Com. v. Copson

• Decision Date: 11 July 2005
• Citation: 830 N.E.2d 193,444 Mass. 609
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Jason COPSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 193

830 N.E.2d 193

444 Mass. 609

COMMONWEALTH v. Jason COPSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued May 2, 2005.

Decided July 11, 2005.

Gregory I. Massing, Assistant District Attorney, Boston, for the Commonwealth.

Raymond Buso, Salem, for the defendant.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

COWIN, J.

The Commonwealth appealed from the allowance of the defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony. The defendant successfully argued before a Superior Court judge that dismissal was required under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), St. 1965, c. 892, § 1, because the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial within 180 days of having received his pro se motion for a speedy trial. He filed the motion while incarcerated on a Federal charge in another State. We granted the Commonwealth's application for direct appellate review and, after oral argument, issued an order reversing the judge's dismissal of the indictment.

In this opinion, we explain why the defendant's pro se motion for a speedy trial, which served as the basis for the dismissal, was insufficient to initiate the running of the 180-day period, thus forestalling its expiration. We hold that a prisoner who seeks to avail himself of the 180-day period of art. III of the Agreement must demonstrate at the very least that he has provided the Commonwealth with all of the information called for in art. III, including a certificate from the appropriate custodial official verifying the accuracy of certain information. Providing the requisite information and certificate is not mere ritual; it is critical to enable the Commonwealth to decide on, and implement, an appropriate course of action with respect to untried charges against a prisoner confined in another State. Because the defendant's pro se motion for a speedy trial in the instant case lacked much of this important information referenced in art. III and was not accompanied by a certificate of inmate status, it failed to comply with the Agreement's requirements. As this case does not require it, we do not consider whether dismissal may be appropriate where a prisoner provides the Commonwealth with all of the information referenced in art. III, including the requisite certificate, but otherwise fails to comply with a technical requirement of the Agreement.

Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Because this case requires that we interpret art. III of the Agreement, we begin with a brief discussion of its provisions. The Agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact entered into by the Federal government, the District of Columbia, and forty-eight States including Massachusetts (St. 1965, c. 892, § 1). Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148-149, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001). Commonwealth v. Wilson, 399 Mass. 455, 459, 504 N.E.2d 1060 (1987). "[T]he Agreement establishes procedures by which one jurisdiction may obtain temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction for the purpose of bringing that prisoner to trial." Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 436 n. 1, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Its stated purpose is to establish "cooperative procedures" in order to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determin[e] ... the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints."¹ St. 1965, c. 892, § 1, art. I. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). The core provisions of the Agreement are art. III and art. IV. Id. These articles establish "two procedures under which the prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged may be transferred to the temporary custody of the receiving State. One of these procedures [set forth in art. III] may be invoked by the prisoner; the other [governed by art. IV is initiated] by the prosecuting attorney of the receiving State." Cuyler v. Adams, supra at 443-444, 101 S.Ct. 703.

Article III "gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State (sending State) the right to request the speedy disposition of any untried charges on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner by another State (receiving State)." Commonwealth v. Martens, 398 Mass. 674, 676, 500 N.E.2d 282 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1982, 95 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987), citing Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 718-719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). See St. 1965, c. 892, § 1, art. II (b) and (c). Article III establishes the precise procedures by which the prisoner must make his request and sets forth the manner in which the request is to be conveyed to the receiving State.² Essentially, in order to initiate the art. III procedures, the prisoner is to give or send the appropriate "notice" and "request" to the warden or other custodial official in the sending State.³ In turn, the custodial officer is responsible for forwarding the prisoner's written notice and request to the appropriate prosecuting official and court in the receiving State, together with a "certificate" of inmate status that includes certain information set forth in art. III (a). See art. III (a) and (b). See also Commonwealth v. Martens, supra at 677, 500 N.E.2d 282. "If the prisoner is not tried on the outstanding charges within 180 days after he has caused the appropriate authorities to be notified of his request for final disposition in accordance with the agreement, the charges are to be dismissed" with prejudice. Id. See Art. V. (c). To facilitate the implementation of the Agreement, and to create uniformity and consistency in carrying out its provisions, States have developed a set of standardized forms for each step in the procedure.⁴ See Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 1283, 1285 n. 2 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 714, 98 L.Ed.2d 664 (1988).

Background. We summarize facts taken from documents in the record (primarily, correspondence between the defendant and the Commonwealth and their pleadings), transcripts of two hearings on the matter, and undisputed claims by the parties. Because the procedural history is central to our resolution of this case, we set it forth in detail.

According to the Commonwealth, while the defendant, Jason Copson, was on probation on a Federal criminal conviction, he and an accomplice broke into a business establishment in Beverly in an apparent attempt to steal computer equipment. The defendant was then indicted by an Essex County grand jury for breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony in violation of G.L. c. 266, § 16. He fled the jurisdiction. As a result of the breaking and entering indictment, the defendant was found to be in violation of his Federal probation, and a Federal arrest warrant issued. He was ultimately arrested in Virginia on October 28, 2003, on the Federal arrest warrant. In December, 2003, the defendant was sentenced to a period of incarceration for the probation violation, and began serving his Federal term of imprisonment at an Alexandria, Virginia, city jail pending transfer to a Federal prison.

On January 2, 2004, the sheriff of Alexandria notified the defendant that the Commonwealth had lodged a detainer on the Essex County charge. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was moved temporarily to the Northern Neck regional jail in Warsaw, Virginia (Warsaw facility), still pending designation to a Federal prison. The defendant asserts that on January 29, 2004, he handed a pro se motion for a speedy trial to two officials at the Warsaw facility, and requested that the warden or commissioner of correction forward the motion "with a certificate as required" by the Agreement to the district attorney and clerk of the Superior Court.⁵ The Virginia authorities apparently took no action with respect to the defendant's motion. The following day, the defendant was removed from the Warsaw facility and transported to the Federal Medical Center at Butner, North Carolina (FMC Butner).

On February 13, 2004, the defendant, through counsel, filed a copy of his motion for a speedy trial (the same motion he allegedly handed to officials at the Warsaw facility) in the clerk-magistrate's office of the Superior Court in Essex County and served a copy of the motion by hand on the district attorney's office in Salem. The defendant's pro se motion referenced the Agreement and contained the defendant's Federal identification number. It requested a final disposition of the Massachusetts indictment and that "the court issue process to bring him before the court as soon as possible and afford him a speedy trial." Although the defendant had been moved to FMC Butner, the motion stated that the defendant "is currently incarcerated as a Federal prisoner, having been sentenced on December 2003, from the Federal Court and ... is currently located in the Northern Neck Regional Jail" in Warsaw, Virginia. Neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth took further action with respect to the pending indictment for the next four months.

On June 18, 2004, the Commonwealth filed a second detainer, this time with FMC Butner, notifying the facility of the pending Massachusetts indictment against the defendant, and setting forth the defendant's speedy trial rights.⁶ On July 6, 2004, the defendant, still in Federal custody at FMC Butner, executed a "Place of Imprisonment" form, including a request for final disposition of the pending Essex County indictment. His request, together with a "Certificate of Inmate Status" form and "Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody" form, were mailed to the district attorney and the Superior Court clerk's office. The district attorney and the clerk's office received the documents on July 12, 2004.

The defendant was first scheduled for arraignment before a Massachusetts court (in Essex County) approximately two...