the elements of murder in the first degree with the exception that the mental element need not be a specific intent to kill as it does for murder in the first degree. Do you understand that?

Mr. Chumley: Yes.

The Court: In summary, if a Defendant is responsible for unlawfully causing the death of the victim and did act with legal malice, either expressed or implied, that will constitute murder in the third degree even though there was no actual intention to injure or kill the particular person who was killed, and even though the death was unintentional or accidental. Murder of the third degree embraces cases where no actual intention to kill exists but where the frame of mind called legal malice prevails. Do you understand that?

Mr. Chumley: Yes."

This colloquy could not have misled appellant into believing that a specific intent to kill was required for murder of the third degree. The guilty plea colloquy in this respect clearly met the requirements of Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974) (record must disclose element of offenses charged, outlined in understandable terms) and the comment to Rule 319(a). See also Commonwealth v. Tabb, 477 Pa. 115, 383 A.2d 849 (1978). Compare Commonwealth v. Jasper, 472 Pa. 226, 372 A.2d 395 (1976) (colloquy invalid where defendant led to believe he could be convicted only of voluntary manslaughter).

Appellant next contends that the colloquy failed to set forth a factual basis for the plea. Ascertainment of whether a factual basis exists is a mandatory area of inquiry under Willis, supra. See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 304 A.2d 121 (1973); Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 300 A.2d 503 (1973); Pa.R.Crim.P. 319(a); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 4.2 (Approved Draft, 1972); ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.4 (Approved Draft, 1968).

The record of the colloquy indicates the following exchange:

"The Court: Do you admit that you specifically participated in the striking of multiple blows about the head, arms and body with a tire iron or hand gun or some other solid instrument?

Mr. Chumley: Yes."

Appellant argues that since this statement does not identify the victim or make any admission as to appellant's mens rea it does not set forth an adequate factual basis. In support of this position appellant cites Commonwealth v. Thompson, 466 Pa. 15, 351 A.2d 280 (1976), in which we held the colloquy insufficient where pursuant to a plea of guilty of murder generally, no attempt was made to elicit any of the circumstances surrounding the murder other than that the defendant fired the shot that killed the victim. No admissions relevant to the element of malice were made by the defendant. Moreover, the defendant had made a pre-trial statement in which he asserted that he killed the victim in self-defense.

The inadequacies in the Thompson colloquy cannot be found here. Appellant at no time during the colloquy, or prior thereto, made any statements or assertions that indicated he was innocent of the crime with which he was charged or had some other defense. In Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), we held that the appellant's admission that he "shot and killed" the victim was adequate to establish a factual basis. We further explained:

"Although there is no specific admission of intent or malice, the court below could infer the requisite malice from the Unexplained shooting. 3 Moreover, the 'factual basis' requirement does not mean that the defendant must admit every element of the crime." (emphasis in original)

Id. at 202, 316 A.2d at 79.

Moreover, in the context of the entire guilty plea colloquy, appellant's admission was not as ambiguous as appellant would represent. At the beginning of the colloquy, the court read the indictment which set forth specific allegations of fact regarding the killing and the surrounding circumstances. Appellant affirmatively indicated that he understood the charges in light of the alleged conduct. Employing the same language quoted above, the indictment clearly stated that the specific conduct which appellant later in the colloquy admitted to was the cause of Mrs. Merriman's death on the night in question. Thus, an examination of the colloquy as a whole leaves no doubt that an adequate factual basis was established.

Appellant also argues that an on the record discussion among the court and counsel as to the applicability of Pa.R.Crim.P. 319A caused confusion in the colloquy and resulted in its inadequacy with regard to ensuring that appellant understood the possible range of punishment to which his plea subjected him. We find no merit in this claim. The discussion centered around whether the death sentence could be imposed upon a defendant who was convicted of murder of the first degree after pleading guilty. There was clearly cause for confusion since a change in the Rules of Criminal Procedure was to become effective between the time appellant entered his plea and the time sentencing would take place. The trial court apparently reached the conclusion that the new rule, allowing capital punishment after a guilty plea, would be inapplicable to appellant's case and clearly informed appellant that the maximum sentence that could be imposed would be life imprisonment even if he was found guilty of murder of the first degree at the evidentiary hearing. Appellant indicated on the record that he understood. Thus the colloquy adequately demonstrated that appellant understood the range of sentences to which he was subject. Compare Commonwealth v. Kulp, supra.

II

Appellant's next several claims also challenge the sufficiency of the colloquy to assure the validity of his plea of guilty. All of these claims address areas of inquiry not expressly required by the comment to Rule 319(a) which sets forth the minimum requirements for a guilty plea colloquy. Compliance with those minimum requirements, however, does not automatically guarantee that the colloquy was adequate to establish a voluntary and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.

Appellant first claims that the colloquy failed to establish that he understood all the rights he waived by entering a guilty plea. Appellant argues that the colloquy was invalid because the trial judge failed to inquire whether he understood that he was...